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RESUMEN EXTENSO 
 
La presente tesis doctoral, "Tres ensayos sobre la liquidez y el contagio", se compone de 
cuatro capítulos. El primer capítulo introductorio contribuye a la finalidad de introducir 
los conceptos básicos de fondo de los tres capítulos siguientes. Más precisamente, se 
explica cómo la literatura fundamental define los conceptos de contagio financiero, 
riesgo de contraparte y riesgo sistémico. El contagio financiero se define en términos 
generales como la transmisión de las dificultades financieras a través de los agentes, 
sectores o regiones de la economía. La literatura distigue diferentes formas de contagio 
financiero, que corresponden a diferentes posibles canales de propagación. Dos tipos 
principales de dificultades financieras pueden propagarse por contagio. Un tipo conduce 
a la insolvencia, es decir, el tipo de defecto que se produce cuando el valor de los 
activos cae por debajo del valor de los pasivos o, equivalentemente, cuando el capital se 
vuelve negativo. El otro tipo de problema financiero implica la falta de liquidez. A 
continuación, se introduce cómo la literatura aplica teorías de redes y técnicas 
desarrolladas en las matemáticas y la física teórica para estudiar el contagio y el riesgo 
sistémico en los sistemas financieros. Los sistemas financieros modernos exhiben un 
alto grado de interdependencia. Existen diferentes fuentes de conexiones entre las 
instituciones financieras, derivadas tanto de la parte del activo como del pasivo de su 
balance. Los bancos están conectados directamente a través de las exposiciones 
recíprocas adquiridas en el mercado interbancario. Del mismo modo, tener carteras 
similares o compartir la misma masa de depositantes crea vínculos indirectos entre 
instituciones financieras. Pensado como un conjunto de nodos y enlaces entre los nodos, 
las redes pueden ser una representación útil de los sistemas financieros. Al proporcionar 
medios para modelar las interacciones económicas, el análisis de redes puede explicar 
ciertos fenómenos económicos. El uso de las teorías de red puede enriquecer la 
comprensión de los sistemas financieros. Introducimos algunas direcciones recientes en 
las redes financieras relativas a las sinergias creadas a partir de la aplicación de la teoría 
de redes para responder a cuestiones financieras sobre el tema del riesgo sistémico. En 
este contexto, se plantean dos preguntas: cómo de resistentes son las redes financieras al 
contagio, y cómo las instituciones financieras forman conexiones cuando se exponen al 
riesgo de contagio.  
En el segundo capítulo se revisan los modelos de riesgo de crédito y los modelos de 
riesgo de contraparte y contagio y su aplicación en la gestión del riesgo de crédito, y se 
comparan los dos tipos principales de modelos en la literatura que tratan de describir los 
procesos predeterminados para las obligaciones de deuda y otros instrumentos 
financieros que son "defaultable" (que son susceptibles de incumplimiento); estos 
modelos normalmente se conocen como modelos estructurales y de forma (o intensidad) 
reducida. Al hacer esto, ponemos énfasis en sus principales diferencias y posibles 
conjunciones y aspectos comunes. Además, se discuten los desafíos y posibles 
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progresos a ser alcanzados al reducir la distancia entre los modelos estructurales y de 
forma reducida en modelar el riesgo de contraparte y riesgo de crédito, sobre todo 
dentro de una perspectiva basada en la información, al estilo de Jarrow y Protter (2004). 
Esta perspectiva permite hacer más fácil la comparación entre los dos enfoques y 
también es una buena fuente de creación de una nueva corriente de literatura que es 
capaz de incorporar y reconciliar ambos enfoques dentro de los modelos híbridos, con el 
fin de conseguir mejoras en la evaluación de la contraparte y el riesgo crediticio. En 
ambas corrientes separadas de la literatura, el objetivo principal es la predicción por 
defecto; por tanto el debate entre los modelos debería naturalmente concentrarse en él. 
Una visión unitaria de los dos enfoques debería considerar las dos corrientes de modelos 
como la misma, pero utilizando diferentes supuestos acerca de la información 
disponible para el modelador. Desde el punto de vista informativo, los modelos 
estructurales suponen un conocimiento completo (muy detallado y de información 
continua), cerrados a la de la visibilidad de los gerentes. La implicación principal es que 
este tipo de modelo es muy apropiado para los ámbitos internos y también para los 
reguladores (en el caso de los bancos comerciales). Para aclarar esto, se considera que 
es evidente que para las necesidades internas los modelos más apropiados deberían 
utilizar tanta información disponible para los administradores como sea posible; la 
pregunta sigue siendo "¿Por qué los reguladores podrían (y deberían) utilizar modelos 
estructurales?". La respuesta es "Porque tienen derecho, por ley, (y acceso) a casi la 
misma información que los "insiders" (gerentes), por lo que deberían beneficiarse de 
esta situación". Además, en el análisis de los modelos estructurales, también hay que 
tener en cuenta un punto débil: si no se permiten saltos, el tiempo predeterminado es 
predecible, o en otras palabras, en teoría sugieren una propagación de cero a corto 
plazo, lo cual contradice el comportamiento empíricamente observado. Por otra parte, 
los modelos de forma reducida presuponen un conocimiento de un conjunto de 
información menos detallada, como el observado (imitando) por el mercado (los 
inversores). La principal consecuencia es que el tiempo predeterminado es 
impredecible. La información de mercado debería tenerse  en cuenta, y, en 
consecuencia, los modelos reducidos son importantes en vigor de razones realistas. 
Cuando los precios – y por tanto la evolución de las empresas - son determinados, en 
equilibrio, en el mercado, se sienten atraídos por los agentes que conocen (la mayoría de 
ellos) sólo información pública. Por ejemplo, el proceso de valor de activos no es 
observable a los "outsiders", más exactamente se observa de forma discontinua; cuando 
la empresa revela información contable y otros temas relevantes. Este punto de vista 
hace que los modelos de forma reducida sean muy apropiados para la fijación de precios 
y la cobertura de riesgos de crédito. Para un análisis correcto de estos modelos también 
hay que tener en cuenta un gran problema que inducen, comparando con la primera 
corriente: ahora el valor predeterminado se plantea de forma exógena, no endógena, al 
igual que en los modelos estructurales (llamados por esta característica modelos de 
causa-efecto). Esto también se contradice con la realidad, ya que los modelos de forma 
reducida asumían que el incumplimiento financiero no está relacionado en absoluto con 
las características de las empresas, lo que es claramente un defecto de estos modelos. La 
intuición detrás de la perspectiva de la reconciliación surge como una forma de mejorar 
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las corrientes separadas anteriores, y también para tener en cuenta sus puntos débiles y 
para encontrar la manera de tratar con ellos. Básicamente, el objetivo es poner en 
práctica modelos que debería ser más realistas desde el punto de vista general del 
"outsider", que tratan con información incompleta o al menos con supuestos relajados 
sobre información completa, donde el incumplimiento financiero debería ser 
impredecible, pero también endógenamente influenciado. El desarrollo reciente del 
tema puede ser una explicación de la complejidad e importancia de estos modelos, pero 
también puede sugerir que muchas cosas acerca de estos modelos no fueron reveladas 
hasta ahora. Los modelos de conciliación o híbridos deberían estar dirigidos a relajar el 
supuesto de conocimiento de información completa, de tal manera que a partir de los 
modelos estructurales con valores predeterminados predecibles para obtener modelos de 
tasa de riesgo con un valor predeterminado inaccesible. Duffie y Lando (2001), 
Giesecke y Goldberg (2004) y Cetin et al. (2004) representan tres enfoques diferentes 
con el fin de conciliar los dos enfoques principales. El modelo de Duffie y Lando 
(2001) es muy similar a los modelos de primer paso (el tiempo predeterminado es fijado 
por los gerentes para la maximización del valor de las acciones de las empresas). Los 
inversores están recibiendo informes contables periódicos e imperfectos, y hacen 
inferencias acerca de la evolución de la empresa sobre la base de estos informes, y 
añadiendo, obviamente, sus creencias (ruido). El punto crucial del artículo es que, a 
pesar de que comience más como un modelo estructural, se puede asegurar un el 
incumplimiento financiero impredecible, al igual que los modelos de forma reducida. La 
explicación de este importante cambio del tiempo de parada de predecible a 
impredecible es que entre los tiempos de observación, el inversor no puede ver la 
evolución de los activos. Giesecke y Goldberg (2004) asumen, de acuerdo con los 
modelos estructurales, un valor del activo continuamente observado. En su enfoque 
también se introduce el ruido, pero la forma es bastante diferente: el punto de quiebra es 
una curva al azar, más exactamente con distribución beta, con la altura expresada en 
términos de apalancamiento de la empresa. La explicación detrás de esto es bastante 
intuitiva: cuando el ratio de apalancamiento es en una reciente alta, entonces la 
incertidumbre a corto plazo es alta también. El modelador no puede ver la curva, que es 
independiente del modelo estructural subyacente, por lo que el tiempo predeterminado 
depende de una curva no observable, por lo tanto es inaccesible. De esta forma se 
resuelve el problema de la previsibilidad de los modelos estructurales. El modelo de 
Cetin et al. (2004) se puede ver como un enfoque alternativo de los dos anteriores. Los 
autores, en lugar de añadir ruido a la información oscura (obscure information) como 
en Duffie y Lando (2001), comienzan también con un modelo estructural, pero con el 
modelador de filtración G para ser una sub-filtración estricta de la que disponen los 
gerentes (incompleta, pero información correcta). El tiempo predeterminado es la 
primera vez, después de que los flujos de caja están por debajo de cero, cuando el flujo 
de caja se mantiene por debajo de cero durante un cierto tiempo y luego se duplica en 
magnitud absoluta. De esta forma se obtiene un tiempo predeterminado totalmente 
inaccesible, y el proceso (point process) tiene intensidad, por lo que este es un modelo 
de riesgo basado en la intensidad. Cualquier modelo estructural con información 
incompleta admite una tendencia de precios, pero no todos admiten intensidad. La 
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imprevisibilidad de incumplimiento es una condición necesaria, pero no suficiente, para 
que la tendencia de precios admita intensidad. Además, el nivel de información 
determina si el modelo admite intensidad: cuando no hay certeza, no hay intensidad. 
Entonces, partiendo de un modelo estructural, y relajando en diferentes grados los 
supuestos de información, Giesecke y Goldberg (2004), considerando el modelo 
estructural con la información completa acerca de los activos y punto de quiebra como 
punto de partida el más "completo" en términos de cantidad y calidad de la información 
disponible, nótese que si se supone una información incompleta acerca de una barrera, 
se puede calcular la tendencia de precios en términos de la función de distribución para 
la barrera y el valor histórico de los activos observable. Aquí tendencia de precios no 
admite una intensidad de defecto. Si se supone información incompleta tanto de activo 
como barrera, la tendencia de precios admite una representación de la intensidad. Un 
hallazgo importante es que, en algunas condiciones particulares, sin tener en cuenta que 
la "default barrier" es observable o no, un modelo estructural con información 
incompleta de activos admite una representación de la intensidad. Así que no hay 
ganancia para un modelador de la reconciliación por relajar en la parte de la barrera; 
también la existencia de intensidad, si es necesario en un modelo en particular, está 
asegurada. Otro marco para desarrollar un modelo de reconciliación deseable podría ser 
empezar al revés, es decir, con el enfoque de modelos reducidos. Aquí el modelador 
sólo conoce partes discretas y perfectas de información (informes de contabilidad en el 
momento que son revelados, información pública acerca de la empresa, también en el 
corto plazo después de revelar). Él tiene que hacer inferencias para los períodos en los 
que no dispone de información. Por esa razón, el modelador puede utilizar la teoría y 
fórmulas desarrolladas para los modelos de forma reducida, pero debe ponderar de 
forma diferente la información, confiando más en lo que él sabe perfectamente (por un 
periodo corto de tiempo) y menos en la parte inferida, ya que es alterado con sus propias 
creencias e inferencias. 
En el tercer capítulo se analizan los efectos de crédito comercial en las decisiones de 
inversión de una empresa restringida financieramente en un sector manufacturero, con 
particular referencia a un contexto de turbulencias financieras y  racionamiento del 
crédito. La evidencia empírica muestra que la tasa de interés implícita en un contrato de 
crédito comercial es en general muy alta en comparación con las tasas de crédito 
bancario. A pesar de este aparente alto costo, el crédito comercial es ampliamente 
utilizado y representa una proporción importante de las finanzas de las empresas. El 
crédito comercial crea riesgo sistémico pero, al mismo tiempo, aumenta la resistencia de 
las empresas a los shocks de liquidez y, a través de la flexibilidad de los plazos de 
amortización, afecta positivamente a las decisiones de inversión de inventario y, en 
consecuencia, los niveles de producción e ingresos futuros esperados. Estas 
características del crédito comercial se investigan con el objetivo de caracterizar sus 
efectos sobre la financiación de la inversión en inventario de las empresas con 
restricciones de liquidez. Con este fin, hemos presentado un modelo multifactorial de 
una empresa que maximiza el beneficio sujeto a las restricciones de crédito bancarias y 
con tres fuentes de financiación: la auto-financiación, crédito bancario y crédito 
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comercial. El modelo es capaz de captar el efecto del seguro de crédito comercial, es 
decir, la cobertura de seguro contra el riesgo de liquidez implícitos en los contratos de 
crédito comercial, gracias a la cual una empresa financieramente restringida que sufre 
de una escasez de liquidez puede mantener un nivel de inversión de inventario esperado 
(y, como en consecuencia, un futuro nivel de producción esperado) lo más cerca posible 
al nivel óptimo deseado. Medimos el efecto del seguro de crédito comercial mediante la 
caracterización de los efectos de un shock de liquidez exógeno en las decisiones de 
inversión y futuro nivel esperado de producción de una empresa financieramente 
restringido en una cadena de suministro manufacturera, bajo el supuesto de que su 
proveedor está dispuesto a conceder una prórroga de pago de una parte de la deuda 
comercial. La solución del problema de inversión óptima muestra que, bajo limitaciones 
financieros actuales y futuras previstas, el importe del crédito comercial actual y futura 
disponible afecta a las decisiones de inversión. Debido a este efecto de seguro, el crédito 
comercial es una fuente óptima de financiación para una empresa financieramente 
restringida bajo  una futura escasez de liquidez esperada. Entonces mediante el uso de 
condiciones de optimización de la modalidad de análisis y derivando una ecuación de 
inventarios de forma reducida, proponemos un marco empírico con el fin de probar 
conjeturas e implicaciones del modelo analítico. Se lleva a cabo un conjunto de 
regresiones econométricas sobre una muestra de empresas manufactureras italianas. La 
muestra se obtiene del conjunto de datos AIDA (Empresa Italiana de Información e 
Inteligencia de Negocios), provista por la Bureau Van Dijk: está constituido por 1 
millón de pequeñas y medianas empresas en Italia durante un período de diez años. Los 
resultados del análisis empírico se dibujarán en la próxima versión de este artículo.  
El cuarto capítulo es un artículo que estudia los efectos que dos características de la 
topología de una red financiera, es decir sus grados de conectividad y de centralización, 
tienen en la respuesta de la red a los choques externos que pueden generar fenómenos 
de "default contagion". Presentamos algunas conjeturas acerca de tales efectos, 
conjeturas basadas en algunos resultados analíticos que arrojan algo de luz sobre la 
exposición al riesgo sistémico de tres clases muy estilizadas de redes: i) redes 
completas, que son las más conectadas; ii) redes circulares (también conocidas como 
"ruedas"), que son las redes menos conectadas y menos centralizadas; y iii) las redes en 
forma de estrella, que son las redes menos conectadas y más centralizadas. Se conjetura 
que cuanto más conectada es una red, más muestra un carácter robusto aunque frágil, en 
el sentido de que es completamente resistente a shocks relativamente pequeñas pero está 
expuesto al riesgo de una fusión total (el incumplimiento financiero de todos los agentes 
de la red) si es golpeado por shocks suficientemente grandes. También conjeturar que la 
centralización de una red financiera tiene los mismos efectos: cuanto más centralizada 
es una red, más sólida aunque frágil será. A la inversa, conjeturar que una red dispersa y 
descentralizada, como las redes circulares, tiene la característica opuesta: cuanto más 
dispersa y descentralizada es una red, tendrá una naturaleza más vulnerable aunque 
resistente, en el sentido de que está expuesta a episodios de contagio local debido a 
shocks relativamente pequeños, mientras que se a un riesgo pequeño de contagio 
completo. Más precisamente: i) la conectividad completa así como la máxima 
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centralización hacen una red robusta y sin embargo frágil, en el sentido de que estos 
tipos de redes tienen un único umbral de contagio: para choques más pequeños que ese 
umbral, no hay defaults (incumplimientos financieros) secundarios, mientras que para 
los choques más grandes que ese umbral todos los miembros de la red entran en estado 
de default; y, a la inversa, ii) la red con conectividad mínima y centralización mínima se 
caracteriza por una gran diferencia entre los primeros y últimos umbrales de contagio, 
por lo tanto, muestra un comportamiento vulnerable sin embargo resistente: se expone a 
episodios de contagio local debido a shocks relativamente pequeños mientras que es 
resistente con respecto a grandes shocks. Por otra parte, conjeturamos que estos efectos 
de centralización y conectividad se aplican a la red genérica de una manera que es 
proporcional a su grado de densidad y centralización. Para probar estas conjeturas, 
corremos simulaciones numéricas en redes generadas al azar con diversos grados de 
conectividad y centralización. Los resultados obtenidos confirman nuestras conjeturas. 
Hemos probado las conjeturas de los efectos de la conectividad mediante la ejecución 
de simulaciones de la clase de redes regulares, donde todos los nodos tienen el mismo 
grado de centralidad, por lo tanto, la centralización se mantiene a cero. Obtenemos que, 
a medida que aumenta la densidad, las redes se vuelven progresivamente más robusto 
aunque frágiles: el primer y último umbrales de contagio convergen al umbral único de 
la configuración pura en forma de estrella de una manera cuasi-monotónica. Del mismo 
modo, hemos probado los efectos de la centralización en una clase de redes con 
conectividad constante y casi mínimo, pasando de las redes circulares hacia las redes en 
forma de estrella. Nos encontramos con que la brecha entre el primero y el último 
umbral de contagio disminuye a medida que nos movemos de redes dispersas y 
descentralizadas hacia las redes dispersas y altamente centralizados, lo cual demuestra 
que las características vulnerables pero elásticos de las redes circulares es reemplazado 
progresivamente por la naturaleza robusta sin embargo frágil de la red en forma de 
estrella muy centralizado. También en estas pruebas, la convergencia del primera y 
último umbral hacia el umbral único de la red en estrella es cuasi-monotónica. 
Curiosamente, nuestros resultados muestran que el patrón del primer umbral en la 
primera serie de experimentos es claramente convexo, mientras que el patrón del mismo 
umbral en el segundo conjunto de experimentos es claramente cóncavo. Todo lo 
contrario se aplica a la estructura del umbral contagio final: en las simulaciones 
destinadas a probar los efectos de la conectividad, el umbral final muestra un patrón 
cóncavo, mientras que, en las simulaciones que ponen a prueba los efectos de la 
centralización, el umbral final tiene un patrón cuidadosamente convexo. Este resultado 
indica que los efectos del aumento de la conectividad, en la prestación de una red 
robusta aunque frágil, se convirtió en notable a partir de niveles relativamente bajos de 
conectividad. Por el contrario, el aumento de la centralización, que también hace que 
una red sea cada vez más robusta y sin embargo frágil, produce efectos evidentes sólo 
para valores altos de centralización. En otras palabras, las pérdidas debidas a shocks 
exógenos se distribuyen entre los miembros de una red de una forma aún - generando el 
fenómeno robusto y sin embargo frágil - partiendo de niveles relativamente bajos de 
densidad. Por el contrario, el aumento de la centralización proporciona el mismo efecto 
pero sólo para altos niveles de centralización. 
Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
Andrea TOTO
february 2016
Abstract
This paper is the rst introductory chapter of the PhD thesis "Three Essays
on Liquidity and Contagion". It serves the aim to introduce the basic background
concepts of the subsequent three chapters. More precisely, we explain how the es-
sential literature denes the concepts of nancial contagion, counterparty risk and
systemic risk. Financial contagion is broadly dened as the transmission of nancial
distress across agents, sectors or regions of the economy. The literature has dis-
tinguished among dierent forms of nancial contagion, corresponding to dierent
possible channels of propagation. Two major kinds of nancial distress can spread
by contagion. One kind leads to insolvency, i.e. the kind of default that occurs when
the value of assets drops below the value of liabilities or, equivalently, when capi-
tal becomes negative. The other kind of nancial distress involves illiquidity. Then
we introduce how the literature applies network theories and techniques developed in
mathematics and theoretical physics to study contagion and systemic risk in nancial
systems. Modern nancial systems exhibit a high degree of interdependence. There
are dierent possible sources of connections between nancial institutions, stemming
from both the asset and the liability side of their balance sheet. Banks are directly
connected through mutual exposures acquired on the interbank market. Likewise,
holding similar portfolios or sharing the same mass of depositors creates indirect
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linkages between nancial institutions. Thought as a collection of nodes and links
between nodes, networks can be a useful representation of nancial systems. By pro-
viding means to model economic interactions, network analysis can explain certain
economic phenomena. The use of network theories can enrich the understanding of
nancial systems. We introduce some recent addresses in nancial networks concern-
ing the synergies created from applying network theory to answer nancial questions
about the issue of systemic risk. In this context, two questions arise: how resilient
nancial networks are to contagion, and how nancial institutions form connections
when exposed to the risk of contagion.
Keywords: nancial contagion { credit risk { counterparty risk { credit conta-
gion { credit risk models { nancial networks - trade credit
1 Contagion
The word "contagion", applied in a nancial context, suggests that nancial contagion
is analogous to the spread of disease, and that damaging nancial crises may be better
understood by bringing to bear ideas that have been developed to understand the break-
down of other complex systems in our world. It also suggests that the aim of systemic
risk management is similar to a primary aim of epidemiology, namely to identify situations
when contagion danger is high, and then make targeted interventions to damp out the
risk. Contagion, meaning the transmission of a disease by direct or indirect contact, is an
appropriate term for the damaging eects that can be transmitted through the interbank
network.
Financial contagion is broadly dened as the transmission of nancial distress across
agents, sectors or regions of the economy. The literature has distinguished among three
dierent forms of nancial contagion, also known as systemic risk, corresponding to dif-
ferent possible channels of propagation1: 1) Informational contagion, that can occur in
banking systems,where depositors'expectations about the possibility of a crisis can lead to
bank runs, and in imperfectly informed nancial markets, where "bad news" can aect
the sentiments of the traders; 2) Direct contagion transmitted via networks of nancial
obligations. In banking and nancial systems, such networks arises from three sources: i)
loans and deposits in the interbank money market, ii) "over-the-counter" trading in assets
and derivatives, and iii) payment systems; while, in the manufacturing sector, networks of
1See the review articles by Dow (2000) and by De Bandt-Hartmann (2000).
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nancial obligations arise from trade credit.2 3) Common exposure to losses in the value of
assets, losses that can be exogenous or endogenous to a nancial network, the latter being
the case of re sales of illiquid assets induced by liquidity shortages.
Modelling credit risk in a coherent yet applicable manner is an important yet challenging
problem. The diculties arise from the combination of a large, and co-dependent set of
risk parameters such as default rates, recovery rates, or exposures, which are correlated and
non-stationary in time. Credit contagion examines the role of counterparty risk in credit
risk modelling. If a rm is in economic distress, or defaults, this will have implications for
any rm which is economically inuenced by this given rm, for example, a service provider
to it, purchaser of its goods or a bank with a credit line to the rm. The direct correlations
between rms caused by credit contagion lead to further complications in modelling the
overall, either portfolio or economy wide, level of risk. One must also distinguish contagion
from correlation, and counterparty contagion from other kinds of contagion.
The counterparty risk is an element of credit contagion: in other words, it produces
systemic eects that must be taken into account in assessing credit risk. Credit risk is one of
the most analyzed market risk components and it's very dicult to quantify it in a reliable
way. Credit risk measurement and management models have become more important in
recent years in the process of risk management for nancial institutions. Traditionally
the problem has been addressed through the application of actuarial methods based on
historical data; but as recent empirical studies have demonstrated that counterparty risk
is able to produce signicant systemic eects on credit risk, they have highlighted the
inadequacy of the traditional standard credit risk models, because they fail to consider
and capture the credit contagion phenomenon.
The notion of counterparty risk has been introduced by Jarrow and Yu (2001) and
afterwards has been considered both in reduced form models (see Giesecke, 2003, Frey and
Backhaus, 2004) and in structural models (see Eglo, Leippold and Vanini, 2007, Giesecke,
2004). Moreover, the counterparty risk may be taken into consideration also in binomial-
type models for the credit risk of portfolios of nancial positions, as has been made by
Davis and Lo (2001) and Giesecke and Weber (2004).
The literature on counterparty contagion is broad and includes mathematical treat-
ments of random graphs, interacting particle systems, and Markov processes, but also -
nancial theorizations about balance sheet constraints and haircuts in collateralized lending,
2see Kiyotaki-Moore (2001, 2002)
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and also empirical studies of data provided by banking regulators. Counterparty contagion
comprises a family of phenomena. There are dierent kinds of counterparty relationships,
and multiple distresses that a rm can transmit to its counterparty.
Credit events tend to cluster in times of economic stress, forcing banks to recognize
disproportionately many defaults in recessions. This is due to two reasons. First, the prof-
itability of rms depends on common macro-economic variables, such as economic growth,
leading to an increase in default rates when macroeconomic conditions are poor. Second,
rms are directly linked with each other through business relations. The default of a
large customer or supplier, for instance, will adversely aect the credit position of a rm,
which may then default and in turn inuence its customers and suppliers. Such a direct
dependency of defaults is referred to as credit contagion. Both mechanisms underlying clus-
tering of defaults have received considerable attention in the credit risk literature for more
than a decade; see (Davis, Lo, 2001) and (Frey, Backhaus, 2003), (Rogge, Schonbucher,
2003), (Giesecke, Weber, 2004), (Neu,Kuhn, 2004), (Hatchett, Kuhn, 2006, 2009), (Eglo,
Leippold, Vanini, 2007). Evidence suggests that the dependence on common factors can
by itself not explain observed levels of correlation, and that credit contagion, possibly in
conjunction with the eect of further unobserved macro-economic covariates | so-called
frailty | is important to explain the data .
Clustering of Defaults means that multiple defaults can occur at the same time. Clus-
tering can occur within or across industries via common shocks to cash ows, or via coun-
terparty eects, which arises from trade credit between industrial partners or from lending
by nancial institutions. The clustering in default correlations is sometimes called \credit
contagion". Sources of default clustering are: i) common risk factors (correlation among
rms): ii) contagion due to nancial connection (trade credit between industrial partners
or from lending by nancial institutions). Unexplained default clustering is a major issue
for traditional credit risk models because it generates greater dispersion, or fatter tails, in
the distribution of credit losses. This implies a greater likelihood of large losses and an
understatement of economic capital. This could lead to a greater number of bank failures
in periods of stress, or losses on CDOs that exceed worst estimates.
Correlation in multiple factor eects, or industry factors, is a source of default cluster-
ing. When a rms defaults, other rms in the same industry could suer from contagion
eects, reecting shocks to cash ows that are common to that industry. Examining rms
within the same industry, Lang and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang (2007) present
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evidence that industry peers are negatively aected by a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, creating
higher correlation within the industry.
As important channel of credit contagion, the counterparty credit risk is a completely
dierent factor, compared to common risk factors. This arises when the default of one
rm causes nancial distress for its creditors. In an extreme case, this can push a cred-
itor toward default as well. This in turn can lead to a cascade of other defaults. Such
interactions are particularly worrisome for nancial institutions, given their intricate web
of relationships. This channel is very dierent from industry or factor eects. It requires
detailed information about counterparty exposures. Counterparty risk aects the shape of
the default distribution, thus providing a potential explanation for the observed default
clustering.
For industrial rms, most exposures take the form of trade credit, dened as direct
lending in a supplier-customer relationship. For nancial rms, exposures take the form of
loans or bonds and are generally larger in money amounts than for industrial creditors, but
less so in relative terms, when considering the larger balance sheets of nancial creditors3.
Counterparty risk is likely to be smaller for nancial rms as lenders or bondholders for a
number of reasons. First, banks impose limits on the amount of lending to one borrower
and are forced to diversify by regulators. Secondly, there are other mechanisms that can
help mitigate risk. Financial institutions have the power to choose whom they lend to, in
contrast to trade credit, which is generally involuntary. Thirdly, bank loans are generally
secured, leading to higher recovery rates than unsecured debt. In contrast, the bankruptcy
of a debtor subjects an industrial rm to a double penalty, loss of trade credit and loss
of valuable customer relationship. Therefore, the direct counterparty eects should be
stronger for an industrial counterparty than for a nancial institution.
1.1 Contagion and Correlation
Contagion must be distinguished from correlation, and counterparty contagion from other
kinds of contagion. More precisely, contagion is distinguished from correlation between
rms that does not feature a causal link; counterparty contagion as mediated by various
kinds of bilateral deals is distinguished from other forms of contagion that are intermediated
by markets. It is a well established principle that correlation is not causation. Contagion is
a form of causation: the default of one rm contributes to the default of another rm, via
3In Jorion, Zhang (2009) sample, the average exposure for nancial institutions is 0.16% of equity.
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contagion. Contagion is one of the phenomena that can yield correlation among defaults.
Exposure to common risk factors is another such phenomenon. Common risk factors and
contagion are both phenomena that can cause correlated defaults, i.e. multiple defaults in
the absence of any direct causal link between those defaults.
Contagion between asset markets during nancial crises is dened as the transmission
of shocks via newly opened channels associated with crisis events. Contagion eects may be
evidenced as increased correlation, or as lower correlation consistent with breaking linkages
between nancial institutions as proposed in network theory; see Allen and Babus (2008).
Contagion, as dened in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), means signicant increases in
cross-market comovements, while any continued market correlation at high levels is con-
sidered to be interdependence (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002): it implies that the existence of
contagion must involve evidence of a dynamic increment in correlations.
Default correlations are the most important drivers of the tails of portfolio credit risk
distributions. Empirically, default correlations are positive, and this positive correlation
increases portfolio risk. Default correlations cannot be measured directly, and must be
inferred from a model. Higher default correlations imply greater probabilities of extreme
losses on the portfolio.
Correlation involves exposure to common risk factors. This type of correlation is source
of contagion. But contagion can cause correlation in default events.
1.2 Types of contagion
Two major kinds of nancial distress can spread by contagion. One kind leads to insolvency,
which is the kind of default that occurs when the value of assets drops below the value of
liabilities; equivalently, when capital, which is the dierence between the values of assets
and liabilities, becomes negative. The other kind of nancial distress involves illiquidity.
Firms must meet their currently due liabilities using their liquid assets, those that can be
readily converted into currency. Default occurs when a rm's liquid assets are insucient to
meet its currently due liabilities. Either kind of nancial distress can spread by aecting a
rm's assets or its liabilities. There are multiple channels of contagion, some direct between
counterparties, and some indirect, mediated by markets and information.
Contagion spreads directly between counterparties when a distressed rm imposes losses
on its creditors, or when a distressed rm withdraws funding from its borrowers. Within the
nancial system, losses are transmitted from the liability side of a defaulting rm's balance
6
sheet to the asset side of its creditors' balance sheets. This phenomenon can involve insol-
vency or illiquidity. Often, the liabilities considered were only interbank loans, but other
securities, including derivative securities, have been considered too. A closely related line
of research studies counterparty contagion of insolvency among industrial rms, including
trade credit and contracts in the supply chain. The supply chain has some unique features:
for example, Battiston et al. (2007) consider among the eects of counterparty contagion
the decrease in prots due to losing a supplier or customer. Research on counterparty con-
tagion of illiquidity in the payments system began some years ago. This type of contagion
is similar to that which travels from obligor to creditor, except that the money that ought
to be paid is primarily that of the banks' customers. A rather dierent phenomenon is
when the distress of a lender is transmitted to the liability side of its borrowers' balance
sheets. A lender may refuse to roll over a maturing loan for various reasons. For example,
it may need to reduce the risk of its asset portfolio due to prudential considerations or
regulatory constraints, or it may need to shrink its balance sheet or hoard liquidity due
to present or anticipated demands on its liquidity. A lender may fail to perform on a line
of credit due to a shortage of liquidity. Thus, in a market environment in which funding
is scarce, nancial distress can travel from the lender to a borrower that does not receive
the funding it expected. Contagion arises when this distress makes the borrower in turn
unwilling or unable to extend credit to its own borrowers.
There is a form of contagion between counterparties that is indirect, mediated by in-
formation. Market participants may believe that the distress of one rm is likely to cause
as-yet-undisclosed distress to its creditors, and consequently become less willing to lend to
the creditors of the distressed rm. In this case, the creditors suer counterparty contagion,
even though the distressed rm has transmitted no losses directly to them.
Indirect channels allow several other types of contagion to spread between rms that
are not counterparties. One is a general phenomenon of information-driven contagion via
funding liquidity, akin to the case of funding lost by counterparties of a distressed rm.
Firms that are similar to a distressed rm can also be perceived as less creditworthy, on the
grounds that they are likely to experience similar trouble soon. Another channel involves
the imperfect liquidity of asset markets. The sale of assets by one rm can impair the
ability of other rms to sell the same assets and cause their price to drop, as the pool of
available buyers is depleted, and motivated sellers drive down prices to nd more buyers.
This makes possible market-mediated contagion via asset portfolios: a rm that responds to
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distress by selling some of its assets drives down their prices and thus causes losses to other
rms that hold the same assets. Collateralized lending is a third channel. Contagion can
spread among rms that use the same assets as collateral for borrowing, in a phenomenon
that combines funding liquidity and asset-market liquidity.
These types of contagion exist when market participants have faith in probabilistic
models and act rationally. When they do not, further types of contagion are possible.
As described by Krishnamurthy (2010), market participants face Knightian uncertainty,
meaning that there is not enough information to quantify risks condently by probabili-
ties. Because market participants' probabilistic models are unreliable, when new evidence
suggests that the models are awed, market participants may suddenly adopt a more risk-
averse posture as they become unwilling to trust their models. This can create contagion
through channels described above: market participants who become more risk-averse sell
risky assets, causing abnormal declines in their prices, causing more market participants
to doubt their models and become more risk-averse; rms experiencing nancial distress
contribute to a general opinion that the scope of nancial distress may exceed what is
likely under normal conditions, causing potential lenders to doubt their models and reduce
the amount of funding they provide, causing more nancial distress. Herd behavior creates
another channel of contagion. When market participants lose trust in their own models,
they may base their behavior more on what they observe that others are doing, leading to
herd behavior. This is a mechanism for the contagion of panic, leading to such crisis phe-
nomena as the collapse of markets for commercial paper or various asset-backed securities.
Related to this, there is an econophysics literature devoted to analyzing phenomena such
as bubbles and crashes (Kaizoji, 2000) and contagion (Kaizoji, 2001) using models of in-
teracting particle systems, in which particles are nancial agents and interactions take the
form of emulation. Samanidou et al. (2007) review econophysics research on agent-based
models.
1.3 Models of Counterparty Contagion
Models of counterparty contagion can be visualized in terms of a network of rms or banks.
The interbank market is interpreted as a network where banks are nodes and the claims
and liabilities between banks dene the links. This allows us to apply methods from general
network theory. In other terms, the main feature of the nancial network is a graph whose
nodes represent rms or banks and whose edges represent counterparty relationships. In
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most models, the edges are directed, representing the direction in which contagion travels,
e.g., from obligor to creditor. The edges may also be weighted, representing the magnitude
of the counterparty relationship and its propensity to transmit contagion.
Recent years have witnessed technical advances in portfolio credit risk models, in theory
allowing nancial institutions to measure their distribution of their potential credit losses
at the top level of the institution. Such information can be used to infer economic capital,
which is the amount of equity capital the institution should carry to absorb a large loss
over a specied horizon with a high condence level. These credit models have been in
widespread use in the nancial industry, and they constitute the basis for the Basel II
regulatory capital charges for commercial banks4.
The calibration of these models is notoriously dicult. This is in large part because
default correlations cannot be directly measured for specic obligors. Instead, default cor-
relations are modeled indirectly, typically using a reduced-form model of default intensity
or a structural model of the value of the rm based on a Gaussian copula. Standard
models typically assume a factor structure, where correlations are induced by a common
factor that can be interpreted as the state of the economy, plus possibly other factors.
More precisely, factor models: i) need to simplify the correlation matrix; ii) generate joint
movements in defaults; iii) defaults are driven by common risk factors (common negative
shocks to cash ows); iv) conditional on these common factors, defaults are independent
The Basel II regulatory capital charges are based on such factor models. This common
feature largely explains why recent comparative studies of industry portfolio models show
remarkable similarities in their outputs, or measures of economic capital. As reported,
in Das et al. (2007), however, such models do not fully capture the clustering in default
correlations, sometimes called \credit contagion".
Inside the factor models approach, while structural models generate correlations in
asset values from equity data and infer default correlations from movements in asset value
below thresholds, reduced-form models generate correlations between defaults by allowing
hazard rates to be stochastic and correlated with macroeconomic variables. Structural
models of counterparty contagion involve modeling some quantitative details of the nodes
and ows on the network, e.g., rms' balance sheets and losses incurred on loans between
4The Basel II rules impose minimum levels of capital that commercial banks have to hold to guard
against credit and other risks. The credit risk charge roughly corresponds to the worst credit loss over a
one-year horizon at the 99.9 percent level of condence.
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rms. They model the causes, mechanism, and consequences of defaults. Correlated
defaults emerge from the mechanism when the nancial system is subjected to stochastic
shocks. Reduced-form models avoid these details and directly provide a stochastic model
of correlated defaults.
Structural models vary according to the type and channel of contagion they represent.
The most commonly studied case is contagion spreading from borrower to lender, trans-
mitting insolvency. In the graph, directed edges represent loans, pointing from borrowers
to lenders. A structural model of solvency compares assets to liabilities and determines
the contagious defaults that follow as a consequence of the fundamental defaults. Inside
this branch, we mention:
1. Cascade models. The aim is to capture the domino eect: the default of one rm
can directly cause the default of its creditor, and thus indirectly cause the default of
its creditor's creditor. In cascade models, defaulted rms are like fallen dominoes:
once a rm defaults, what happens to it no longer depends on what happens to other
rms. For this reason, cascade models do not suce to model the severity of defaults.
Among cascade models, we mention Amini et al. (2010), Battiston et al. (2009), Gai
and Kapadia (2010), and Nier et al. (2007)5
2. Clearing models. Clearing models of solvency allow more verisimilitude in model-
ing the severity of defaults and magnitude of losses, and they allow for endogenous
recovery rates. They deal with the cycle by computing "clearing" vectors of asset
values and recovery rates, which are as high as possible, given the defaults that can
not be avoided.
In reduced form-models the objects of study and modeling are the default and the
hazard rate of default. In these models, contagion causes distress, a state in which a rm's
hazard rate of default is elevated. Inside the reduced-form approach, we mention:
1. Default Contagion Models. In this models there is no cascade of contagion: conta-
gious defaults can not spread any further contagion. In continuous time, it features
default clustering, e.g. multiple defaults can occur at the same time because of com-
mon risk factors6. These models are not able to incorporate contagion as another
source of default cluster clustering.
5See Chapter 2
6See Sun et al. (2011) and Davis and Lo (2001), in Chapter 2
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2. Models in which Contagion causes distress. Many models in which contagion aects
the hazard rate for default are formulated in terms of Markov chains or interacting
particle systems. The state of the system includes the state of each of the rms, such
as default, distress, or health. In some models, it also includes common risk factors.
The transition probabilities (in discrete time) or transition rates (in continuous time)
associated with changes in the state of rm i naturally depend on the state of rm
i and on some of the common risk factors. The graph on which contagion travels
contains an edge directed from node j to node i if transition probabilities or rates
associated with changes in the state of node i also depend on the state of node j.
The weight associated with such an edge is related to the strength of the dependence.
Physical models of interacting particle systems are relevant because of an analogy
between economics and physics: rms are like particles whose states are inuenced by
their interactions with each other, allowing distress to spread via contagion. These
models are used because of the mathematical tractability of the asymptotic behavior
of an interacting particle system in the limit as the number of particles becomes
large. Sometimes an assumption of homogeneity among rms is imposed to achieve
mathematical tractability in an interacting particle system model or computational
tractability in a Markov chain model.
Second-generation models attempt to provide structural explanations for the default
clustering phenomenon. For instance, Due et al. (2008) estimate a \frailty" model where
defaults are driven by an unobserved time-varying latent variable, which partially explains
the observed default clustering. In these second generation models, excess clustering could
be explained by counterparty risk, which occurs when default of one rm causes nancial
distress on other rms with which it has close business ties. Davis and Lo (2001) is the
rst theoretical work inside this branch of research.
Davis and Lo (2001) considered a model in which defaults occur either directly, or
through infection by another defaulted rm, with probabilities for direct default or infec-
tion taken uniform throughout the system (or throughout sectors, assuming independence
across sectors). Defaults occurring due to both, endogenous or exogenous causes were
not considered in their set-up. Jarrow and Yu (2001) introduced a framework of primary
and secondary rms, the former would default depending on some background stochastic
process while the latter were aected by a stochastic process and the performance of the
primary rms. They argued that this was a reasonable level of detail for their purposes
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and it also simplies matters as there are no feedback loops in the system. Secondary rms
depend only on primary rms whose performance is independent of the secondary. rms.
Rogge and Schonbucher (2003) use copula functions to quantify correlations in default dy-
namics, and in particular to determine the impacts a defaulting obligor will have on the
hazard rates of other obligors in a portfolio | conditioned on a specication of the set of
countdown levels of surviving obligors and on the set of defaults that have already occurred
at the given time. Another approach for modelling credit contagion dynamics was provided
by Giesecke and Weber 2006 who used the well known voter process, from the theory of
interacting particle systems, to model interactions between rms. They assumed a regular
structure for their rms (a regular innite hyper-cubic lattice) and focussed on the equilib-
rium properties of the model. The model is highly idealised and both the regularity and the
symmetry of the interaction pattern have to be abandoned in order to calibrate a model of
this kind to represent realistic patterns of mutual dependencies. Eglo et al. (2007) model
contagion using a linear coupling of asset returns between business counterparts to describe
the micro-structure of mutual dependencies. This leads to a self-consistent description of
mutual dependencies in equilibrium (though an autoregressive mechanism is mentioned to
capture non-equilibrium situations), which allows analytic solutions even for the case of
asymmetric and heterogeneous impacts. Frey and Backhaus (2003) and Kraft and Stef-
fensen (2007) use continuous time Markov models to describe the dynamics of transitions
of the indicator variables describing rating classes of the obligors in a portfolio. The major
problem here is that the state space of the system grows exponentially in portfolio-size.
Frey and Backhaus reduce this problem by using a mean-eld approximation for large
portfolios, assuming that these portfolios contain only a small number of dierent sectors,
and that contagion eects are homogeneous within sectors, whereas Kraft and Steensen
(2007) concentrate on small portfolios (involving 2 or 3 rms), and so-called "n-to default
baskets" with small n chosen such that the dimension of the state space remains small,
allowing them, among other things, to derive explicit results for loss-distributions, and also
to address pricing issues in some detail.
There are a variety of techniques for modelling the correlations between rms' default
behaviour, which is a major complication in credit risk modelling. The binomial expansion
technique assumes independence between rms so that the number of defaults in a portfolio
is described by a binomial distribution. In order to capture the eects of correlations a
binomial distribution with an \eective" number of rms is assumed which is smaller than
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the actual number in the portfolio, but the weight given to each rm scaled so as to
keep the mean number of defaults constant, while the variance of the overall number of
defaults is increased. The relationship between the true number of rms and the eective
reduced number is a modelling choice that depends on the diversity of the rms in terms
of sectors, geographic locations or any other identiable trait that would lead to strong
correlations in default behaviour. JP Morgans' CreditMetrics approach and Credit Suisse
First Financial Products CreditRisk+ uses the correlations in equity values as a surrogate
for the correlations in credit quality. The structural modelling approach goes back a long
way to work by Merton (1974) which directly models the dynamics of a rm's assets, with
default being triggered by the asset value hitting some predetermined value. Correlations
between rms are due to correlations in the dynamics of dierent rms' assets. This
approach is very general, as it is relatively transparent to identify dierent driving forces
of asset levels and straightforward to include them in the model.. However, it suers from
the fact that the asset level is not an observable quantity. On the other hand, the reduced
form approach gives default rates for a given rm without modelling the underlying default
process. Correlations are then directly introduced between the default rates. There was
some discussion in the literature about whether the reduced form model could describe the
true level of default correlations seen empirically. Yu (2007) seems to have answered this
question in the armative if a suitable structure between the default rates is taken into
account, while the results of Das et al. (2007) seem to imply that the reduced form model
is insucient to fully account for observed default correlations and direct contagion would
indeed be required for a full explanation.
2 Counterparty Contagion and Systemic Risk
Due and Singleton (2003) identify ve categories of risk faced by nancial institutions:
i) market risk: the risk of unexpected changes in market prices; ii) credit risk: the risk of
changes in value due to unexpected changes in credit quality, in particular if a counterparty
defaults on one of their contractual obligations; iii) liquidity risk: the risk that costs of
adjusting nancial positions may increase substantially; iv) operational risk: the risk that
fraud, errors or other operational failures lead to loss in value; v) systemic risk: the risk of
market wide illiquidity or chain reaction defaults.
The concept of systemic risk must comprise at least three ingredients. First, a trig-
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gering event. Second, the propagation of shocks through the nancial system. And third,
signicant impact of the crisis on the macroeconomy. Propagation of shocks may happen
through direct linkages between banks or indirectly, such as through the impact on the
asset holdings of many banks caused by the forced sales of a few banks or through a crisis
of condence.
Andrew G. Haldane (2009)7, identies two phenomenon causing system risk: increasing
complexity and decreasing diversity. In real world networks these two trends are observed to
lead to fragility, and ring alarm bells for ecologists, engineers, geologists. Highly connected,
heterogeneous networks may be robust yet fragile, by which he means that they may be
resistant to average or typical shocks, yet highly susceptible to an attack that targets
a highly connected or dominant node. In such networks, connections that we think of
as shock absorbers may turn out to act as shock ampliers during a crisis. There may
be a sharp tipping point that separates normal behaviour from a crisis regime. Thus, a
network with a fat-tailed degree distribution (i.e. where there is a signicant number of
highly connected nodes) may be robust to random shocks while vulnerable to shocks that
preferentially target these highly connected nodes.
Financial networks generate chains of claims and at times of stress, these chains can
amplify uncertainties about true counterparty exposures. In good times, counterparty risk
is known to be small, and thus we are in presence of uncertainty which describes modelling
situations where probabilities cannot plausibly be assigned to outcomes; in such times we
might expect that stability will improve with connectivity. In bad times, counterparty risk
can be large and highly uncertain, due to the complicated web and the nature of the links;
risk describes situations where uncertainty can be adequately captured in a probability
distribution, and we would then expect stability to decline with connectivity.
Systemic contagion that causes the failure or impairment of a large number of banks will
in reality always manifest itself through a multitude of dierent channels, with spillover or
domino eects from one to another. In the language of network science, nancial networks
are multiplex, meaning there are interbank links of many dierent types, and a contagious
event that starts with one type of link will likely quickly infect all other types of links.
Nonetheless, it is important to identify the basic types of shock mechanisms that we expect
to nd activated during a nancial crisis, either as the primary cause, or else as the result
of spillover eects stemming from the initial shock:
7Executive Director of Financial Stability at the Bank of England
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 Asset Correlation: Dierent banks tend to hold common assets in their portfolios.
 Default Contagion: Bank deposits held in other banks can be considered as a form
of interbank lending, but banking in modern times has dramatically expanded the
range of interbank exposures. There is a multitude of linkage types between bank
counterparties that range well beyond traditional interbank lending, to include swaps,
derivatives and other securitized assets. At any moment, banks can at least in prin-
ciple identify their exposures to all other banks and they also work hard to identify
their expected potential exposure over dierent future time horizons. When a bank
becomes insolvent, if it is not bailed out by a government agency, it will be forced
into bankruptcy. Its creditors, including other banks, will then experience severe
losses given this default, possibly losing close to 100% of their total exposure in the
short term aftermath. Such shocks to creditor banks' interbank assets at the time
of default of a debtor bank are the channel for default contagion. If left unchecked
by government intervention, such shocks can in principle chain together like domi-
nos to create a default cascade. Default cascades can only happen when interbank
exposures are a high fraction of lending banks' equity, and Upper (2011) provides
evidence that this was the case in Europe before and during the crisis, when many
banks' interbank exposures exceeded their capital by factors of 5 or more. In reality,
few bank defaults seem to lead to this type of contagion, mostly because of bank
bailouts.
 Liquidity Contagion: Funding illiquidity is the situation of a bank with insucient
access to short term borrowing. Such banks, being short of cash or other liquid assets,
will adopt a variety of strategies that can be considered as shrinking their balance
sheets. They will try to access the repo8 markets for untapped sources of collater-
alized borrowing. They will refuse to rollover short term loans and repo lending to
other counterparties. When banks respond to funding illiquidity by curtailing a large
8A repurchase agreement (repo) is a form of short-term borrowing for dealers in government securities.
The dealer sells the government securities to investors, usually on an overnight basis, and buys them back
the following day.
For the party selling the security (and agreeing to repurchase it in the future) it is a repo; for the party
on the other end of the transaction, (buying the security and agreeing to sell in the future) it is a reverse
repurchase agreement.
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fraction of their interbank lending, the resulting funding shocks to other banks are
the channel for liquidity contagion in the system.
 Market Illiquidity and Asset Fire Sales: As Adrian, Shin (2010) discussed, in good
times banks tend to create upward asset price spirals by increasing their leverage
through large scale asset purchasing. This pushes up prices, and creating the illusion
of even better times, and further increases in leverage. As they also discuss, the
reverse is true in bad times. This tendency for distressed banks to sell assets into
a depressed market creates the contagion mechanism known as an asset re sale.
A re sale cascade proceeds through a double step mechanism: rst, asset sales by
distressed banks decreases prices, then marking-to-market leads to losses by other
banks holding these assets.
2.1 Financial Networks
Counterparty contagion cause systemic risk. Jorion and Zhang (2009) provide quantitative
evidence about counterparty risk among industrial rms and its contribution to the dis-
tribution of the system-wide severity of defaults. Upper (2011) surveys studies of national
banking systems using regulatory data, primarily on interbank lending. He summarizes,
"contagion due to interbank exposures is likely to be rare. However, if it does take place, it
could destroy a sizable proportion of the banking system in terms of total assets." That is,
these systems show robust yet fragile behavior with respect to contagion . The conclusions
of the surveyed studies depend on how contagion is modeled, which risk factors are consid-
ered, and which method is employed for dealing with incomplete data. For example, the
impact of contagion is magnied in models that include bankruptcy costs. The maximum-
entropy method of dealing with incomplete network data tends to imagine that there is a
large number of small interbank loans, resulting in a dierent impact of contagion than in
a real banking system, which has fewer, larger loans (Mistrulli, 2011). Since the time of
Upper's survey, Cont et al. (2010) used Brazilian data and found that contagion causes
a signicant proportion of the expected number of defaults. They argue that for the true
importance of contagion to be evident, one must analyze events in which correlated shocks
deplete the capital of many banks and cause some to default: the depleted banks are more
vulnerable to contagion from the defaulting banks. Drehmann and Tarashev (2011), work-
ing with data on 20 large banks in the global nancial system, also found that contagion
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is a signicant source of systemic risk: systemic risk increased by 30% when they modeled
contagion spread by interbank loans.
The theoretical literature on contagion in networks takes two approaches. The rst one
considers contagious eects via direct linkages. A seminal paper in this eld is Allen and
Gale (2000). The paper studies how the banking system responds to contagion when banks
are connected under dierent network structures. In a setting where consumers have the
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) type of liquidity preferences, banks perfectly insure against
liquidity shocks by exchanging interbank deposits. The connections created by swapping
deposits expose the system to contagion. The authors show that incomplete networks
are more prone to contagion than complete structures. Better connected networks are
more resilient to contagion since the proportion of the losses in one bank's portfolio is
transferred to more banks through interbank agreements. To show this, they take the case
of an incomplete network where the failure of a bank may trigger the failure of the entire
banking system. They prove that, for the same set of parameters, if banks are connected
in a complete structure, then the system is resilient to contagious eects.
Dasgupta (2004) also discusses how linkages between banks represented by crossholding
of deposits can be a source of contagious breakdowns. Fragility arises when depositors, that
receive a private signal about banks' fundamentals, may wish to withdraw their deposits if
they believe that enough other depositors will do the same. To eliminate the multiplicity
of equilibria the author uses the concept of global games. A unique equilibrium is isolated
and this depends on the value of the fundamentals.
It is not only in the banking industry that contagion can occur. Cummins et al. (2002)
show how the structure of catastrophe insurance markets can also lead to contagion. They
show how the network structure limits the capacity of the insurance industry to absorb
the eects of a major catastrophic event to well below the total amount of equity capital
in the industry.
Parallel to this literature, there is a number of papers that make use of network tech-
niques developed in mathematics and theoretical physics to study contagion. For instance,
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) take this kind of technical approach when investigating default
by rms that are part of a single clearing mechanism. First the authors show the existence
of a clearing payment vector that denes the level of connections between rms. Next,
they develop an algorithm that allows them to evaluate the eects that small shocks have
on the system. This algorithm produces a natural measure of systemic risk based on how
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many waves of defaults are required to induce a given rm in the system to fail.
Similarly, Minguez-Afonso and Shin (2007) use lattice-theoretic methods to study liq-
uidity and systemic risk in high-value payment systems, such as for the settlement of
accounts receivable and payable among industrial rms, and interbank payment systems.
Gai and Kapadia (2007) develop a model of contagion in nancial networks and use simi-
lar techniques as the epidemiological literature on spread of disease in networks to assess
the fragility of the nancial system depending on the banks'capital buers, the degree
of connectivity and the liquidity of the market for failed banking assets. They nd that
greater connectivity reduces the likelihood of widespread default. However, shocks may
have a signicantly larger impact on the nancial system when they occur. Moreover, the
resilience of the network to large shocks depends on shocks hitting particular fragile points
associated with structural vulnerabilities.
The second approach focuses on indirect balance-sheet linkages. Laguno and Schreft
(2001) construct a model where agents are linked in the sense that the return on an agent's
portfolio depends on the portfolio allocations of other agents. In their model, agents who
are subject to shocks reallocate their portfolios, thus breaking some linkages. Two related
types of nancial crisis can occur in response. One occurs gradually as losses spread,
breaking more links. The other type occurs instantaneously when forward-looking agents
preemptively shift to safer portfolios to avoid future losses from contagion. Similarly, de
Vries (2005) shows that there is dependency between banks'portfolios, given the fat tail
property of the underlying assets, and this carries the potential for systemic breakdown.
Cifuentes et al. (2005) present a model where nancial institutions are connected via
portfolio holdings. The network is complete as everyone holds the same asset. Although
the authors incorporate in their model direct linkages through mutual credit exposures
as well, contagion is mainly driven by changes in asset prices. Fragility, not only arises
exogenously, from nancial institutions'exposure to macro risk factors, as is the case in de
Vries (2005). It also evolves endogenously, through forced sales of assets by some banks
that depress the market price inducing further distress to other institutions, as in Cifuentes
et al. (2004).
Complementary to the literature on network eects, Babus (2007) considers a model
where banks form links with each other in order to reduce the risk of contagion. The
network is formed endogenously and serves as an insurance mechanism. At the base of
the link formation process lies the same intuition developed in Allen and Gale (2000):
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better connected networks are more resilient to contagion. The model predicts a connec-
tivity threshold above which contagion does not occur, and banks form links to reach this
threshold. However, an implicit cost associated to being involved in a link prevents banks
from forming connections more than required by the connectivity threshold.
Besides the theoretical investigations, there is a substantial interest in looking for evi-
dence of contagious failures of nancial institutions resulting from the mutual claims they
have on one another. These papers use balance sheet information to estimate bilateral
credit relationships for dierent banking systems. Subsequently, the stability of the inter-
bank market is tested by simulating the breakdown of a single bank. Upper and Worms
(2004) analyze the German banking system. Sheldon and Maurer (1998) consider the Swiss
system. Cocco et al. (2005) present empirical evidence for lending relationships existing
on the Portuguese interbank market. Furne (2003) studies the interlinkages between the
US banks, while Wells (2004) looks at the UK interbank market. Boss et al. (2004) pro-
vide an empirical analysis of the network structure of the Austrian interbank market and
discuss its stability when a node is eliminated. In the same manner, Degryse and Nguyen
(2007) evaluate the risk that a chain reaction of bank failures would occur in the Bel-
gian interbank market. These papers nd that the banking systems demonstrate a high
resilience, even to large shocks. Simulations of the worst case scenarios show that banks
representing less than 5% of total balance sheet assets would be aected by contagion on
the Belgian interbank market, while for the German system the failure of a single bank
could lead to the breakdown of up to 15% of the banking sector in terms of assets. These
results heavily depend on how the linkages between banks, represented by credit exposures
in the interbank market, are estimated. For most countries, data is extracted from banks'
balance sheets, which can provide information on the aggregate exposure of the reporting
institution vis-a-vis all other banks. To estimate bank-to-bank exposures, it is generally
assumed that banks spread their lendings as evenly as possible. In eect, this assumption
requires that banks are connected in a complete network. Upper (2006) contains a survey
of this literature.
2.2 Random Networks
Researchers have investigated the qualitative behavior of randomly constructed nancial
networks in order to determine what behaviors contagion causes in nancial networks,
and what characteristics of the network aect them. They vary the characteristics of the
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stochastic model used to generate nancial networks and observe the eect on systemic
risk in these networks. This enables conclusions about how systemic risk depends on the
characteristics that are varied, such as the average number of edges per node ("degree")
or the total amount of interbank lending. Early papers on this topic (Gai and Kapadia,
2010; Iori et al., 2006; Nier et al., 2007) used simulation of random networks and random
shocks that aect the networks. Then May and Arinaminpathy (2010) presented mean-
eld approximations to the models of Gai and Kapadia (2010) and Nier et al. (2007).
Amini et al.(2010), Gleeson et al. (2011), Hurd and Gleeson (2011) have derived tools
for computing the expected size of a default cascade, based on the asymptotic behavior of
large networks.
The most important distinction among papers on this topic is whether they consider
the initial shock to the network to be a single shock causing the default of a single node
(as in most papers), independent shocks simultaneously aecting all banks (Battiston et
al., 2009; Iori et al., 2006), or correlated shocks (Amini et al., 2011; Georg, 2011; Ladley,
2011). The complex systems literature on contagion often considers an initial shock to the
system in which a disease or an innovation is introduced at a single node. Following this
approach, many papers on contagion in nancial networks have assumed that the initial
shock to the network is the default of a single bank9. These papers focus on the resilience
of the network, meaning the propensity for a small shock to lead to a small number of
defaults rather than a large cascade of defaults. This is similar to the study of contagion in
epidemics. The asymptotic study of the resilience of large networks to small shocks leads
to the study of contagious links and vulnerable nodes. The focus on a small shock is useful
if one wants to investigate the systemic impact of idiosyncratic risks, such as operational
risk involving error or fraud. However, if the aim is understanding scenarios such as the
recent global nancial crisis in which hundreds of banks experienced fundamental defaults,
then the object of study must be correlated shocks, which have a substantial probability
of causing many fundamental defaults.
2.3 The Robust Yet Fragile nature of Financial Networks
Several studies nd that nancial networks can be "robust yet fragile" (Gai and Kapadia,
2010; Gallegati et al., 2008). Of course, robustness and fragility depend on parameters of
9In the study of the asymptotic behavior of large networks, the equivalent assumption is that the initial
shock is the default of a small proportion of the banking system.
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the system: a well-capitalized banking system with only a few, low-risk interbank exposures
will be robust and not fragile. Gallegati et al. (2008) follow Watts (2002), who says
a robust-yet-fragile system "may. . . withstand many external shocks (robust), then
suddenly. . . exhibit a large cascade (fragile)." Gai and Kapadia (2010) describe a robust-
yet-fragile nancial system as follows: "while the probability of contagion may be low, the
eects can be extremely widespread when problems occur." In a system that is robust in the
sense that there is a high probability that a shock causes no contagion (or contagion whose
extent falls below a low threshold), fragility arises because of a high conditional probability
that the extent of contagion is very great given that contagion occurs (or exceeds a low
threshold). Robust-yet-fragile behavior that has been found in nancial networks comes
from some kind of non-linearity in the system's response to shocks.
Network structure provides one kind of non-linearity leading to robust-yet-fragile be-
havior. First, consider models in which correlated shocks aect all banks' capital. Capital
has a non-linear eect on contagion (Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Nier et al., 2007) because of
its eects on the sets of vulnerable nodes and contagious links in the network. Together
with the distribution of shocks, this can generate robust-yet-fragile behavior. Most shocks
leave the network resilient to contagion. Rare, large shocks create contagious links as well
as multiple fundamental defaults, so they often trigger large cascades of defaults. This
kind of non-linearity is also at the heart of robust-yet-fragile behavior in models with a
single idiosyncratic shock. The robust-yet-fragile system of Gai and Kapadia (2010) has
two features. It has moderately few contagious links and vulnerable nodes, so that one
default is unlikely to lead to more than a few more defaults. It has many nodes that are
not vulnerable to the default of only one of their creditors, but that do default if a larger
number of their creditors default. Thus, the threat of further contagion conditional on the
event that a cascade contains at least n defaults can be more than n times the threat of
contagion from one fundamental default. In the presence of n   1 defaults, more nodes
become susceptible to a contagious default that would be caused by the default of just
one more of their obligors. Therefore most shocks lead to very small default cascades that
contain only vulnerable nodes, but a few shocks lead to very large default cascades that
contain also nodes that are not vulnerable to the default of a single creditor.
Risk-sharing entails another kind of non-linearity that causes robust-yet-fragile behav-
ior. In a very simple model, Gallegati et al. (2008) observe that risk-sharing decreases
the variance of loss for each rm while increasing the correlation among losses. Thus,
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risk-sharing decreases the expected number of defaults, but it increases the variance of
the number of defaults and it increases the number of defaults in bad scenarios. In the
extreme case of complete risk-sharing, there are no defaults unless the aggregate shock
exceeds the capacity of the system as a whole to absorb it, in which case every rm fails.
Such a system can be extremely robust yet fragile, with a very low probability of a bad
outcome (any defaults), but always the worst outcome (every rm defaults) if the outcome
is bad. The same phenomenon is at work in more complicated models, such as the dynamic
model of uncorrelated liquidity shocks to banks due to Iori et al. (2006). Lending evolves
over time as banks without enough liquidity to meet demand seek to borrow from banks
that connect to them in the network and that possess excess liquidity. Interbank lending
constitutes risk-sharing: it enables banks to survive liquidity shocks by borrowing, but
it drains liquidity from lenders, leaving them more exposed to future liquidity shocks. If
there is enough connectivity, then default is rare because banks subjected to large shocks
are probably suciently well-connected to draw upon liquidity that exists elsewhere in the
network. However, default is usually part of a large cascade, because it usually occurs only
when the system as a whole has been drained of liquidity, leaving many banks vulnerable
to shocks and contagion. Such a system is robust yet fragile: it is characterized by rare
but large cascades of defaults.
Recent analytic results (Acemoglu et al. 2013, 2015; Eboli 2013, 2016) have shown
that complete networks, i.e. networks where everybody is connected to everybody else,
conrm the conjecture by Haldane (2009) that highly dense interbank networks have a
`robust-yet-fragile' nature:
\In a nutshell, interconnected networks exhibit a knife-edge, or tipping point, property.
Within a certain range, connections serve as a shock-absorber. The system acts as a mu-
tual insurance device with disturbances dispersed and dissipated. Connectivity engenders
robustness. Risk-sharing { diversication { prevails. But beyond a certain range, the sys-
tem can ip the wrong side of the knife-edge. Interconnections serve as shock-ampliers,
not dampeners, as losses cascade. The system acts not as a mutual insurance device but as
a mutual incendiary device. Risk-spreading { fragility - prevails." Eboli (2013) shows that
star-shaped networks display the same feature: the bank at the center of such a kind of
network acts as a hub, distributing losses evenly among the other members of the network,
in case of a crisis. In summary, the above cited works resort to highly stylised examples
of nancial networks and these results suggest that: highly dense and sparse but highly
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centralised networks have a robust-yet-fragile nature.
2.4 The Eects of Interconnectedness on Network Fragility
The characteristics of the network aect the probability of large cascades and the expected
number of defaults. The most frequently studied characteristic is interconnectedness. In
discussing interconnectedness, we must distinguish between increasing the size of interbank
loans while leaving the network of lending relationships xed, and increasing the degree
of connectivity, i.e., increasing the number of interbank loans while decreasing their size
so as to leave unchanged the total amount of aggregate interbank loans, and thus leave
the banks' balance sheets constant. Aside from interconnectedness, Caccioli et al. (2011)
also explore the eects of disassortativity10 and of heterogeneity in degree and size. In
heterogeneous networks, contagion does not depend just on the average degree, but also
depends on the distribution of degree (Amini et al., 2010; Gai et al., 2011; Georg, 2011).
The eect of increasing the degree of connectivity on the probability of a large default
cascade may be monotonic or non-monotonic, depending on the model and even on the
parameters in the model. Gai and Kapadia (2010), Gai et al. (2011), and Nier et al.
(2007) nd a non-monotonic relationship in their cascade models with a single shock.
The number of contagious defaults tends to be low if connectivity is low. This is because a
network with few links has few contagious links. Increasing connectivity increases contagion
up to a point by providing more links and more contagious links. Further increasing
connectivity decreases contagion by decreasing the proportion of links that are contagious.
The proportion of links that are contagious drops because a node with suciently high
degree has made many small interbank loans, all of which are smaller than its capital,
so they are not contagious links. Indeed, both zero connectivity and suciently high
connectivity prevent contagion altogether in this kind of model with a single idiosyncratic
shock. Nier et al. (2007) also consider a version of their model with re sales in which
they nd similar non-monotonic behavior if the nancial system is well-capitalized. The
same eect was found by Cifuentes et al. (2005) in their clearing model with re sales.
However, Nier et al. (2007) nd a monotonic increasing eect of connectivity on contagion
in their cascade model with re sales if the nancial system is under-capitalized: given
the parameters they used, a network with suciently high connectivity is very likely to
10Disassortativity is the tendency of nodes with low degree, like single-branch retail banks, to be linked
to nodes with high degree, like money center banks
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experience default of all rms due to the amplication of losses in re sales. In a more
complicated model featuring independent shocks to all banks and amplication of losses,
Battiston et al. (2009) nd a non-monotonic eect opposite to the non-monotonic eect
described above. In their model, adding edges to a graph with few edges reduces the
frequency of large default cascades by increasing diversication, but adding too many
edges eventually increases the frequency of large default cascades by promoting contagion.
The results about the eect of connectivity on expected number of defaults are mixed.
In their dynamic model of liquidity, Iori et al. (2006) nd that increasing the degree of
connectivity in a homogeneous system reduces defaults, but increasing degree in a hetero-
geneous system has a non-monotonic eect on the expected number of defaults. With very
low connectivity, banks are nearly isolated and likely to fail, but to fail without causing con-
tagion. In the heterogeneous system, as connectivity increases, banks become more able to
withstand liquidity shocks they suer, but become more exposed to contagion originating
from shocks at other banks. When connectivity is too large in the heterogeneous system,
contagion outweighs risk-sharing, so more connectivity increases the expected number of
defaults. Ladley (2011) nds that the relationship between connectivity and expected num-
ber of defaults depends on the size of the shocks. If the shocks are small enough, increased
connectivity decreases the expected number of defaults by dispersing the shocks so that
the losses felt by nodes are too small to cause default. If the shocks are large enough,
increased connectivity increases the expected number of defaults by spreading large losses
more thoroughly. In either case, higher connectivity leads to more extreme robust-yet-
fragile behavior: a lower probability of contagion, but a higher conditional expectation of
the number of defaults given that contagion occurs.
This literature does not support a simple conclusion about the eect of interconnected-
ness. Interconnectedness can produce a range of good and bad eects, including diversica-
tion, risk-sharing, larger potential default cascades via counterparty contagion, and greater
potential to trigger severe episodes of other kinds of contagion. The net impact of these
eects on defaults and contagion depends on the model's parameters. However, one may
summarize the literature by saying that it is often found that more highly interconnected
nancial networks are more robust yet fragile. Eboli (2016) puts forward a novel approach
to the analysis of direct contagion in nancial networks in which nancial systems are
represented as ow networks11. The model shows that complete networks, i.e. networks
11Flow Networks are directed and weighted graphs ar endowed with source nodes and sink nodes and
24
where everybody is connected to everybody else, conrm the conjecture by Haldane (2009):
highly dense interbank networks have a robust-yet-fragile nature12 In the fourth chapter
we present the results of several numerical simulations that conrm the predictions of the
model: highly dense and sparse but highly centralised networks have a robust-yet-fragile
nature; sparse and decentralised networks display a vulnerable-yet-resilient behaviour.
3 Trade Credit and its role in Supply Chains: sys-
temic risk vs insurance eect
For industrial rms, most exposures take the form of trade credit, dened as direct lend-
ing in a supplier-customer relationship. From the viewpoint of debtors, trade credit is
important. Indeed, it constitutes the single most important source of external nance,
representing about 20% of debtors' assets13. In case of default, the trade creditor will
lose part of the unsecured exposure. Depending on the size of this exposure, this loss may
create nancial distress for the for the creditor14. There is a major dierence between bank
lending and trade credit. The on-going business of the trade creditor can be impaired by
the bankruptcy of its borrower because this is often a major customer. Thus, in addition to
the loss on the current credit exposure, which represents a balance-sheet measure, a client
bankruptcy will aect future earnings, which is a ow, if the client cannot be replaced
quickly.
The use of trade credit in supply chains creates systemic risk and puts the grounds for
nancial contagion, but, at the same time, provides funding and the sharing of liquidity
the propagation of losses and defaults, originated by an exogenous shock, is represented as a ow that
crosses such a network.
12\In a nutshell, interconnected networks exhibit a knife-edge, or tipping point, property. Within a
certain range, connections serve as a shock-absorber. The system acts as a mutual insurance device with
disturbances dispersed and dissipated. Connectivity engenders robustness. Risk-sharing { diversication {
prevails. But beyond a certain range, the system can ip the wrong side of the knife-edge. Interconnections
serve as shock-ampliers, not dampeners, as losses cascade. The system acts not as a mutual insurance
device but as a mutual incendiary device. Risk-spreading { fragility { prevails. . . "
13See Cunat (2007). Boissay (2006) reports that the average trade debt of S&P 500 rms is around 30%
to 40% of quarterly sales.
14In Jorion, Zhang (2009) sample, the average exposure ratio is small, at 0.32% of market value of the
creditor's equity; the median is only 0.01%. Some rms have large and undiversied exposures, however,
reaching 37% of equity.
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risk. Empirical evidence and economic theory show that the default of a buyer does not
imply the end of the commercial relation between the supplier and the defaulting client,
cause is more convenient for a supplier to concede a deferral of payment to a defaulting
client, rather than to push for the liquidation of its assets, i.e. its bankruptcy. For this
reason, in spite of its implicit high cost, trade credit is widely used and represents an
important proportion of rms nance. In other terms, the use of trade credit as a source
of funding improves the resilience of a liquidity-constrained rm to unexpected nancial
shortages, i.e. it helps an illiquid rm to stay solvent and to maintain a level of investments
which is as well as possible close to the optimal level. Trade credit contracts embed an
insurance coverage against liquidity risk. The cost of this insurance is incorporated in the
pricing policies set by suppliers (who often use trade credit terms to discriminate among
their clients) and, as a consequence, aect the allocation of earnings among the rms that
belong to a supply chain.
In the third chapter we put forward an analytical framework which models a trade
credit supplier-buyer relationship with the aim to capture the insurance eect of trade
credit. In specic terms:
 Trade Credit yields eects on the investment decisions of a nancially constrained
rms in manufacturing supply chains, with particular reference to a context of nan-
cial turmoil and credit rationing levels.
 Trade Credit enhances the resilience of rms to liquidity shocks and, through the
exibility of repayment terms, aects positively the inventory investment decisions
and, consequently, the future expected levels of output and revenues.
 An insurance coverage against liquidity risk is embedded in trade credit contracts,
thanks to which a nancially-constrained rm suering a liquidity shortage can main-
tain a level of expected inventory investment (and, as a consequence, a future ex-
pected output level) as close as possible to the optimal desired level.
The thesis is organised as follows. In chapter two, we review credit risk models and
models of counterparty risk and contagion and their application in credit risk manage-
ment, and compare the two primary types of models in the literature that attempt to
describe default processes for debt obligations and other defaultable nancial instruments,
usually referred to as structural and reduced-form models. We put emphasis on their prin-
cipal dierences and possible conjunctions and common aspects. Furthermore, the chapter
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discusses challenges and possible progress to be made in closing the distance between struc-
tural and reduced-form models in modeling counterparty and credit risk, mainly inside an
information based perspective. In chapter three we put forward a multi-factor model of
trade credit connections in supply chains which is able to capture the insurance eect of
trade credit, i.e. the insurance coverage against liquidity risk embedded in trade credit
contracts, thanks to which a nancially-constrained rm suering a liquidity shortage can
maintain a level of expected inventory investment (and, as a consequence, a future ex-
pected output level) as close as possible to the optimal desired level. Finally in chapter
four, we introduce a network model that describes analytically the behaviour of highly
stylised examples of nancial networks in a stress scenario: the complete network, i.e. the
most densely connected network, the star, i.e. the most centralised and sparse network,
the circle, i.e. the most sparse and decentralised network. Futhermore, We present the
results of several numerical simulations that we run to test the model conjectures. Such
results show the eects that connectivity and centralization have on such stylised nancial
networks: the more a nancial network is a) densely connected or b) sparse and highly
centralised, the more the network has a robust-yet-fragile nature, likewise the complete and
the star-shaped networks; while the more a network is sparse and decentralised { likewise
the circular networks { the more it displays a vulnerable-yet-resilient behaviour.
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Abstract
This article reviews credit risk models and models of counterparty risk and conta-
gion and their application in credit risk management, and compare the two primary
types of models in the literature that attempt to describe default processes for debt
obligations and other defaultable nancial instruments, usually referred to as struc-
tural and reduced-form (or intensity) models. In doing this, we put emphasis on their
principal dierences and possible conjunctions and common aspects. Furhermore, we
discuss challenges and possible progresses to be made in closing the distance between
structural and reduced-form models in modeling counterparty and credit risk, mainly
inside an information based perspective.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to review credit risk models and models of counterparty risk
and contagion and their application in credit risk management, and to compare the two
primary types of models in the literature that attempt to describe default processes for debt
obligations and other defaultable nancial instruments, usually referred to as structural
and reduced-form (or intensity) models. In doing this, we put emphasis on their principal
dierences and possible conjunctions and common aspects. The article discusses challenges
and possible progress to be made in closing the distance between structural and reduced-
form models in modeling counterparty network and risks, under an information based
perspective.
In the literature we can nd basically two dierent approaches to measuring credit risk:
i) model-based approaches (market models) and ii) traditional approaches (or non-model-
based), based on historical data of defaults. Among market models, we can distinguish
structural models and reduced-form models, which are considered the primary classes of
models for modeling credit risk.
We can distinguish structural models in:
 rm-value models, based on the evolution of the issuing rms' asset values and capital
structure and based on the theory of nancial option pricing (Black and Scholes, 1973,
and Merton, 1974) for the determination of default probability and recovery rates in
the event of insolvency; the main diculty associated with the use of these models
concerns the estimation of the parameters that describes the evolution of rm value,
because their magnitudes are not directly observable. Structural models have been
applied in the approaches of CreditMetrics (developed by JPMorgan, based on the
concept of credit migration) and KMV (consulting rm specialized in the analysis
of credit risk). Firm value models explain the defaultable term structure of interest
rate; they are not applicable for large portfolio of corporate bonds; the defaults are
endogenous;
 rst-passage time models (introduced by Black and Cox, 1976, see also Longsta
and Schwartz, 1995), who consider the possibility of default before debt maturity, if
assets values fall below a certain threshold level.
Structural models originated with Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1974) and reduced
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form models originated with Jarrow and Turnbull (1992), and subsequently, they were
studied by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Due and Singleton (1999) among others. These
models are viewed as competing (see Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2002; Rogers, 1999; Lando,
2009; Due, 2003), and there is a very close debate in the professional and academic
literature directed to establish which class of models is best (see Jarrow et al., 2003). This
debate usually revolves around default prediction and/or hedging performance.
Structural models use the evolution of rms' structural variables, such as asset and
debt values, to determine the time of default. Merton's model (1974) was the rst modern
model of default and is considered the rst structural model. In Merton's model, a rm's
default occurs if, at the time of reimbursing the debt, its assets are below its outstanding
debt. A second approach, within the structural framework, was introduced by Black and
Cox (1976). In this approach defaults occur as soon as rm's asset value falls below a
certain threshold. In contrast to the Merton approach, default can occur at any time.
Structural default models provide a link between the credit quality of a rm and the rm's
economic and nancial conditions. Thus, defaults are endogenously generated within the
model. Furthermore, the value of the rm's assets and liabilities at default will determine
recovery rates.
In reduced-form models, default is treated as an unexpected event whose probability is
governed by a default-intensity process. Some authors (see for example Jarrow and Protter,
2004) stress that the key aspect that distinguishes reduced-form models from structural
models is that the former use only public (market) information which is fully observable
by everybody. Indeed, reduced-form models do not consider the relation between default
and (the true) rm value in an explicit manner. Therefore, it is argued that reduced-form
models are much more useful for investors who use them for pricing and hedging, whereas
the classical structural models are more appropriate for managers and for regulatory needs.
The reduced form approach relies on market prices of defaultable instruments as the only
source of information about the rms' credit risk. Inside the reduced form framework,
intensity models represent the most extended type of models1. The intensity based model
is designed for large portfolios of corporate bonds, it does not explain defaultable term
1Brody, Hughston and Macrina (2005) present an alternative reduced form model, based on the amount
and precision of the information received by market participants about the rm's credit risk. Such model
does not require the use of default intensities; it belongs to the reduced form approach because (as intensity
models) it relies on market prices of defaultable instruments as the only source of information about the
rms' credit risk.
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structure of interest rate, it ts term structure of interest rate into market data and the
defaults are exogenous. In contrast to structural models, the time of default in intensity
models is not determined via the value of the rm, but it is the rst jump of an exogenously
given jump process; in other terms, dierently from the structural approach, defaults are
exogenously given instead of being endogenously determined. The parameters governing
the default hazard rate are inferred from market data. Another dierence between the two
approaches refers to the treatment of recovery rates: as well as in the case of the defaults
treatment, reduced models exogenously specify recovery rates, while in structural models
the value of the rm's assets and liabilities at default denes recovery rates. Among the
reduced form models, we can mention the CreditRisk+ approach (proposed by Credit Suisse
Financial Products, it only considers default risk) in which the default event is not related
to rm's capital structure and there are no assumptions about the causes that can leading
to defaults. Reduced-form models ignores the knowledge of the assets values and liabilities
of the company: the available information is the same available for the market. These
models are widely and commonly used in the IRB approach for credit risk measurement
and determination of capital requirements . However, they have important limitations and
some weaknesses. For example, there is lack of data for a reliable implementation of these
models and it is necessary to perform a process of model validation under Basel rules. But
the main problem, which is more relevant to a reliable estimate of the credit risk, is the
fact that these models fail to consider the contagion phenomenon, so they do not capture
the systemic eects produced by counterparty risk, with negative consequences in terms of
underestimation of the credit risk components and in terms of inadequate determination
of Regulatory Capital.
Structural models of counterparty contagion involve modeling quantitative details of
the nodes and ows on the network: among them, rms' and banks' balance sheet entries
and losses incurred on loans between rms, or losses inside the interbank deposits struc-
ture. They model the causes, mechanism, and consequences of defaults. In the structural
approach, when the nancial system is subjected to stochastic shocks, the correlated de-
faults phenomenon emerges. Reduced-form models skip these details and directly provide
a stochastic model of correlated defaults. Some models make it easy to distinguish between
fundamental defaults, i.e. the defaults which would occur even in the absence of contagion,
and contagious defaults, which happen because of contagion, as a direct consequence of
fundamental defaults. In some reduced-form models, this distinction is not easy to make.
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However, the impact of contagion can still be quantied through a comparison between two
dierent outputs of the same investigated model. In other terms it is possible by comparing
the behavior of the model to that of a model in which the parameters have been changed
so that there is no contagion.
All of the models provide output that shows which rms have defaulted by a given time
horizon. Some of the models also provide default times. Clearing models (a subset of the
structural models set) also provide the severity of defaults, e.g., the recovery rate on loans
to a defaulting rm. These models could also be considered useful under a public policy
point of view, linking the outcomes in the nancial system to public welfare2.
One of the main problems in the evaluation and management of credit risk and coun-
terparty risk is to be able to assign a correct estimate of the default probability to a
counterparty or to each nancial asset in a portfolio of risks. Moreover, a crucial role in
the evaluation of the counterparty risks or the risks of a credit portfolio is played by the
evaluation of the probabilities that many joint defaults occur in a given time interval. This
phenomenon, sometimes described as \credit contagion", is called "default clustering" and
means that multiple defaults can occur at the same time or that happen close to each other
in time3. Such a problem is especially relevant in the risk management of portfolios of bank
loans. Therefore, given the relevance of this kind of activities, held by all banks, this prob-
lem turns out to be crucial for the stability of the whole credit system of a country. In
order to model joint defaults in a portfolio of risks, it is necessary to consider models which
introduce a structural dependence among the portfolio positions. Dierent approaches can
be used in order to obtain dependence in a large portfolio (see e.g. Lando, 2009):
1. A rst approach introduces dependence among the portfolio positions by considering
2From a public policy perspective, it is valuable to go beyond the number of defaults, or the magnitude
of the associated losses, to link the outcomes in the nancial system to public welfare. A way to do this
is to focus on the losses to a deposit insurer or a hypothetical government bailout fund that result from
nancial system outcomes. Another way is to model net new investment by banks (Aikman et al., 2009)
or bank lending capacity (Pokutta and Schmaltz, 2011) as a consequence of nancial system outcomes,
because of the social cost of a credit crunch in which a shortage of credit has eects such as diminished
investment and growth. Gai et al. (2011) mention a possible extension of their model to include a credit
crunch caused by liquidity hoarding.
3Unexplained default clustering is a major issue for traditional credit risk models because it generates
greater dispersion, or fatter tails, in the distribution of credit losses. This implies a greater likelihood
of large losses and an understatement of economic capital. This could lead to a greater number of bank
failures in periods of stress, or losses on CDOs that exceed worst estimates.
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common or correlated risk factors which aect the default probabilities of the positions.
2. A second approach gives rise to dependence by modeling a direct contagion eect.
3. A third way to bring dependence into default events is to take into account a learning
eect.
The basic idea underlying the factor models (a subset of the structural models set),
which apply the rst approach, is that all portfolio positions are aected by the value of
some state variables which represent the fundamentals of the economy and are connected
to the business cycle. Such an approach may be implemented both in reduced form models
and in structural models. An interesting feature of the factor models is that, conditional on
the value of the macroeconomic factors, defaults become independent events. In reduced
form models the default intensities depend (usually linearly) on the value of some macroeco-
nomic factors. The dependence of the default intensity of each position on common factors
naturally induces dependence in the default probabilities. Among these models we may
cite Giesecke (2003). On the other hand, in structural models it is the fundamental value
of the assets that depends (usually linearly) on the value of some macroeconomic factors.
Among these models we may cite Schonbucher (2000) and the widely used Creditmetrics
and KMV models.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze the reduced form
approach. In doing this, we review the most important models in this stream of literature,
we briey describe the informational and probabilistic building blocks of this approach and,
nally, we analyze how default correlation and contagion mechanism are considered inside
the reduced form framework. In section three we analyze the structural approach. In doing
this we review the most important models in the literature, starting from Merton's model
(1974), we briey describe three subsets inside the structural approach, i.e. First Passage
Models, Liquidation Process Models and State Dependent Models; nally we analyze how
the default correlation is taken account in structural models. In section four we discuss
the reconciliation of the two approach, under an informational perspective, starting from
the vision of Jarrow, Protter (2004). Conclusions are drawn in section ve.
2 Reduced-Form Models
Reduced-form models or intensity-based models (see, among others, Jarrow and Turnbull,
1995, Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull, 1997, and Due and Singleton, 1999), represent a
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recent approach to credit risk which consists in the development of models that deal with
the insolvency event as a completely exogenous event, not dependent on the rm's capital
structure. These models are based on the specication of an exogenous process that governs
the default event: typically it is assumed as a Poisson process and often it's assumed that
the recovery rate is exogenous to the model.
Reduced-form credit risk models generate default probabilities directly from market
credit spreads with no assumptions regarding the source or causes of obligors' credit risk
premiums. In that sense, reduced-form models might be considered as a statistical approach
to credit risk. These models are rooted rmly in nancial theory, as extensions to risky
assets of the no-arbitrage theory that has proved so successful for interest rate modelling.
Furthermore, reduced-form credit models have proven to be the most useful models for
trading and hedging risky securities by broker and dealers.
The crucial aspect of the reduced-form approach is that it doesn't condition default on
the value of the rm, and parameters related to the rm's value need not be estimated
to implement them. In addition to that, reduced-form models introduce separate explicit
assumptions on the dynamic default probability, which is modeled independently from
the structural features of the rm, its asset volatility and leverage. Reduced-form models
fundamentally dier from typical structural-form models in the degree of predictability
of the default. A typical reduced-form model assumes that an exogenous random variable
drives default and that the probability of default over any time interval is non-zero. Default
occurs when the random variable undergoes a discrete shift in its level. These models treat
defaults as unpredictable Poisson events.
The reduced form approach does not consider endogenous cause of defaults; rather, they
rely on exogenous specications for credit default and debt recovery. Generally speaking,
reduced-form models assume an exogenous recovery rate that is independent from the
default probability and the dynamics of a rm's assets, and take as basics the behavior of
default-free interest rates, the recovery rate of defaultable bonds at default, as well as a
stochastic process for default intensity. At each instant, there is some probability that a
rm defaults on its obligations. Both this probability and the recovery rate in case of a
default event may vary stochastically through time. Those stochastic processes determine
the price of credit risk. Although these processes are not formally linked to the rm's asset
value, there is presumably some underlying relation. The exogenous specication for credit
default and debt recovery is both a strength and a weakness: while these models suer from
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the lack of economic insights about default occurrence, they oer more degrees of freedom
resulting in more exibility and functionality. Such exibility contributes to analytical
tractability and ease of implementation and calibration, compared to structural models.
However, reduced form models' dependence on historical data may result in good in-sample
tting properties but limited out-of-sample predictive power. Reduced form models are
widely used on credit security trading oors where traders require fast computation tools
to help them react to market movements quickly.
The reduced-form approach was developed precisely with the aim to avoid to model
directly the rm's unobservable asset value process4. This was instead accomplished by
modelling the price process of the rm's liabilities, for example, a zero-coupon bond issued
by the rm. This approach was originated by Jarrow and Turnbull (1992, 1995), Artzner
and Delbaen (1995), and Due and Singleton (1999). Typically, reduced-form models
characterize default as the rst jump time of a point process, often assumed to follow a
Cox process (i.e., a doubly stochastic Poisson process). As such, the default time is usually
a totally inaccessible stopping time, implying non-zero credit spreads for short maturity
corporate debt. A review of the credit risk literature can be found in many books, including
Ammann (2001), Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002), Due and Singleton (2003), and Lando
(2009). A systematic study of the mathematical tools in reduced-form models is available
in Elliott, Jeanblanc, and Yor (2000) and Jeanblanc and Rutkowski (2002).
The reduced form approach (inside which the "intensity approach" is the most extended
one), assumes that a rms default time is inaccessible or unpredictable and driven by a
default intensity that is a function of latent state variables. Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull
(1995), Due and Singleton (1999), and Hull and White (2001) present detailed explana-
tions of several well known reduced-form modeling approaches. Many professionals and
experts in the credit rating environment have shown the tendency to gravitate toward
this modeling approach, given its mathematical tractability. They can be made consis-
tent with the risk-neutral probabilities of default backed out from corporate bond prices
or credit default swap (CDS) spreads/premia. Jarrow and Protter (2004) argue further
that reduced-form models are more appropriate in an information theoretic context given
that we are unlikely to have complete information about the default point and expected
recovery.
4The unobservability of the rm's asset value process is one of the strongest limitations of the Structural
Approach (see Section 3).
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Central to the reduced-form models is the assumption that multiple defaults are inde-
pendent conditional on the state of the economy. In reality, the default of one party might
aect the default probabilities of other parties. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2010) and Jorion
and Zhang (2009) nd that a major credit event at one rm is associated with signicant
increases in the credit spreads of other rms. Giesecke (2004), Das et al. (2007), and
Lando and Nielsen (2010) nd that a defaulting rm can make the rms less resilient in its
network of business links. These ndings have important implications for the management
of credit risk portfolios, where default relationships need to be explicitly modeled. The
main drawback of the conditionally independent assumption of the reduced-form models
is that the range of default correlations that can be achieved is typically too low when
compared with empirical default correlations (see Das et al., 2007). The countermeasures
to correct this weakness can be generally classied into two categories: endogenous default
relationship approaches and exogenous default relationship approaches.
The endogenous approaches include the contagion (or infectious) models and frailty
models. The frailty models (see Due et al. ,2009; Koopman et al. 2011) describe default
clustering based on some unobservable explanatory variables. In variations of contagion or
infectious type models (see Davis and Lo, 2001; Jarrow and Yu, 2001), the assumption of
conditional independence is relaxed and default intensities are implemented depending on
default events of other entities. Contagion and frailty models ll an important gap but at
the cost of analytic tractability5. They can be especially dicult to implement for large
5To get a realistic assessment of the impact of counterparty contagion on systemic risk, one must consider
other phenomena that cause correlation or contagion. In reduced-form modeling, one must separate
counterparty contagion from other sources of correlated defaults, such as common risk factors. Systematic
risk factors, such as the overall health of the economy, produce correlated defaults when used in reduced-
form models. In these models, the challenge is to calibrate the model to data without confounding three
sources of correlation among defaults: systematic risk, frailty, and contagion. In a model without contagion,
Due et al. (2009) show how to distinguish the eects of frailty from the eects of systematic risk factors.
Their empirical study shows that there is a signicant amount of default correlation that can not be
explained by the systematic risk factors that have been identied so far. It is dicult to distinguish
between frailty, in which an unobserved risk factor can contribute to the default of rms A and B, and
contagion, in which the default of rm A can contribute to the default of rm B. In either case, the default
of rm A increases the default hazard of rm B. In the case of contagion, the default of rm A directly
causes an increased default hazard of rm B. In the case of frailty, by Bayes' rule, the default of rm A
implies that a frailty risk factor that also a ects rm B has probably taken on a dangerously high level. For
this reason, Giesecke and Kim (2011) refrain from estimating the eects of frailty and contagion separately,
and class them together into "spillover hazard." Failure to account properly for systematic and frailty risk
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portfolios. The exogenous approaches (see Li , 2000; Laurent and Gregory, 2005; Hull and
White; 2004; Brigo et al., 2011) attempt to link marginal default probability distributions
to the joint default probability distribution through some external functions. Due to their
simplicity in use, the exogenous approaches become very popular in practice.
The reduced form approach provides a stochastic model of correlated defaults. In some
reduced-form models, default is the sole object of study while, in others, the hazard rate
of default is also modeled. In these models, contagion causes a distress state, a state in
which a rm's hazard rate of default is elevated (Davis, 2011). Davis and Lo (2001) have
a single-period reduced-form model of contagious default.
In their model, let Di be the default indicator of rm i, which is 1 if rm i defaults and
0 otherwise. Let D
0
i be the fundamental default indicator of rm i. First, the fundamental
default of each rm i happens with probability pi. Second, given that rm i does not have
a fundamental default, then its contagious default happens with probability 1   jD0iqji,
where qji is the probability that the fundamental default of rm j causes a contagious
default of rm i. The graph on which contagion travels contains an edge directed from
node j to node i if the weight qji is positive. In this model, unlike many other models,
there is no cascade of contagion: contagious defaults can not spread any further contagion.
Such a model can be extended to continuous time. The extended version of the model
consider the default clustering phenomenon, meaning that multiple defaults can occur at
the same time. Sun et al. (2011) produced an ecient simulation of a continuous-time
model in which default clustering occurs because of common risk factors. Anyway, their
model would need to extend in order to incorporate contagion as another source of default
clustering. In continuous-time models, there are no simultaneous defaults, and default
clustering refers to defaults that happen close to each other in time.
In many reduced form models contagion aects the hazard rate for default; they are
formulated in terms of Markov chains (see, e.g., Nelson, 2002) or interacting particle sys-
factors contributes to over-estimation of contagious eects, because one relies on contagion to explain all
of the correlation among defaults, some of which is really due to other causes. Azizpour et al. (2015) show
how to distinguish between contagion, frailty, and systematic risk. The history of defaults and systematic
risk factors, which are observable, can be used to forecast defaults. Because the modeler does not observe
the frailty risk factors, they can not be used to forecast defaults. Within a model of default hazards, this
allows for distinction among the e ects of systematic risk, the eects of default contagion as the component
of default correlation that is explained by history but not by systematic risk, and the eects of frailty as
the component of default correlation that is not explained by history.
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tems (see, e.g., Liggett, 1985). The state of the system includes the state of each of the
rms, such as default, distress, or health. In some models, it also includes common risk
factors. The transition probabilities (in discrete time) or transition rates (in continuous
time) associated with changes in the state of rm i naturally depend on the state of rm i
and on some of the common risk factors. The graph on which contagion spreads contains
an edge directed from node j to node i if transition probabilities or rates associated with
changes in the state of node i also depend on the state of node j. The weight associated
with such an edge is related to the strength of the dependence. Physical models of inter-
acting particle systems are relevant because they suppose analogy between economics and
physics: rms are like particles whose states are inuenced by their interactions with each
other, allowing distress to spread via contagion6. These models are used because of the
mathematical tractability of the asymptotic behavior of an interacting particle system in
the limit as the number of particles becomes large. In some models an assumption of ho-
mogeneity among rms is considered necessary to achieve mathematical tractability in an
interacting particle system model or computational tractability in a Markov chain model.
In the discrete-time Markov chain model of Eglo et al. (2007), the state of a rm is
its credit rating, default being the lowest rating. The probability of a rm's transition to a
lower credit rating can be increased by bad levels of common risk factors and by low credit
ratings of those rms that can transmit contagion to it. These rms can be thought of as
"neighbors" in a graph. This model is related to interacting particle systems with local
interactions characterized by a graph. For mathematical tractability in such models, it is
necessary to assume that the graph has a simple structure.
As a matter of fact, rms seem to show correlation in the default probabilities due not
only to a dependence on common risk factors, but also to some rm-specic risks. The
empirical evidence shows the existence of clustering of default events in recession periods
which cannot be explained only by the dependence induced by common factors; on this
subject see for example Jarrow and Yu (2001) and Giesecke andWeber (2004). Giesecke and
Weber (2004, 2006) use an innite lattice as an undirected graph of contagion, and assume
that if one rm can receive contagion from another rm, it can also transmit contagion
to that rm. Their model is based on the long-run behavior of a continuous-time Markov
6There is an econophysics literature devoted to analyzing phenomena such as bubbles and crashes
(Kaizoji, 2000) and contagion (Kaizoji, 2001) using models of interacting particle systems, in which par-
ticles are nancial agents and interactions take the form of emulation. Samanidou et al. (2007) review
econophysics research on agent-based models.
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process in which the state of a rm is healthy or distressed. Similar to the model of Eglo
et al. (2007), transitions depend on common risk factors and distress among neighboring
rms.
Das, Due and Kapadia (2007) develop statistical tests of the standard doubly stochas-
tic model of default, under which the default times are correlated only through the factors
determining their default intensities. The results of the application of these tests to data on
U.S. corporations in the period 1987-2000 suggest that either there is a mis-specication
of the default intensities or such a model is not able to account for all the dependence
exhibited by the data.
On the whole, the outcomes of the empirical studies carried out suggest that the id-
iosyncratic or rm-specic risk should be described not only by a residual noise term but
it should also include a term which takes into account the business connections among
dierent rms. This is what direct contagion models do. Following Jarrow and Yu (2001),
a counterparty risk can be modeled explicitly7.
Jarrow and Yu (2001), Giesecke and Weber (2004) and Frey and Backhaus (2004), de-
velop mixed models, all in a reduced form framework, that consider the contagion eect
due to the counterparty risk jointly with the macroeconomic eect induced by the depen-
dence on common factors: in other terms these models consider both a macroeconomic
term and a microeconomic contagion eect. Similar to the model of Eglo et al. (2007),
transitions depend on common risk factors and distress among neighboring rms. Instead,
the microeconomic contagion eect is used alone in Davis and Lo (2001) model to account
for the dependence in the default probabilities.
Yu (2007), extends the work of Jarrow and Yu (2001); it has a framework in which the
hazard rate for default of each node can depend on common risk factors and on the default
history, i.e., the times of previous defaults and identities of the nodes that defaulted.
Frey and Backhaus (2008), Herbertsson and Rootzen (2008), and Kraft and Steensen
(2007) set up the contagion model in terms of a Markov chain. The Markov property
means that hazard rates depend only on which rms have defaulted, not on the time of
default. In their numerical investigation, Herbertsson and Rootzen (2008) nd that a non-
homogeneous model of contagion could be well approximated by a homogeneous model,
7The counterparty risk can be dened as the risk that the default of a rm's counterparty might aect
its own default probability. By explicitly introducing the counterparty risk in the model, which can either
be a reduced form or a structural model, an additional source of dependence is taken into consideration.
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for which computation is much easier. Davis (2011) contains further references on this
type of model. In a dierent kind of model, the time of default matters because a default
raises the hazard rate of default for other rms, but only temporarily: the eect of a default
decays over time. This promotes stronger default clustering. Giesecke et al. (2011) provide
ecient simulation algorithms for such models.
The empirical testing of reduced-form models is still nascent. The reason relates back
to the lack of theoretical guidance on characterizing the default intensity process. Duee
(1999) found that the parameter estimates using a square-root process of intensity can be
fairly unstable. Another reason is that the bond data, on which these models are usually
calibrated, are typically indicative in their nature, creating data problems as information
slowly leaks into the price; this may produce misleading results. Sources of bond data
continue to be plagued by missing and mistaken data. A nal reason involves the diculty
in empirically separating the merits of the modeling framework and the quality of the
underlying data given that bond data are typically used to t the model as well as test
the model. Structural models based on equity price data will not suer from this diculty
when they are then tested on bond data. The recent availability of credit default swap data
provides a new opportunity to understand the power of both the structural and reduced-
form modeling frameworks.
2.1 Default Correlation in Reduced-Form Models
The dependence between defaults caused by common factors is captured by the standard
reduced form credit risk models such as Lando (1998) or Due and Singleton (1999).
Counterparty risk on the other hand has only recently attracted attention in the credit
risk literature. Jarrow and Yu (2001) is the rst paper, where the impact of defaults on
the default probabilities of surviving rms is explicitly modelled; see also Davis and Lo
(2001) for a related approach. Mathematical aspects of the Jarrow-Yu model were discussed
among others in Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002). Finally, Giesecke and Weber (2006) use
the voter model, which is well-known in the literature on interacting particle systems (see
for instance Liggett (1985)), to model interaction between defaults. They come up with a
model for the loss distribution of a given portfolio, which is constructed as a mixture of
the equilibrium distributions of the voter model.
Modeling the default dependence between rms in the reduced-form approach is a
dierent problem with respect to calculate the survival or default probability of a given
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rm in a given time interval. The problem under investigation concerns the default or
survival probability of more than one rm. If we are currently at time t (0  t  T ) and
no default has occurred so far: what is the probability that n  1 dierent rms default
before time T?, or, what is the probability that they all survive until time T?
Schonbucher (2003), again, points out some properties that any good approach to model
dependent defaults should verify.
1. the model must be able to produce default correlations of a realistic magnitude.
2. it has to do it by keeping the number of parameters introduced to describe the
dependence structure under control, without growing dramatically with the number
of rms.
3. it should be a dynamic model, able to model the number of defaults as well as the
timing of defaults.
4. since it is clear from the default history that there are periods in which defaults may
cluster, the model should be capable of reproducing these periods.
5. the easier the calibration and implementation of the model, the better.
We can distinguish three dierent approaches to model default correlation in the liter-
ature of intensity credit risk modeling.
1. The rst approach introduces correlation in the rms' default intensities making
them dependent on a set of common variables Xt and on a rm specic factor. These
models are known as conditionally independent defaults (CID) models, because they
are conditioned to the realization of the state variablesXt the rm's default intensities
are independent as are the default times that they generate. The main drawback
of these models is that they do not generate suciently high default correlations.
However, Yu (2002a) indicates that this is not a problem of the model itself, but
rather a signal of the lack of sophistication in the choice of the state variables. Two
direct extensions of the CID approach try to introduce more default correlation in
the models. One is the possibility of joint jumps in the default intensities (Due and
Singleton 1999) and the other is the possibility of default-event triggers that cause
joint defaults (Due and Singleton 1999, Kijima 2000, and Kijima and Muromachi
2000).
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2. The second approach to model default correlation, contagion models, relies on the
works by Davis and Lo (1999) and Jarrow and Yu (2001). It is based on the idea
of default contagion in which, when a rm defaults, the default intensities of related
rms jump upwards. In these models default dependencies arises from direct links
between rms. The default of one rm increases the default probabilities of related
rms, which might even trigger the default of some of them.
3. The last approach to model default correlation makes use of copula functions8.
8Copula is one of the possible ways to describe a dependence of random variables. Formally, copula is
the joint multivariate distribution function for a multivariate distribution with standard uniform marginal
distributions. Any joint multivariate distribution function can be expressed as a copula with arguments
equal to univariate marginal distribution functions of respective variables. More precisely, a copula is a
function that links univariate marginal distributions to the joint multivariate distribution with auxiliary
correlating variables. To estimate a joint probability distribution of default times, we can start by esti-
mating the marginal probability distributions of individual defaults, and then transform these marginal
estimates into the joint distribution using a copula function. Copula functions take as inputs the individual
probabilities and transform them into joint probabilities, such that the dependence structure is completely
introduced by the copula. The copula approach separates individual default probabilities from the credit
risk dependence structure. The copula function takes as inputs the marginal probabilities and introduce
the dependence structure to generate joint probabilities. Copulas were introduced in 1959 and have been
extensively applied to model, among others, survival data in areas such as actuarial science. A copula
function transforms marginal probabilities into joint probabilities. The copula function takes as inputs
the marginal probabilities without considering how we have derived them. Thus, the intensity approach
is not the only framework with which we can use copula functions to model the default dependence struc-
ture between rms. Any other approach to model marginal default probabilities, such as the structural
approach, can use copula theory to model joint probabilities. Within the reduced-form approach, we can
distinguish two approaches to introduce default dependence using copulas. The rst one, which we will
refer to as Li's approach, was introduced by Li (1999) and represents one of the rst attempts to use copula
theory systematically in credit risk modelling. Li's approach takes as inputs the marginal default (survival)
probabilities of each rm and derives the joint probabilities using a copula function. Li (1999) considers
a copula that links individual survival probabilities to model the joint survival probability. The second
approach was introduced by Schonbucher and Schubert (2001), in which the idea is to link the default
thresholds with a copula. The simulation of the default times in this approach is exactly the same as in Li's
approach. The only dierence with the SS approach is that it allows to recover the dynamics of the "real"
default intensities, which include the default contagion eects implicit in the default threshold copula. In
contrast to the models of Jarrow and Yu (2001) and Davis and Lo (1999), the SS approach allows the
contagion eects to arise endogenously through the use of the copula. Schonbucher (2003) calls the SS
approach a dynamic approach in the sense that it considers the dynamics of the "real" default intensities,
as opposed to Li's approach, which only considers the dynamics of the pseudo default intensities. Galiani
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The complete specication of the default correlation will be given by the joint distribu-
tion of default times. Correlation coecients, when estimated via a risk neutral intensity
model, are based on the risk neutral measure. In order to calculate the correlation coef-
cients using empirical default events, the correlation coecients are obtained under the
physical measure. Jarrow, Lando and Yu (2003) and Yu (2002a) provide a procedure for
computing physical default correlation through the use of risk neutral intensities. Duee
(1999), Zhang (2003), Driessen (2005), propose, and estimate, dierent CID models.
The literature on credit risk correlation has criticized the CID approach, arguing that
it generates low levels of default correlation when compared with empirical default corre-
lations. However, Yu (2002a) suggests that this apparent low correlation is not a problem
of the approach itself but a problem of the choice of state or latent variables: this is due
to the inability of a limited set of state variables to fully capture the dynamics of changes
in default intensities. In order to achieve the level of correlation seen in empirical data, a
CID model must include among the state variables, the evolution of the stock market, cor-
porate and default-free bond markets, as well as various industry factors. Yu (2005) argues
that the default correlation in reduced-form models can be quite sensitive to the common
factor structure imposed on individual default intensities. According to Yu, the problem of
low correlation in may arise because of the insucient specication of the common factor
structure, which may not capture all the sources of common variation in the model, leaving
them to the idiosyncratic component, which in turn would not be independent across rms.
Driessen (2005) proposes a model in which the rms' hazard rate is a linear function of
two common factors, two factors derived from the term structure of interest rates, a rm
idiosyncratic factor, and a liquidity factor. Yu also examines the model of Driessen (2005),
nding that the inclusion of two new common factors elevates the default correlation.
Due and Singleton (1999) propose two ways in order to solve the low correlation prob-
lem. First, they introduce correlation to the rm's jump processes, keeping unchanged the
characteristics of the individual intensities. They postulate that each rm's jump compo-
nent consists of two kinds of jumps, joint jumps and idiosyncratic jumps. The joint jump
process has Poisson intensity and an exponentially distributed size. The idiosyncratic jump
(independent across rms) is set to have an exponentially distributed size and intensity.
The second alternative considers the possibility of simultaneous defaults triggered by com-
(2003) provides a detailed analysis of the use of copula functions to price multiname credit derivatives
using both a normal and t-student copula.
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mon credit events, at which several obligors can default with positive probability. If given
the occurrence of a common shock, the rm's default probability is less than one. This
common shock is called non-fatal shock, whereas if this probability is one, the common
shock is called fatal shock. In addition to the common credit events, each entity can expe-
rience default through an idiosyncratic Poisson process, which is independent across rms.
Due and Singleton (1999) also propose algorithms to simulate default times within these
two frameworks. The criticisms that the joint credit event approach has received stem
from the fact that it is unrealistic that several rms default at exactly the same time, and
also from the fact that after a common credit event that makes some obligors default, the
intensity of other related obligors that do not default does not change at all. Due and
Singleton (1999) model is theoretically appealing, but it present a drawback: there are not
papers in the literature which carries out an empirical calibration and implementation of
a model.
2.2 Contagion mechanisms in Reduced-Form Models
In CID and contagion models the specication of the individual intensities includes all the
default dependence structure between rms. Contagion models take CID models one step
further, introducing into the model two empirical facts: the rst one is that the default
of one rm can trigger the default of other related rms; the second one is that default
times tend to concentrate in certain periods of time, in which the default probability of all
rms is increased. The model of "joint credit events" diers from contagion mechanisms
in that if a debtor does not experience a default, its intensity does not change due to the
default of any related debtor. The literature of default contagion includes two approaches:
the infectious defaults model of Davis and Lo (1999), and the model proposed by Jarrow
and Yu (2001). The main issues to be resolved concerning these two models are associated
with diculties in their calibration to market prices.
The Davis and Lo model (1999) has two versions, a static version that only considers
the number of defaults in a given time period, and a dynamic version in which the timing
of default is also incorporated.9
In the dynamic version of the model, each rm has an initial hazard rate of i;t, for
i = 1; :::; I, which can be constant, time dependent or follow a CID model. When a
default occurs, the default intensity of all remaining rms is increased by a factor a > 1,
9This dynamic version is introduced in Davis and Lo (2001).
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called enhancement factor, to ai;t. This augmented intensity remains for an exponentially
distributed period of time, after which the enhancement factor disappears (a = 1). During
the period of augmented intensity, the default probabilities of all rms increase, reecting
the risk of default contagion.
With the aim of incorporating the clustering of default in specic periods, Jarrow and
Yu (2001) extend CID models to account for counterparty risk, i.e. the risk that the default
of a rm may increase the default probability of other rms with which it has commercial
or nancial relationships. This allows them to introduce extra-default dependence in CID
models to account for default clustering. In a rst attempt, Jarrow and Yu assume that
the default intensity of a rm depends on the status (default/not default) of the rest of the
rms, i.e. symmetric dependence. However, symmetric dependence introduces circularity
in the model, which they refer to as looping defaults, which makes it extremely dicult
and troublesome to construct and derive the joint distribution of default times.
Jarrow and Yu restrict the structure of the model to avoid the problem of looping de-
faults. They distinguish between primary rms and secondary rms. First, they derive
the default intensity of primary rms, using a CID model. If a primary rm defaults, this
increases the default intensities of secondary rms, but not the other way around (asym-
metric dependence). This model introduces a new source of default correlation between
secondary rms, and also between primary and secondary rms, but it does not solve the
drawbacks of low correlation between primary rms, which CID models apparently imply.
Yu (2002a) and Frey and Backhaus (2003) oer a further extension of Jarrow and Yu (2001)
model.
The mean-eld approximation is an alternative way to introduce contagion phenomenon
in reduced form models10. The characteristic of a mean-eld approximation is that the
neighborhood structure is ignored. In physical models, a force eld is approximated as a
constant equal to the mean taken over the space in which the particles are located. That is,
particles are treated as though their behavior produce the same force everywhere. In the
nancial context, defaults are treated as though the identities of the rms did not matter;
any default (or any default of the same size) has the same impact on a rm. That is,
counterparty contagion as a local phenomenon is approximated by a global phenomenon
of contagion. Mean-eld approximations to contagion are used by Giesecke et al. (2011)
with time-decaying impact of default and by Cvitanic et al. (2012), Dai Pra et al. (2009),
10Interacting particle systems may admit tractable mean-eld approximation.
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and Dai Pra and Tolotti (2009) with permanent impact of default.
Going one step further, it may be possible to assume that all rms contribute to and are
aected by contagion in the same way. All that matters is the number, size, and timing
of defaults. This makes it possible to create a \top-down" model of default, meaning
that the model directly species the hazard rate for the next default in the system. Only
the aggregate eect of contagion is visible in a top-down model. In contrast, the models
discussed previously are \bottom-up," meaning that the hazard rate for default of each
rm is specied, and the eect of contagion on each rm is visible. Giesecke (2008) make
an introduction to top-down vs. bottom-up modeling of default
3 Structural Models
This models are called "structural" because a rm's probability of default is estimated by
an examination of its capital structure as inferred from nancial statements and equity
market information. They provide a concise interpretive framework for understanding the
factors that inuence credit quality and have served as the catalyst for a great deal of
academic research on credit11. Although structural models are popular among investors
for avoiding potential defaults, their use has proved to be problematic for the valuation
and hedging of credit portfolios.
Under structural models, all the relevant credit risk elements, including default proba-
bilities and recovery at default, are a function of the structural characteristics of the rm:
asset levels, asset volatility (business risk) and leverage (nancial risk). The recovery rate
is therefore an endogenous variable, as the creditors' payo is a function of the residual
value of the defaulted company's assets12. In structural models of risky debt default is trig-
11An extension of the structural approach is the so called Hybrid Approach. Hybrid credit models are
extensions of structural models that incorporate other nancial and market factors in an eort to more
accurately quantify default risk. The term hybrid model is used to indicate that the model is a combination
of a structural model with the statistical approach.
12Under the `second generation' structural models, the recovery rate in the event of default is exogenous
and independent from the rm's asset value. It is generally dened as a xed ratio of the outstanding
debt value and is therefore independent from the default probability. For example, Longsta and Schwartz
(1995) argue that, by looking at the history of defaults and the recovery rates for various classes of debt
of comparable rms, one can form a reliable estimate of the recovery rate. In their model, they allow for
a stochastic term structure of interest rates and for some correlation between defaults and interest rates.
They nd that this correlation has a signicant eect on the properties of the credit spread. This approach
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gered when the market value of the rm's assets falls below a certain solvency boundary.
They link the default of an entity to the value of the rm through its equity price.
These models treat equity as an option to buy the company's assets, and use option
pricing formulas to link the equity price, which is used as a proxy of the (generally un-
observable) rm's asset value, to probability of default. The benet of such models is
that they can use the latest market prices to provide a \marked to market" probability
of default for individual companies. The major shortfall of structural models is that they
deliberately simplify the capital structure of a rm, meaning that these models are hardly
suitable for analyzing assets that have unusual capital structures or unusual payos.
Structural models view a rm's liabilities as complex put options on the rm's assets.
Therefore, their aim of this approach is to model the rm's liability structure and the rm's
asset value process. In these models, the default time is usually characterized as the rst
hitting time of a rm's asset value to a given boundary, the boundary being determined
by the rm's liabilities. As such, if the rm's asset value process follows a diusion, then
the default time is usually a predictable stopping time.
While the reduced form approach models credit defaults as exogenous events driven
by a stochastic process (such as a Poisson jump process), the structural approach aims
to provide an explicit relationship between default risk and capital structure. In a struc-
tural model, the probability of the rm's default over any horizon is derived from the
model given the capital structure and the assumptions concerning the rm's value pro-
cess and conditions determining default. Reduced-form models take the default process
as the model's \primitive": a process is directly posited for default probability that is
then calibrated to the prices of securities issued by the rm or to the prices of derivatives
based on those securities. Consequently, while reduced-form models are commonly imple-
mented using debt-market (usually bond-price) or credit derivative (credit-default swap)
data, structural model implementation is typically undertaken using equity market infor-
mation. Under structural models, a default event is deemed to occur for a rm when its
assets reach a suciently low level compared to its liabilities. These models require strong
assumptions on the dynamics of the rm's asset, its debt and how its capital is structured.
The main advantage of structural models is that they provide an intuitive picture, as well
as an endogenous explanation for default.
simplies the rst class of models by both exogenously specifying the cash ows to risky debt in the event
of bankruptcy and simplifying the bankruptcy process.
53
The diculty of using the structural approach is twofold:
1. the rm's asset value process is not directly observable and it makes empirical im-
plementation dicult;
2. a predictable default time implies credit spreads should be near zero on short matu-
rity corporate debt. This second implication is well known to be inconsistent with
historical market credit spread data.
The basis of the structural model approach is the observation that the value of the
liabilities (debt and equity) of a rm at a point in time depends on the value of the rm's
assets at that point as well as the outlook concerning that value. Debt and equity are
contingent claims on the rm's assets and the value of the rm's assets acts as the central
driving variable in structural models. In the typical structural model, the rm's debt and
equity structure is taken as given, a process is posited for the evolution of the rm's asset
value, conditions that constitute \default" are specied, and debt and equity are priced
o the posited process. Since the rm's value process is unobserved, implementation of
structural models is commonly performed in an indirect manner using the characteristics
of the rm's equity. That is, given that equity is a contingent claim on the rm's assets
whose value and other properties are observed, the implied value and other properties
of the rm's assets may be backed out from this information. From this implied value,
then it is possible to calculate the desired output such as probability of the rm's default
over any chosen horizon. One of the most successful commercial implementations of the
structural model approach is that developed by KMV Corporation (now Moody's KMV)
in the late 1980s. KMV's model derives default correlations from a structural model that
links correlations with fundamental factors. Finally, KMV provides an analytical derivation
of the asymptotic loss distribution of the portfolio at a given time horizon, assuming the
bank's loan portfolio is innitely ne grained and that all instruments in the portfolio
mature within this time horizon. This distribution is characterized by high skew and
leptokurtosis.
Structural models was pioneered by Black, Scholes and Merton: they employ modern
option pricing theory in corporate debt valuation. Merton model was the rst structural
model and has served as the cornerstone for all other structural models. Credit pricing
models changed forever with the insights of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974);
more precisely, the structural literature on credit risk starts with the paper by Merton
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(1974), who applies the option pricing theory developed by Black and Scholes (1973) to
the modelling of a rm's debt. In Merton's model, the rm's capital structure is assumed
to be composed by equity and a zero-coupon bond with maturity T and face value of D.
The rm's equity is simply a European call option with maturity T and strike price D on
the asset value and, therefore, the rm's debt value is just the asset value minus the equity
value. This approach assumes a very simple and unrealistic capital structure and implies
that default can only happen at the maturity of the zero-coupon bond.
The works of Black, Scholes and Merton started the literature of structural credit risk
modeling. Starting from that point, many researchers have proposed extensions to Merton
model, cause it has been criticized for being based on a number of simplifying assumptions.
The extended structural models represent important improvements for Merton's original
framework as they are more realistic and able to better align with market data (e.g., CDS
spreads). We can summarize these improvements as follows:
 In Merton's framework, a company could only default at its debt maturity date.
The model can be modied to allow for early defaults by specifying a threshold level
such that a default event occurs when asset value At falls below this critical level.
The methods for pricing barrier/threshold options can be applied in this setting.
Such threshold level sometimes results from shareholders' optimal default strategy
to maximize equity value. Extensions to Merton model along this direction were
pioneered by Black and Cox, and this group of models is often referred to as First
Passage Time models.
 The constant interest rate assumption is not reliable, and a stochastic interest rate
model can be incorporated into Merton model or its extended versions. In this case,
correlation between asset and interest rate processes can also be introduced if needed.
 Mapping all debts into a single zero-coupon bond is not always feasible. It has been
shown that multiple debts with dierent characteristics can also be modeled using
a structural approach. The Geske Compound Option model developed by Robert
Geske was the rst structural model of this category.
 Several more sophisticated structural models involving stochastic volatility, jump
diusion and even regime-switching methods have also been proposed. These appli-
cations can help explain market observations with higher accuracy, but they often
involve a high level of analytical complexity.
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Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) criticized the promise of these structural models
of default by showing how these types of models systematically underestimated observed
spreads. Their research reected a sample of rms with simple capital structures observed
during the period 1977 to 1981. Ogden (1987) conrmed this result nding that the Merton
model under-predicted spreads over U.S. treasuries by an average of 104 basis points.
KMV ( Moody's KMV or MKMV) revived the practical applicability of structural models
by implementing a modied structural model called the Vasicek-Kealhofer (VK) model
(see Crosbie and Boh, 2003; Kealhofer, 2003a; Kealhofer, 2003b; Vasicek, 1984). This
VK model is combined with an empirical distribution of distance-to-default to generate
the commercially available Expected Default Frequency | or EDF | credit measure.
The VK model builds on insights obtained from modications to the classical structural
model suggested by other researchers. Black and Cox (1976) model the default-point as
an absorbing barrier. Geske (1977) treats the liability claims as compound options. In
this framework, Geske assumes the rm has the option to issue new equity to service debt.
Longsta and Schwartz (1995) introduce stochastic interest rates into the structural model
framework to create a two-factor specication. Leland and Toft (1996) consider the impact
of bankruptcy costs and taxes on the structural model output. In their framework, they
assume the rm issues a constant amount of debt continuously with xed maturity and
continuous coupon payments. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) extend the Longsta
and Schwartz model by introducing a stationary leverage ratio, allowing rms to deviate
from their target leverage ratio in the short run, only.
A few empirical researchers have begun to test these model extensions. Lyden and
Saraniti (2000) compare the Merton and the Longsta-Schwartz models and nd that
both models under-predicted spreads; the assumption of stochastic interest rates did not
seem to change the qualitative nature of the nding. Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2003)
nd evidence contradicting conventional wisdom on the bias of structural model spreads.
They nd structural models that depart from the Merton framework tend to over-predict
spreads for the debt of rms with high volatility or high leverage. For safer bonds, these
models, with the exception of Leland-Toft, under-predict spreads.
On the commercial side MKMV oers a version of the VK model applied to valuing
corporate securities, which is built on a specication of the default-risk-free rate, the market
risk premium, liquidity premium, and expected recovery in the context of a structural
model. The VK model framework is used to produce default probabilities dened as EDF
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credit measures and then extended to produce a full characterization of the value of a credit
risky security. This model appears to produce unbiased, robust predictions of corporate
bond credit spreads. (see Bohn, 2000 and Agrawal, Arora, and Bohn, 2004 for more details.)
Some important modications to the typical structural framework include estimation of
an implicit corporate-risk-free reference curve instead of using the U.S. treasury curve.
Some of the under-prediction found in the standard testing of the Merton model likely
results from choosing the wrong benchmark curve in the sense that the spread over U.S.
treasuries includes more than compensation for just corporate credit-risk. The assumption
here is that the appropriate corporate default risk-free curve is closer to the U.S. swap
curve (typical estimates are 10 to 20 basis points less than the U.S. swap curve.) The
MKMV implementation of the VK model allows for a time-varying market risk premium,
which materially improves the performance of the model. Other important modications
to the framework include the specication of a liquidity premium that may be associated
with the rm's access to capital markets and the assumption of a time-varying expected
recovery amount. All these modications contribute to producing a more usable structural
model.
The paper by Black and Cox (1976) is the rst of the so-called First Passage Models
(FPM). First passage models specify default as the rst time the rm's asset value hits
a lower barrier, allowing default to take place at any time. When the default barrier is
exogenously xed, as in Black and Cox (1976) and Longsta and Schwartz (1995), it acts
as a safety covenant to protect bondholders. Alternatively it can be endogenously xed as
a result of the stockholders' attempt to choose the default threshold which maximizes the
value of the rm (cf. Leland 1994 and Leland and Toft 1996.).
Concerning interest rates, structural models have considered them both as non-stochastic
processes (Black and Cox 1976, Geske 1977, Leland 1994 and Leland and Toft 1996) and
as stochastic processes (Ronn and Verma 1986, Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan 1993,
Nielsen et al. 1993, Longsta and Schwartz 1995, Briys and de Varenne 1997 and Hsu,
Saa-Requejo and Santa-Clara 2004).
In First Passage Models, by denition, default occurs the rst time the asset value goes
below a certain lower threshold, i.e. the rm is liquidated immediately after the default
event. In contrast with First Passage Models, in another set of models, named Liquidation
Process Models (LPM), supported by more recent theoretical and empirical research, a
default event does not immediately cause liquidation but it represents the beginning of
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a process, the liquidation process, which might or might not cause liquidation after it is
completed. This practice is consistent, for example, with Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy
Law, where rms lling for bankruptcy are granted a court-supervised favor period (up to
several years) aimed at sorting out their nancial problems in order to, if possible, avoid
liquidation.
State Dependent Models (SDM) represent, together with LPM, two recent eorts to
incorporate into structural models dierent real-life phenomena. Although theoretically
they make good sense, there is a lack of empirical research testing its performance. SDM
assume that some of the parameters governing the rm's ability to generate cash ows or its
funding costs are state dependent, where states can represent the business cycle (recession
vs. expansion) or the rm's external rating.
Considering the contagion mechanism, structural models vary according to the type
and channel of contagion they represent. Most of them focus on the most commonly
studied case: contagion spreading from borrower to lender, transmitting insolvency. In
the graph, directed edges represent loans, pointing from borrower to lender. The directed
edge pointing from node i to node j has weight Lij equal to the size of the loan made by
node j to node i. There are also structural models of liquidity (Gai et al., 2011; Iori et al.,
2006) and of liquidity and solvency simultaneously. The latter may feature a single graph
of lending relationships (Georg, 2011; Pokutta and Schmaltz, 2011) or distinct graphs of
loans to model solvency and credit lines to model liquidity (Muller, 2006).
A structural model of solvency compares assets to liabilities. For example, we can
consider a single-period model in which there are no external liabilities, i.e., liabilities
owed to entities outside the system. The total liabilities of rm i are pi =
P
j Lij. The
fraction of the liabilities of rm i owned by rm j is Dij . Let ei be the value of external
assets of rm i, i.e., of liabilities owed to rm i by entities outside the system. The vector
e may be random, representing shocks to the system inicted by risk factors. Let recj be
the recovery rate, i.e., fraction of its liabilities that rm j is able to pay: it is 1 if rm j
does not default, and less than 1 if rm j defaults. Taking default into account, the total
asset value of rm i is wi = ei +
P
j recjLij. Firm i defaults, denoted DEFi = 1, if its
total asset value falls short of its liabilities, wi < pi. Its default is fundamental if it would
default even in the absence of any other defaults, ei +
P
j Lij; otherwise, the default is
contagious.
Structural models of solvency determine the contagious defaults that follow as a conse-
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quence of the fundamental defaults. The diculty is that the vector w of asset values both
determines and depends on the vectors rec of recovery rates and DEF of default indicators.
Cascade models deal with this issue by breaking the cycle. Typically, the recovery rate
reci in case of default is taken to be an exogenously specied constant, and not allowed to
depend on the asset value wi.
Cascade models capture the domino eect: the default of one rm can directly cause
the default of its creditor, and thus indirectly cause the default of its creditor's creditor.
In cascade models, defaulted rms are like fallen dominoes: once a rm defaults, what
happens to it no longer depends on what happens to other rms. For this reason, cascade
models do not suce to model the severity of defaults. Amini et al. (2010), Battiston et
al. (2012), Gai and Kapadia (2010), and Nier et al. (2007) use cascade models.
Clearing models allow for endogenous recovery rates: reci = min
n
1; wi
pi
o
, meaning
that in case of default, a rm's creditors receive its entire asset value. They deal with
the recovery problem by computing "clearing" vectors of asset values and recovery rates,
which are as high as possible, given the defaults that can not be avoided. Clearing models
of solvency allow more verisimilitude in modeling the severity of defaults and magnitude
of losses.
Giesecke (2004) also implements an approach which brings dependence into default
events by taking into account a learning eect. More precisely it proposes a structural
model of correlated multi-rm defaults in which investors update their information set
on the health status of rms as new information on the defaults arrives over time. Such
an approach may be able to represent the changes in the investors' beliefs consequent to
sudden default events such as the recent accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom and
Parmalat and, unfortunately, several others.
The Eisenberg and Noe (2001) model involves only liabilities of equal seniority. Elsinger
(2007) extends the analysis to include multiple levels of seniority and equity. Muller (2006)
adds credit lines and liquidity.
In summary, structural approach, led by Merton model, has the highly appealing feature
of connecting credit risk to underlying structural variables. It provides both an intuitive
economic interpretation and an endogenous explanation of credit defaults, and allows for
applications of option pricing methods. As a result, structural models not only facilitate
security valuation, but also address the choice of nancial structure. The main disad-
vantage of structural models lies in the diculty of implementation. For example, the
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assumption that corporate assets are continuously tradable is unrealistic, and calibrating
stochastic asset processes using publicly available information is sometimes more dicult
than anticipated. Furthermore, although improved structural models have addressed sev-
eral limitations of earlier models, they tend to be analytically complex and computationally
intensive. In general, structural models are particularly useful in areas such as counterparty
credit risk analysis, portfolio/security analysis and capital structure monitoring, while the
diculty in calibration limits their presence in front-oce environments. More precisely,
since its intuitive economic interpretation of the model facilitates consistent discussion re-
garding a variety of credit risk exposures, the structural model is particularly useful for
practitioners in the credit portfolio and credit risk management elds. Corporate transac-
tion analysis is also possible with the structural model. If an analyst wants to understand
the impact on credit quality of increased borrowing, share repurchases, or the acquisition of
another rm, the structural model naturally lends itself to understanding the transaction's
implications. In general, the ability to diagnose the input and output of the structural
model in terms of understandable economic variables (e.g. asset volatility as a proxy for
business risk, the market's assessment of an enterprise's value, and the market leverage) fa-
cilitates better communication among loan originators, credit analysts, and credit portfolio
managers.
3.1 First Passage Models and Liquidation Process Models
First Passage Models (FPM) were introduced by Black and Cox (1976) extending the
Merton model to the case when the rm may default at any time, not only at the maturity
date of the debt.
Consider that the dynamics of the rm's asset value under the risk neutral probability
measure P are given by the diusion process
dVt = rVtdt+ V VtdWt (1)
and that there exists a lower level of the asset value such that the rm defaults once it
reaches this level. Black and Cox (1976) considered a time dependent default threshold.
FPM have been extended to account for stochastic interest rates, bankruptcy costs,
taxes, debt subordination, strategic default, time dependent and stochastic default barrier,
jumps in the asset value process, etc. Although these extensions introduce more realism
60
into the model, they increment its analytical complexity. For an extensive review of FPM
see Bielecki and Rutkowski (2002, Chapter 3) and references therein.
The default threshold, always positive, can be interpreted as a safety covenant of the
rm's debt which allows the bondholders to take control of the company once its asset
value has reached this level. The safety covenant would act as a protection mechanism for
the bondholders against an unsatisfactory corporate performance. In this case, the default
threshold would be deterministic, or possibly time dependent, and exogenously xed when
the rm's debt is issued. Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993) and Longsta and
Schwartz (1995) assume an exogenously given constant default threshold K. Longsta and
Schwartz (1995) choose a constant default threshold and point out that (p. 793) \since
it is the ratio of Vt to K, rather than the actual value of K, that plays the major role
in our analysis, allowing a more general specication for K simply makes the model more
complex without providing additional insight into the valuation of risky debt."
Hsu, Saa-Requejo and Santa-Clara (2004) suggest that Vt and K do not matter directly
to the valuation of default risky bonds but only through their ratio, which is a measure
of the solvency of the rm. They model the default threshold as a stochastic process,
which together with the stochastic process assumed for the rm's asset value, allow them
to obtain the stochastic process of the ratio Vt
K
. The dynamics of the ratio Vt
K
are used to
price corporate bonds.
The default threshold can also be chosen endogenously by the stockholders to maximize
the value of the equity. See for example Mello and Parsons (1992), Nielsen et al. (1993),
Leland (1994), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Leland and Toft (1996) and Francois
and Morellec (2004). The literature has also considered the possibility of negotiation
processes between stockholders and bondholders when the rm goes near the point of
nancial distress, from which the default threshold is determined. Similarly as how we
described the choice of the face-value of the zero-coupon in the Merton model, in FPM the
default threshold can be calculated as a weighted average of short and long-term debts.
Interest rates can be considered either as a constant or as a stochastic process.13
The stochasticity of interest rates allows the model to introduce correlation between
asset value and interest rates, and to make the default threshold stochastic, in the cases it
13See Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994), and Leland and Toft (1996) for models with constant interest
rates, and see Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1993), Nielsen et al. (1993), Longsta and Schwartz
(1995), Bryis and de Varenne (1997), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), and Hsu, Saa-Requejo and
Santa-Clara (2004) for models with stochastic interest processes.
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is specied as the discounted value of the face value of the debt. Nielsen et al. (1993) and
Longsta and Schwartz (1995) consider a Vasicek process for the interest rate, correlated
with the rms' asset value.
Hsu, Saa-Requejo and Santa-Clara (2004) consider both the case of independence be-
tween risk-free interest rates and the default generating mechanism (given by the dynamics
of the ratio Vt
K
) and the case of correlation between both processes, specifying the risk-free
rate as a CIR process. They present an interesting empirical illustration of the model,
covering the calibration of the risk-free rate process and the estimation of the model's
parameter through the Generalized Method of Moments.
The principal drawback of FPM is the analytical complexity that they introduce, which
is increased if we consider stochastic interest rates or endogenous default thresholds. This
mathematical complexity makes dicult to obtain closed form expressions for the value
of the rm's equity and debt, or even for the default probability, forcing us to make use
of numerical procedures. In the literature we can nd that the empirical testing of FPM
and structural models in general has not been very successful. Zhou (1997, Abstract) indi-
cates that \the empirical application of a diusion approach has yielded very disappointing
results."
Another drawback of the structural models presented before is the so-called predictabil-
ity of defaults. Generally, structural models consider continuous diusion processes for the
rm's asset value and complete information about asset value and default threshold. In
this setting, the actual distance from the asset value to the default threshold tells us the
nearness of default, in such a way that if we are far away from default the probability of
default in the short-term is close to zero, because the asset value process needs time to
reach the default point. The knowledge of the distance of default and the fact that the
asset value follows a continuous diusion process makes default a predictable event, i.e.
default does not come as a surprise. This predictability of defaults makes the models gen-
erate short-term credit spreads close to zero. In contrast, it is observed in the market that
even short-term credit spreads are bounded from below, incorporating the possibility of an
unexpected default or deterioration in the rm's credit quality. The same characteristics
of the structural models that imply the predictability of default also imply predictability
of recovery. In models which do not consider strategic defaults, the bondholders get the
remaining value of the rm in case of default, which is precisely the value of the default
threshold at default. Thus, if we assume complete information about asset value and
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default threshold, the recovery rate is also a predictable quantity.
The predictability of default comes from the assumption of investors' perfect knowledge
of the rm's asset value and default threshold. In practice, it is not possible to deduce
from the capital structure of the rm neither the value of the rm Vt, its volatility V
, nor the level of the default threshold. If we consider incomplete information about
either the rm value process, the default threshold (or both), investors can only infer a
distribution function for these processes, which makes defaults impossible to predict. These
considerations can be found, among others, in Due and Lando (2001), Giesecke (2004)
and Jarrow and Protter (2004).
While in FPM default occurs the rst time the asset value goes below a certain lower
threshold, i.e. the rm is liquidated immediately after the default event14, in Liquidation
Process Models (LPM) the default event does not immediately cause liquidation but it
represents the beginning of a process, the liquidation process, which might or might not
cause liquidation after it is completed.
There is a clear distinction between the terms "default event" and "liquidation" and
in this distiction lies the dierence between LPM and FPM. A default event takes place
when the rm's asset value Vt goes below the lower threshold K (which can be exogenous,
constant, time dependent, stochastic or endogenously derived). A default event signals the
beginning of a nancially distressed period, which will not necessarily lead to liquidation.
Liquidation takes place when the rm is actually liquidated, its activity stops and its
remainings distributed among its claimholders.
In FPM described above the default event does coincide with liquidation.
If we consider that the liquidation process can take quite a while, it implies that past in-
formation shows itself as a signicant explanatory variable, together with contemporaneous
information, because it comprises information about the liquidation process. Information
here comprises the rms' nancial variables as well as nancial markets, business cycle,
credit markets and default cycle indicators. Couderc and Renault (2005) use a database
containing the rating history of over ten thousand rms for the period 1981-2003 and an-
alyze, using duration models, whether past values of several nancial markets (business
cycle, credit markets and default cycle) are relevant in explaining default probabilities in
addition to their contemporaneous values. Their results show the critical importance of
past information in default probabilities.
14The default event corresponds to the crossing of the asset value through the lower barrier.
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LPM extend FPM to account for the fact that the liquidation time takes place after
(sometimes quite a lot after) the occurrence of a default event. Francois and Morellec
(2004), Moraux (2004), and Galai, Raviv and Wiener (2005) put forward theoretical LPM.
Francois and Morellec (2004) consider that, after a default event, i.e. after the asset
value Vt goes below the lower threshold K, a rm is liquidated if and only if Vt remains
below K consecutively during a period of time of a given length d (which in their numerical
simulations they take to be 2 years). If a default event happens and the asset value
remains under the lower threshold for a period lower than d the liquidation process nishes
and the rm continues business activities as usual15. The authors provide closed-form
solutions for corporate debt and equity values and analyze the implications of the model
for optimal leverage and credit spreads. Numerical simulations show that credit spreads
are an increasing function of the length d. Financial distress refers to the situation in
which Vt < K. The author derives closed form solutions for dierent claims such as equity,
dierent seniority debts and convertible debt. In particular, the value of equity is derived as
a Down and Out Parisian option written on the rm assets and a Down and Out cumulative
call option. Numerical simulations show that the value of equity is an increasing function
of d, and that, unlike in Francois and Morellec (2004), credit spreads increase or decrease
with d depending on the seniority of the debt.
Galai, Raviv and Wiener (2005) represent a step forward in the renement of LPM,
proposing a model extending and including the two previous ones. Galai, Raviv and
Wiener argue that in the two previous models, the only thing that matters for a rm
to be liquidated is the amount of time it spends in nancial distress (either successively
or cumulatively), but they fail to (p. 5) \capture the following two common features of
bankruptcy procedures: (i) Recent distress events may have a greater eect on the decision
to liquidate a rm's assets then old distress events. ... (ii) Severe distress events may have
greater eect on the decision to liquidate a rm than mild distress events." To account for
such two stylized facts, the authors propose a structural model in which a rm is liquidated
when a state variable representing the cumulative weighted time period spent by the rm
in distress exceeds d. At each time, the cumulative weighted time period is computed as
a weighted average of the total time spent by the rm in distress, weighted by (i) how
far away in the past such distress occurred and (ii) how severe was such a distress, where
15The number of successfully managed past default events and liquidation periods the rms has experi-
enced does not aect the maximum length d of future liquidation periods.
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distress severity is measured as an increasing function of max f0; K   V g. The authors
solve the model numerically using Monte Carlo simulation based on Parisian options.
3.2 State Dependent Models
Another branch within the structural approach consists of extending standard models with
regime switching: some of the model parameters are state-contingent. States can represent
the state of the business cycle or simply the rm's external rating. Cash-ows, bankruptcy
costs and funding costs might be state-dependent. This branch of structural models is able
to reduce the problems of predictability of defaults (and recovery) suered by standard
models because the rm is subject to exogenous changes of parameters which aect its
ability to generate cash ows or its funding costs, which are the main drivers of default
probabilities.
Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) put forward two dierent models illustrating the
previous ideas. In both cases the authors provide closed form expressions for the value of
equity and debt, whose solution imply solving systems of ordinary dierential equations.
In Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2006) cash ows and recovery rates depend on the state
of the business cycle. Cash ows follow a geometric Brownian motion and are scaled by a
business cycle scalar factor: they are higher in expansions than in recessions. In the same
way, bankruptcy costs are expressed as a state-dependent fraction of the rm's assets; again,
the recovery rate in expansions, H is higher than in recessions L, H > L. At each point
in time, there is an exogenous probability of switching between recession and expansion.
The default threshold is endogenously chosen by shareholders to maximize the value of
equity, and it turns out to be higher in recessions: the rm defaults earlier in recessions
than in expansions. Numerical examples illustrate the implications of the model for default
thresholds, default clustering, optimal leverage (countercyclical) and credit spreads.
As described by Due (2005, p. 2772), \It has become increasingly common for bond
issuers to link the size of the coupon rate on their debt with their credit rating, oering
a higher coupon rate at lower ratings, perhaps in an attempt to appeal to investors based
on some degree of hedging against a decline in credit quality. This embedded derivative
is called a `ratings-based step-up."' The author illustrates an example of a ratings-based
step-up bond issued by Deutsche Telecom in 2002 with coupon payments linked to the
rm's rating.
As well as LPM, State Dependent Models (SDM) have only been developed theoretically
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and their future success in credit risk modelling (if any) lies in their empirical applicability
and their ability to replicate and predict credit spreads and default probabilities.
3.3 Default Correlation in Structural Models
The most natural way to introduce default dependences between rms in structural models
is by correlating the rms' asset processes. Describing a rm's asset value process by
geometrical Brownian motion means that defaults are perfectly predictable. This approach
is used in Vasicek formula, also called the asymptotic single risk factor approach, which
forms the heart of the IRB16 formula of Basel II. Vasicek (1987) assumes the portfolio
is comprised of similar borrowers with the same default probabilities. Given correlation
between returns on the assets of the borrowers in the portfolio and given the level of
condence, his formula species the level of capital that is required to prevent the bank
from going bankrupt in one year, assuming no recovery.
Huang et al (2007) suggest a higher order saddlepoint approximation for estimation
of asset returns correlation in a concentrated credit portfolio. This technique allows for
a more adequate estimate of obligors' returns distributions, and thus, for an enhanced
estimate of portfolio credit risk. Huang et al (2007) also demonstrate that this approach
can be extended for a more general multi-factor returns correlation model with stochastic
loss given default17.
Vasicek (1987 and 1991) model and its derivatives are often criticized on the grounds
that these models accommodate for predictable defaults. One way of leaving out the
problem of the default predictability would be to introduce jump components in the rms'
asset processes. Those jump components could be either correlated or uncorrelated across
16Internal Rating Based approach, proposed by Basle Committee, permits the lending institutions to
use their own internal measures for key drivers of credit risk as primary inputs to the capital calculation,
subject to meeting certain conditions and to explicit supervisory approval. All institutions using the IRB
approach will be allowed to determine the borrowers' probabilities of default while those using the advanced
IRB approach will also be permitted to rely on own estimates of loss given default and exposure at default
on an exposure-by-exposure basis. These risk measures are converted into risk weights and regulatory
capital requirements by means of risk weight formulas specied by the Basel Committee
17Basel II Capital Adequacy accord and most of the industrial credit risk models use loss given default
(LGD), Or recovery rate (RR), with RR = (1-LGD), as one of the building blocks for estimation of the
expected loss of a credit portfolio, dening loss given default as the ratio of losses to exposure at default.
For measurement and estimation approaches of the LGD, see Shuermann (2004).
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rms. Correlated jump components, besides making defaults unpredictable, would also
account for credit risk contagion eects. The main problem lies in the calibration of those
jump components. Giesecke (2004) proposes a model in which the default thresholds are
constant and known, and in which the distribution of the historical lows of rms' asset
value processes are linked through a copula function.
Giesecke (2004) and Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) suggest that the default correlation
implied by the use of correlated rms' asset processes accounts for the dependence of the
rms' credit quality on common macroeconomic factors, what they call cyclical default
correlation, but it does not account for credit risk contagion across rms and periods of
default clustering. In order to introduce the contagion correlation in the model, Giesecke
(2004) and Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) propose a model in which the rms' default
thresholds are dependent one to each other and are unknown to investors.
Cyclical default correlation does not account for all the credit risk dependence between
rms. Giesecke (2004) extends structural models for default correlation to incorporate
credit risk contagion eects under incomplete information. The default of one rm can
trigger the default of other related rms. Furthermore, default times tend to concentrate
in some periods of time in which the probability of default of all rms is increased and
which can not be totally, or even partially, explained by the rms' common dependence
on some macroeconomic factors. Contagion eects can arise in this setting by direct links
between rms in terms of, for example, commercial or nancial relationships. The news
about the default of one rm have a big impact in the credit quality of other related rms
which is immediately reected in their default probabilities.
In structural rst passage models it is assumed that investors have complete informa-
tion about both asset processes and default thresholds, so they always know the distance
of default for each rm, i.e. the distance between the actual level of the rm's assets and
its default threshold. Giesecke (2004) introduces contagion eects in the model by relaxing
the assumption that investors have complete information about the default thresholds of
the rms, while maintaining the assumption of complete information about the diusion
process governing the dynamics of the rms' asset process. Bond holders do not have
perfect information neither about such thresholds nor about their joint distribution. How-
ever, they form a prior distribution which is updated at any time one of such thresholds
is revealed, which only happens when the corresponding rm defaults. In other terms,
in Giesecke (2004) investors have incomplete information about the rms' default thresh-
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olds but complete information about their asset processes. Giesecke and Goldberg (2011)
extend that framework to one in which investors do not have information neither about
the rms' asset values nor about their default thresholds. In this case, default correlation
is introduced through correlated asset processes and, again, investors receive information
about the rms' asset and default barrier only when they default. Such information is used
to update their priors about the distribution of the remaining rms' asset values and de-
fault thresholds. The incomplete information about the level of the default thresholds and
the fact that those levels are dependent between rms represent the source of credit risk
contagion. Investors form a belief, in terms of both individual and joint distribution func-
tions, about the level of the rms' default thresholds. Each time one of the rms default,
the true level of its default threshold is revealed, and investors use this new information
to update their beliefs about the default thresholds of the rest of the rms. The update of
the investors' perceptions about the default thresholds of the rm, and thus about the dis-
tance of default for each rm, introduces the default contagion eects in the models. This
model allows the introduction of default correlation both through dependences between
rms' asset values, cyclical default correlations, and through dependences between rms'
default barriers, i.e. contagion eect. The major problem of this approach is to calibrate
and estimate the default threshold.
The uncertainty of the default point is discussed by Galai, Raviv and Wiener (2005).
The authors argue that in practice default does not necessarily lead to immediate change
of control or to liquidation of the rm's assets by its debtholders. To consider the impact
of this on the valuation of corporate securities, they develop a model in which liquidation is
driven by a state variable that accumulates with time and severity of distress. This model
can be viewed as a generalization of the Merton's framework, in which liquidation occurs
only upon debt maturity, and the Black-Cox model, in which reorganization of the rm's
assets is invoked when a minimum threshold is violated during the lifetime of the debt.
4 Structural vs Reduced-Form Models: an informa-
tion based perspective
Under an information based perspective, the dierence between these two model types can
be characterized in terms of the information assumed known by the modeler. Structural
models assume that the modeler has the same information set as the rm's manager,
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i.e. complete knowledge of all the rm's assets and liabilities. In most situations, this
informational assumption implies that a rm's default time is predictable18. In contrast,
reduced form models assume knowledge of a less detailed information set, i.e., that the
modeler has the same information set as the market, and incomplete knowledge of the
rm's condition. In most cases, this informational assumption implies that the rm's
default time is inaccessible19. The reconciliation between structural and reduced form
models is based on the information structure the models assume, and dierent information
frameworks will have dierent implications.
The informational perspective, which leads to this reconciliation of the two approaches,
is the hypothesis of Jarrow, Potter (2004). Jarrow and Protter (2004) argue that the key
distinction between structural and reduced form models is not whether the default time is
predictable or inaccessible, but whether the information set is observed by the market or
not. According to Jarrow, Potter (2004), the reduced form approach and the structural ap-
proach are not disconnected and disjoint model types, as is commonly supposed, but rather
they are really the same model containing dierent informational assumptions. Given this
insight, one sees that the key distinction between structural and reduced form models is
not in the characteristic of the default time, i.e. if it is predictable or inaccessible, but in
the information set available to the modeler. Indeed, structural models can be transformed
into reduced form models as the information set changes and becomes less rened, from
that observable by the rm's management to that which is observed by the market.
As a consequence of this observation, the debate in the credit risk literature about these
two model types is misleading. Rather than debating which model type should be used in
force of forecasting performance, the debate should be focused on what type of information
set the model should assume, i.e. whether the informational assumptions should comprise
the information observed by the market or not. For pricing and hedging credit risk, the
information set observed by the market is the relevant one, cause this information is the
one used by the market, in equilibrium, to determine prices. This belief should suggest
that the reduced form approach is the most suitable one and that it should be employed.
Futhermore, inside this information structure, the characteristic of the rm's default time
is determined as a corollary, i.e. whether it is a predictable or totally inaccessible stopping
time.
18Complete knowledge leads to a predictable default time. But this is not necessarily the case: an
example would be where the rm's asset value follows a continuous time jump diusion process
19Imperfect knowledge leads to an inaccessible default time.
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In the credit risk literature, there appears to be no disagreement that the asset value
process is unobservable by the market (see especially: Duan, 1994; Ericsson and Reneby,
2002, 2005 in this regard). This consensus gives support to the use of reduced form models.
Futhermore, without assuming the rm's asset value as continuously observed, the available
information set implies that the rm's default time is inaccessible, and that a hazard rate
model should be applied.
Most structural models assume complete information. Jarrow and Protter's claim rests
on the premise that a modeler only has as much information as the market; this makes
the reduced-form approach more realistic. In practice, however, the complete information
assumption in structural models is an approximation designed to facilitate a simpler way of
capturing the various economic nuances of how a rm operates. The strength or weakness
of a model should be evaluated on its usefulness in real world applications. A reduced-form
model, while not compromising on the theoretical issue of complete information, suers
from other weaknesses including lack of clear economic rationale for dening the nature of
the default process.
Reduced-form models are characterized by exibility in their functional form. This ex-
ibility is both a strength and a weakness. Given the exible structure in the functional form
for reduced-form models, tting a narrow collection of credit spreads is straightforward.
But this exibility in functional form may result in a model with strong in-sample tting
properties, but poor out-of-sample predictive ability. Since this type of model represents a
generally non-theoretic20 characterization of default risk, diagnosing how to improve per-
formance of these models can be challenging. Diculties in interpretation of results are
particularly acute when modeling large cross-sections of debt instruments { particularly
when there is a high degree of heterogeneity in terms of credit quality.
Structural and reduced-form models are viewed as competing paradigms. However,
recent work by Due and Lando (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2010),
Cetin et al. (2004) and Jarrow and Protter (2004) point out an intrinsic connection between
these two approaches.
According to Guo, Jarrow and Zeng (2005, p. 2):
"Reduced-form models can be viewed as structural models that are analyzed under dif-
ferent ltrations. Structural models are based on the information set available to the rm's
management, which includes continuous-time observations of both asset values and liabili-
20Less grounded in the economics driving default than in mathematical tractability.
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ties. Reduced-form models are based on the information set available to the market, typically
including only partial observations of both the rm's asset values and liabilities. As shown
in examples by Due and Lando (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003),
Cetin et al. (2004), and Jarrow and Protter (2004), it is possible to transform a structural
model with a predictable default time into a reduced-form model, with a totally inacces-
sible default time, by formulating the so called \incomplete information". For instance,
Due and Lando (2001) used noisy and discretely observed asset value in a continuous-
time model, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2003) used a simple form of delayed
information in a Brownian motion type model."
The aim of Guo, Jarrow and Zeng (2005, p. 2) is to address the issue of \incomplete
information"; the notion of \incomplete information" has not been mathematically and
systematically studied. Indeed, it is unclear if incomplete information such as the \noisy
information" and the \delayed information" can be unied under a proper mathematical
framework. They dene the notion of \delayed information", for both discrete and contin-
uous type. They generalize the work by Due and Lando (2001), Collin-Dufresne et al.
(2003), and characterize the existence of an intensity process for any Markov models, with
and without jumps. They show that delayed information transforms a predictable default
time into a totally inaccessible stopping time.
In recent years, some papers have tried to bridge the gap between the two main ap-
proaches in credit risk modelling: structural and reduced form models. They consider
standard structural models under a dierent informational perspective, i.e. modifying in-
formational assumptions: more precisely they suppose incomplete information. The aim is
to obtain reduced form models in which the intensity of default is not given exogenously
but determined endogenously within the model; the intensity of default would be a func-
tion of the rm's characteristics and the level of information that investors posses. The
main distinguishing characteristic of structural models with respect to reduced form mod-
els is that the structural approach provide a link between the probability of default and
the rms' fundamental nancial variables: assets and liabilities. Reduced form models use
market prices of the rms' defaultable instruments (such as bonds or credit default swaps)
to extract both their default probabilities and their credit risk dependencies, relying on
the market as the only source of information regarding the rms' credit risk structure. Re-
duced form models are easy to be calibrated, but are characterized by lack of link between
credit risk and the information regarding the rms' nancial situation incorporated in their
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assets and liabilities structure.
The crucial element to close the distance between the two approaches lies in the model's
information assumptions. Using a specication of a structural model where investors do
not have complete information about the dynamics of the processes which trigger the rm's
default, it would be possible to derive a cumulative rate of default consistent with a reduced
form model. Generally, in structural models, there is the assumption of complete informa-
tion; due to this, investors are able to predict the arrival of default. This predictability of
default implies zero short-term credit spreads for the rm's debt, which is not consistent
with the short-term spreads seen in practice21. The assumption of complete information
about asset and default processes is not realistic from the point of view of investors, since it
assumes that at each moment in time investors know the true value of the rm's assets and
the true value of the default threshold. Relaxing the assumption of complete information
makes the default time an unpredictable event.
Reduced form models overcome the limitation related to the lack of consistency of the
complete knowledge assumption specifying an exogenous default intensity which makes
default an unpredictable event. Due and Singleton (2003) point out that \with imperfect
information, default occurs at some intensity, so one may view this structural model with
imperfect information as formally equivalent to a reduced-form model that has the endoge-
nously determined default intensity with rst passage." In contrast to classical models, the
time of default in intensity models is not determined via the value of the rm, but it is
the rst jump of a point process. Intensity models assume the existence of an exogenously
given process, the intensity of default, which represents the intensity of arrival of the de-
fault time. These models solve the problem of default predictability but they lack of an
endogenous specication of default based on the rm's economic fundamentals.
The main problem with reduced form models is that the arrival of default is not modeled
on any characteristic of the rm's underlying credit quality. Relaxing the complete infor-
mation assumption, Due and Lando (2001), Cetin et al. (2004), Giesecke (2004, 2006)
and Giesecke and Goldberg (2004), and Guo, Jarrow and Zeng (2005) arrive, through dif-
ferent although equivalent ways, to a framework which links both credit risk modelling
approaches.
Due and Lando (2001) consider a model in which the default time is xed by the
rm's managers in order to maximize the value of the equity, as in Leland and Toft (1996),
21In practice it is observed that they are bounded from below away from zero.
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considering a geometric Brownian motion for the asset process. Investors cannot observe
the issuer's assets directly, and receive only periodic and imperfect accounting reports.
Due and Lando derive the distribution of the rm's asset value conditional to investors'
information and from it the intensity of default in terms of the conditional asset distribution
and the default threshold.
Giesecke (2006) represents the case of a structural model in which investors have com-
plete information about both the level of the rm's asset value and the default threshold.
Considering a continuous process for the asset value, it poses itself inside a standard rst
passage model which implies predictable defaults. After that, he deals with the case of
complete information about the asset value but incomplete information about the default
threshold. The default threshold is a constant value, but it is not known by the investors,
who are forced to work under a distribution function for the default threshold. The im-
possibility of observing the default threshold makes the default time an unpredictable
event. Investors can calculate the pricing trend in terms of the distribution function for
the threshold and the observable historical asset value. After that, Giesecke studies the
cases of incomplete information for the asset value and complete information about the
default threshold, and nally, incomplete information for both the asset value and the
default threshold. In contrast with the previous case in which investors have incomplete
information about the default threshold but complete information about the asset value
process, with imperfect asset information the pricing trend, calculated in terms of the
threshold distribution and the distribution for the minimum historical asset level, admits
an intensity representation.
Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) consider the case in which the default barrier is ran-
dom and unobserved. Investors don't know the default threshold, so they use a priori
distribution for its value.
Giesecke (2004) takes the incomplete information assumption in structural model and
use it to model the default correlation. He provides a structural model in which the rms'
default probabilities are linked via a joint distribution for their default thresholds. There
is no perfect information about neither such thresholds nor about their joint distribution.
They form a prior distribution which is updated at any time one of such thresholds is
revealed, which only happens when one of the rms defaults. In Giesecke (2004) investors
have incomplete information about the rms' default thresholds but complete information
about their asset processes. Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) extend that framework to one
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in which investors do not have information neither about the rms' asset values nor about
their default thresholds. In this case, default correlation is introduced through correlated
asset processes and investors receive information about the rms' asset and default barrier
only when they default.
Cetin et al. (2004) propose another approach to link structural and reduced form
models assuming that investors receive only a reduced version of the information that is
available for rm's managers. They claim that the default time is a predictable event
for rm's managers, since they have enough information about the rm's fundamentals.
But public investors do not have access to that information, since they observe a reduced
version of this information. The rm's Cash Flow is the variable which triggers default,
after reaching some minimum levels during a given period of time. While rm's managers
can observe the CF levels, investors can only receive information about the sign of the
CF and, due to this, the default time is unpredictable for them. They derive the default
intensity as seen by the market.
Resuming, examining the two approaches under an informational perspective implies
that, in order to distinguish which credit risk model is applicable, structural or reduced
form, one needs to understand what information set is available to the modeler. Structural
models assume that the information available is that held by the rm's managers, while
reduced form models assume that it is the information observable to the market. Given
this perspective, the dening characteristics of these models is not the property of the
default time, i.e. if it is predictable or inaccessible - but rather the information structure
of the model itself.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have reviewed the two primary types of credit risk models in the literature,
referred to as structural and reduced-form (or intensity) models, and we have analyzed
them from an information based perspective, in the style of Jarrow and Protter (2004).
This perspective allows to make easier the comparison between the two approaches and it
is also a good source of creation for a new stream of literature that is able to incorporate
and reconcile both the approaches inside hybrid models, in order to get improvements in
assessing counterparty and credit risk. In both separated streams of literature, the main
objective is the default prediction; hence the debate amongst models should naturally be
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concentrated on it. A unitary vision of the two approaches should consider the two streams
of models as being actually the same, but using dierent assumptions about information
available to the modeler.
From the informational point of view, structural models assume complete knowledge
(very detailed and continuous information), closed to that of the managers visibility. The
main implication is that this type of model is very appropriate for internal scopes and also
for regulatory ones (in case of commercial banks)22. On the other hand, the reduced form
models assume knowledge of a less detailed information set, like that observed by the mar-
ket (available for the investors). The main implication is that default time is unpredictable.
Market information should be taken into account, and, consequently, reduced models are
important in force of realistic reasons. When prices - hence rms' evolution - are deter-
mined, in equilibrium, in the market, they are drawn by the actors knowing only public
info. For example, assets value process is not observable to the outsiders, more exactly
is discontinuously observed, when rm discloses accounting info and other relevant issues.
This view makes the reduced form models very appropriate for pricing and hedging credit
risk. For a correct analysis of these models one should also take into account a big problem
that they induce, comparing with the rst stream: now the default arises exogenously,
not endogenously, like in the structural models (called, for this characteristic, cause-eect
models). This is also contradicted by reality, because reduced form models assumed that
default is not linked at all with rms' characteristics, which is clearly a shortcoming of
these models.
The intuition behind the reconciliation view arises as a way to improve the previous
separated streams, and also to take into account their weak points and to nd some way
to deal with them. Basically, the target is to implement models which should be more
realistic from the general outsider point of view, that deal with incomplete information or
at least with relaxed assumptions about complete information, where default should be
unpredictable, but also endogenously inuenced. The very recent development of the topic
22To clarify this, we consider that it is clear that for internal needs the most appropriate models should
use as much as possible the information available for the managers; the question remains "Why the
regulators could (and should) use structural models?". The answer is "Because they have the right, by
law, (and access) to almost the same information as insiders (managers), so they should benet from this
situation". Also, when analyzing structural models, one should also take into account a weak point: if no
jumps are allowed, default time is predictable, or in other words, they theoretically suggest a zero-short
term spread, which contradicts the empirically observed behavior.
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can be an explanation of the complexity and importance of these models, but also can
suggest that many things about these models were not revealed up to now. Reconciliation
or hybrid models should be aimed to relax complete information knowledge assumption,
such that starting from structural models with predictable defaults to obtain hazard rate
models with inaccessible default.
Due and Lando (2001), Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) and Cetin et al. (2004) repre-
sent three dierent approaches in order to reconcile the two main approaches.
Due and Lando (2001) model is very similar with rst passage models (the default
time is xed by the managers for maximization of rms' equity value). The investors
are receiving periodic and imperfect accounting reports, and they make inferences about
the rm's evolution based on these reports, and adding, obviously, their beliefs (noise).
The crucial point of the paper is that, even it starts more as a structural model, it can
assure an unpredictable default, like the reduced form models. The explanation of this
major changing of the stopping time from predictable to unpredictable is that between the
observation times, the investor cannot see the evolution of assets.
Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) assume, in accordance with structural models, continu-
ously observed asset value. In their approach the noise is also introduced, but the manner
is quite dierent: default barrier is a random curve, more exactly beta distributed, with
height expressed in terms of rm leverage. The explanation behind it is quite intuitive:
when the leverage ratio is at a recent high, then the short-term uncertainty is high also.
The modeler cannot see the curve, which is independent of the underlying structural model,
so the default time depends on an unobservable curve, hence is inaccessible. That way it
is solved the predictability problem from the structural models.
Cetin et al. (2004) model can be viewed as an alternative approach to previous two.
The authors, instead of adding noise to obscure information as in Due and Lando (2001),
they start also with a structural model but with a modeled ltration G that is a strict
sub-ltration of that available to the managers (incomplete, but correct information). The
default time is the rst time, after the cash ows are below zero, when cash ow remains
below zero for a certain time and then doubles in absolute magnitude. In this way a
totally inaccessible default time is obtained, and the point process has intensity, so this is
an intensity based hazard model.
Any structural model with incomplete information admits a pricing trend, but not all
admit intensity. Unpredictability of default is a necessary, but not sucient, condition for
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the pricing trend to admit intensity. Also, information level determines whether the model
admits intensity: when there is certainty, there is no intensity. Then, by starting with a
structural model (i.e. by considering the structural model with complete info about assets
and default barrier as starting point, the most "complete" in terms of quantity and quality
of available information), and relaxing in dierent degrees the information assumptions,
Giesecke and Goldberg (2004) notice that, if it is assumed incomplete information about
barrier, it can be calculated the pricing trend in terms of distribution function for the
barrier and the observable historical asset value. Here pricing trend does not admit an
intensity of default. If it is assumed incomplete info for both assets and barrier, the pricing
trend admits an intensity representation. An important nding is that, in some particular
conditions, regardless that the default barrier is observable or not, a structural model
with incomplete asset info admits an intensity representation. So there is not gain for a
reconciliation modeler to relax on barrier part; also the existence of intensity, if it is needed
in a particular model, is assured.
Another framework to develop a desirable reconciliation model could be to start the
other way around, i.e. with reduced models approach. Here the modeler only knows
discrete and perfect pieces of information (accounting reports at the moment when revealed,
public information about the rm, also in short term after revealing). He has to make
inferences for the periods he does not have information. For that reason, the modeler can
use the theory and formulas developed for reduced form models, but must weight dierently
information, relying more on what he perfectly knows (for short period of time) and less
on the inferred part, because it is altered with its own beliefs and inferences.
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Abstract
Empirical evidence shows that the implicit interest rate in a trade credit agree-
ment is generally very high compared to the rates of bank credit. In spite of this
apparent high cost, trade credit is widely used and represents an important propor-
tion of rmsnance. This paper analyses the e¤ects of trade credit on the investment
decisions of a nancially constrained rm in a manufacturing supply chain, with par-
ticular reference to a context of nancial turmoil and credit rationing. Trade credit
creates systemic risk but, at the same time, enhances the resilience of rms to liq-
uidity shocks and, through the exibility of repayment terms, a¤ects positively the
inventory investment decisions and, consequently, the future expected levels of output
and revenues. These feature of trade credit are investigated with the aim of pinning
down their e¤ects on the nancing of inventory investments of liquidity-constrained
rms. To this end, we put forward a multi-factor model of trade credit connections
in supply chains which is able to capture the insurance e¤ect of trade credit, i.e. the
insurance coverage against liquidity risk embedded in trade credit contracts, thanks
to which a nancially-constrained rm su¤ering a liquidity shortage can maintain a
level of expected inventory investment (and, as a consequence, a future expected out-
put level) as close as possible to the optimal desired level. We measure the insurance
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andrea.toto@unich.it, m.eboli@unich.it
90
e¤ect of trade credit by characterising the impact of an exogenous liquidity shock on
the investment decisions and future expected output level of a nancially constrained
rm in manufacturing supply chain, under the assumption that its supplier is willing
to concede a repayment deferral of a portion of the trade debt . Finally we use the
optimality conditions to derive a reduced form inventories equation in order to test
empirically the implications of the model.
Keywords: Financing Constraints  Supply Chains  Trade Credit  Credit
Rationing Inventories.
1 Introduction
In general, it is well established that liquidity constraints limit the investment decisions
of rms and, consequently, their output. In the manufacturing sectors, given the relative
rigidity of the production in the short run, liquidity shocks are bound to a¤ect not only the
levels of investment and output, but also the protability of rms (or the implicit wages
paid in family rms). Financing the production of rms operating in manufacturing sectors
is an issue that constantly attracts the attention of both researchers and policy makers,
especially so during periods when the institutional framework of the relations between
banks and rms is undergoing substantial changes (e.g. Basel Agreements II and III).
The issue becomes particularly relevant in periods of economic downturn associated with
a nancial crisis (like the current one), when the traditional concerns for the di¢ culties
faced by manufacturing rms in accessing bank credit are reinforced by the emergence
of liquidity shortages and the detrimental e¤ects that such constraints can have on the
investment decisions and, consequently, on the production and earnings of manufacturing
rms.
An analysis of the coverage of the nancial needs arising from investment in working
capital requires a careful evaluation of the role played by the sources of funding, such as self-
nancing and trade credit, that do not come from banks or other nancial intermediaries.
Regardless of the actual severity of liquidity constraints due to the rationing of bank credit,
such sources of funds are relevant in as much as they are intertwined with the contractual
terms (timing of payments, discounts, pricing, etc.) of the commercial links that rms
have with their suppliers and buyers. Moreover, trade credit is particularly relevant for
liquidity-constrained rms in that the default of a buyer does not imply the end of the
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commercial relation between the supplier and the defaulting client. It is well established
by empirical evidence, and explained by economic theory, that it is more convenient for
a supplier to concede a deferral of payment to a defaulting client, rather than to push
for the liquidation of its assets, i.e. its bankruptcy. Thus, the use of trade credit as
a source of funding improves the resilience of a liquidity-constrained rm to unexpected
nancial shortages, i.e. it helps an illiquid rm to stay solvent. In other words, trade credit
contracts embed an insurance coverage against liquidity risk. The cost of this insurance is
incorporated in the pricing policies set by suppliers (who often use trade credit terms to
discriminate among their clients) and, as a consequence, a¤ect the allocation of earnings
among the rms that belong to a supply chain. On the other hand, the fact that in a
trade credit contract a supplier shares part of the liquidity risk run by its client, implies
that a liquidity shock su¤ered by a defaulting rm is transmitted to its supplier and from
the latter to its own suppliers and so forth, generating a systemic liquidity risk a¤ecting
most of the rms in a supply chain. In brief, the use of trade credit in supply chains
provides funding and the sharing of liquidity risk but, at the same time, it creates the
grounds for nancial contagion.
Trade credit arises when a supplier allows a customer to delay the payment of goods
already delivered. It is generally associated with the purchase of intermediate goods. Ap-
pearing in rmsbalance sheets as accounts receivable (on the sellers side) and accounts
payable (on the buyers side), trade credit is a type of credit sellers extend to buyers, allow-
ing the latter to purchase goods from the former without immediate payment. Common
wisdom in operations suggests that demand uncertainty and early commitment to order
quantities leave the buyer (downstream rm) with signicant inventory risks, hence forcing
the buyer to order less than would be optimal for the supply chain. As a type of inter-rm
contracts, trade credit has unique advantages in mitigating this problem: rst, the amount
and timing of trade credit are closely associated with purchase and inventory decisions,
second, the repayment of trade credit is contingent on the demand realization and possible
liquidity shocks, similar to many risk-sharing mechanisms in channel coordination.
Empirical evidence shows that the implicit interest rate in a trade credit agreement is
generally very high compared to the rates of bank credit. The reason why trade credit
appears to be an expensive form of nance lies within the structure of a standard trade
credit contract. A typical deal normally involves three elements: a discount on the price
agreed if the buyer pays early; the number of days that qualify for early payment; and the
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maximum number of days for payment. For example, a common contract called 2-10 net
30means that if customers pay within ten days of delivery they qualify for a 2% discount.
Otherwise they can pay up to 30 days after delivery. The discount for early payment
implies an interest rate that the customer pays for the credit received. In the case of the
2-10 net 30contract, the customer is e¤ectively receiving credit at a 2% rate for 20 days.
Thus the equivalent one year interest rate of this deal is about 44%. This is an extremely
high rate compared with the market rate that a bank would charge for a similar type of
loan. Other common deals also have very high interest rates. For example, one of the most
common contracts in the US, according to Ng et al. (1999), is the 8-30 net 50, analogous
to the previous one, but corresponding with an annual interest rate of 358%. In spite of
this apparent high cost (i.e. the high interest rates implicit in delayed payment prices),
trade credit is widely used and represents an important and considerable proportion of
rmsnance, as will be extensively illustrated in the section 2. It is therefore surprising
that banks do not take over this potentially protable business, o¤ering more credit lines
to nance commercial transactions.
There are a number of empirical ndings suggesting that rms su¤ering from credit
rationing use trade credit. As noted by Mian and Smith (1992, 1994) credit extended by a
seller who allows delayed payment for his products, or trade credit, represents a substantial
fraction of corporate liabilities, especially for middle-market companies. The authors report
that "for the 3,550 non nancial Nasdaq rms covered by COMPUSTAT, accounts payable
were 26% of corporate liabilities, at the end of 1992." Atanasova, Wilson (2003) nd that in
a Federal Reserve Board study, Elliehausen and Wolken (1993) note that accounts payable
constituted 20% of all non-bank, non-farm small businessesliabilities and 15% of all large
rmsliabilities in 1987. In addition, more than 80% of all rms used trade credit. On the
other hand, accounts receivable is one of the main assets on most corporate balance sheets,
representing on average up to 30-35% of total assets. Petersen and Rajan (1994,1995) nd
that rms which are less likely to be bank credit constrained tend to rely less on trade
credit. They show that rms without relationships with banks resort more to trade credit,
and sellers with greater ability to generate cashows provide more trade credit. Empirical
results of Nilsen (1994) show that rms react to monetary contractions by using trade
credit: when the interest rates increase (because the monetary policy is tightened), small
rms react by using trade credit to avoid credit rationing. During monetary contractions,
small rms, which Gertler and Gilchrist (1993a, 1993b) suggest are likely to be particularly
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bank credit rationed, react by borrowing more from their suppliers. Also, trade credit tends
to be used less in economies where relationships between banks and rms are strong, such as
Germany [see Breig (1994)], or where nancial markets play an information transmission
and monitoring role, such as the United States, and more in economies where nancial
markets are less developed and bank rm relationships are more distant, such as France.
These empirical ndings raise a puzzle. i) Why is trade credit so expensive? ii) Why is
trade nanced by suppliers instead of banks? iii) Why is trade credit available when bank
credit is rationed? and iv) Why do companies rely on their suppliers to obtain nancing,
rather than specialized nancial intermediaries such as banks or nancial markets? Sup-
pliers are themselves more likely to be credit constrained and to have high cost of funds
than banks. Hence when banks cannot lend, suppliers should not be able to lend either.
In the section 2 we illustrate most of the answers that researchers gave to the trade credit
puzzle.
This paper focuses on the role of trade credit in manufacturing supply chains, with the
aim of putting forward an analytical model of trade credit connections in supply chains
which is able to measure the degree of exposure of such investment decisions to unexpected
liquidity constraints arising from liquidity risk and systemic risk, and to capture the in-
surance e¤ect of trade credit, i.e. the insurance coverage against liquidity risk embedded
in trade credit contracts, thanks to which the rm, under liquidity shortage, can maintain
a level of inventory investments (and, as a consequence, a future expected output level)
as close as possible to the optimal desired level. By enhancing the resilience of rms to
liquidity shocks, the insurance e¤ect incorporated in the trade credit, under an aggregated
supply chain perspective, is able to improve the global resilience of the chain, despite the
fact that it create systemic risk. More precisely, in this paper we try to demonstrate an-
alytically that the insurance motive, through an increasing e¤ect on the marginal cost of
inventory investment, gives the nancially constrained buyer (the downstream rm) the
incentive to nance inventories with trade credit. Furthermore, also when less nancially
constrained, in term of access to bank credit, it can be optimal to borrow from suppliers,
since the "defaultability" of trade credit (i.e. the possibility to defer the repayment of the
trade debt, which we assume to be granted by supplier) gives the rm the possibility to
absorb expected liquidity shocks through a sort of risk-sharing mechanism. In this way
the rm improves its resilience to liquidity shocks and, under liquidity shortage, it is less
forced to reduce drastically investments in inventories and, consequently, the future ex-
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pected output level for the next period. To this end, we start from the model described in
Caggese (2007), inside which we consider the trade credit as substitute source of funding
respect on bank credit. Using the model, we measure the e¤ects of trade credit on invest-
ment decisions and expected output of a nancially constrained rm su¤ering a liquidity
shortage condition due to an exogenous liquidity shock.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature related
to this work. In doing this, we describe the most important empirical evidences in the
literature related to the trade credit. In section three we model the e¤ect of trade credit in
term of inventory investment decisions of a nancially constrained rm in a manufacturing
supply chain. In doing this we show that, under liquidity shock conditions and with
expectations of future nancial constraints, trade credit gives the rm an insurance against
liquidity shortage, allowing the rm to maintain the optimal desired level of inventory
investment. In section four we draw three possible empirical frameworks in order to test
the implications of the model over a sample of italian manufacturing rms. The proofs of
the propositions used in the paper are collected in the Appendix.
2 Trade Credit in Economic Theory
The widespread use of trade credit, despite its high cost, has attracted the attention of
economic theorists who, over the last fteen years, have provided convincing and exhaustive
answers to such a phenomenon.
The existing data show that trade credit constitutes a relevant share of the balance
sheet of companies in developed countries and an even larger share in developing coun-
tries. Trade credit is the largest source of short-term nancing for American corporations.
Most rms extensively use trade credit despite its apparent greater cost, and trade credit
interest rates commonly exceed 18 percent. Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that trade
credit, as a percentage of total credit granted to companies, amounts to 11,5% in Germany,
to 17% in France, 15% in the United States, 13,3% in Canada, 13,7% in Great Britain,
14,7% in Italy, and to 15,4% in Japan. These authors also argue that the trade credit
granted by companies, as a percentage of their total assets, goes from 13% in Canada to
29% in France and Italy. Cuñat (2007) shows that in Great Britain, trade credit amounts
to 17% of total assets, 43% of debts and 52% of short term debts of companies, while in
the US these percentages are 18%, 34% and 58%, respectively. This author sustains that
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these percentages grow during periods when buyers su¤er temporary liquidity shortages,
and that such an increase in trade credit occurs through defaults on existing debts, where
suppliers allow lenders to postpone payments. Suppliers seem to lend to their customers
experiencing nancial trouble, even when banks are not willing to lend. This additional
lending may occur through nancing a higher proportion of purchased goods or by ex-
tending the agreed maturity of the loans. Furthermore, in many circumstances, this extra
lending occurs via late payment of already extended debts. Cannari et al. (2004) study
trade credit terms in Italy on the basis of two surveys carried out by the Bank of Italy. The
authors show that, on average, 80-90 per cent of sales of the Italian companies surveyed are
paid on a deferred payment basis of 90 days on average and a delay of 11 days. 83 per cent
of trade credit is extended on net terms (with no discount o¤ered for prompt payment).
When two-part terms are o¤ered, the cost of trade credit is normally very high and well
above market interest rates. These results point to the importance of marketing determi-
nants for the extension of trade credit (product quality guarantee, customer relationships)
more than nancial motives. Most of suppliers (80 per cent) di¤erentiate customers by
means of price and payment terms in favor of older and bigger rms and long-standing
customers; they apply stricter terms to late payers, while being indulgent with those in
temporary distress. Two-part terms are o¤ered to not well-known customers and are aimed
at extracting information on their creditworthiness. The analysis shows that two-part and
net terms respond to very di¤erent aims. Contrary to the presumption of most of the
literature, generalizing the characteristics of two-part terms contract as pertaining to the
whole of credit transactions is unwarranted. Price and payment terms are a exible and
many-faceted device extensively used by rms for building customer relationships, acquir-
ing information on buyers creditworthiness, and exploiting market power.
An important aspect of trade credit, furthermore, is the two-way nature of the transac-
tion. Many companies, particularly those at intermediate points in the value chain, both
use trade credit as customers and provide it as suppliers. Trade credit thus represents a
substantial component of both corporate liabilities and assets. Prior empirical evidence
suggests that larger rms are, in aggregate, net trade credit providers and may therefore
provide an important mechanism for channelling nance down to those rms rationed by
nancial intermediaries. These studies nd that small rms, which are more likely to be
credit rationed, rely heavily on trade credit when credit market conditions deteriorate.
Empirical evidence made economists wonder why such a large share of companiescredit is
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not provided by banks and nancial intermediaries, which are specialized in credit services.
The question becomes even more puzzling because of the cost of trade credit, which is
much higher than the cost of bank credit. Considering that trade credit is so expensive,
why do companies with no liquidity shortage resort to trade credit? Why do rms with
binding liquidity constraints grant trade credit to their clients?
Economic theory has responded to the questions at the heart of the trade credit puz-
zle with a number of arguments. Wilner (2000) argues that trade creditors, desiring to
maintain an enduring product market relationship, grant more concessions to a customer
in nancial distress than would be granted by lenders in a competitive credit market.
The debtor rm anticipates larger renegotiation concessions from the supplier part, and
so agrees to pay a higher interest rate to a trade creditor than to a credit market lender.
In this perspective, the higher trade credit interest rate is fair compensation for the rms
receiving larger concessions if nancial distress occurs. The author argues that the bor-
rower in nancial distress can take advantage of this trade credit connection if it generates
a large percentage of the creditors prots: if so, the borrower should be willing to accept
what appears to be a less favorable contract, anticipating more power in renegotiations
should nancial distress occur.
In Biais,Gollier (1997) asymmetric information between banks and rms can preclude
nancing of valuable projects. The authors starts from the assumption that suppliers have
private information about their customers, and shows that trade credit can facilitate ag-
gregation of the suppliers information with the banks information and thus alleviate an
information asymmetry which otherwise would preclude nancing of positive net present
value (NPV) projects. Lending through trade credit serves a non-nancial role and sup-
pliers have some comparative advantage in lending, since it is reasonable to assume that
suppliers place more value on the collateral of their customer than the bank would. In other
terms, trade credit, by incorporating in the lending relation the private information held
by suppliers about their customers, can alleviate bank credit rationing due to asymmetric
information between banks and rms and this theoretical result appears consistent with
empirical studies documenting that rms which are likely to be credit constrained (such
as small rms during monetary contractions, or rms without relationships with banks)
resort more to costly trade credit. Furthermore, such a theoretical analysis of the link be-
tween information-motivated trade credit and information-motivated bank credit rationing
provides an interpretation for a number of stylized facts. One of these empirical results, for
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example, is described in Petersen and Rajan (1995): rms which do not su¤er from credit
rationing do not use trade credit, while rms for which asymmetric information generates
credit rationing react by using trade credit. Furthermore, when the buyer does not have
cash and is bank credit constrained, in absence of trade credit it could not buy the good
from the seller. Yet by extending trade credit the seller enables the buyer to raise the funds
necessary to purchase the good. Another crucial argument in Biais,Gollier (1997) is that
trade credit is a credible way for the seller to transmit its private information about the
buyer to the bank. If the seller is willing to extend trade credit, and thus to bear the default
risk of the buyer, it must be that it has good information about the latter. On observing
this, the bank updates positively its beliefs about the buyer, and therefore agrees to lend.
In this perspective, trade credit enables the private information of the seller to be used in
the lending relationship, and this additional information can alleviate credit rationing due
to adverse selection. As a consequence, bank credit and trade credit are complementary
because the granting of trade credit by the suppliers of a rm reveals favorable information
about the rm, and this constitutes a positive signal for banks and other potential lenders.
So, in their model some buyers borrow both from the bank and their supplier, in spite
the fact that the rate at which they borrow from the latter is larger than the bank rate.
Firms would use simultaneously two sources of nancing, one being more expensive than
the other, since if they did not use trade credit, then the information from the seller could
not be conveyed, and the relatively low bank rate would not be granted. Thus this is an
interpretation for the fact that trade credit is used even though it is costly.
Ng, Smith, Smith (1999) also analyze trade credit under the informational perspective.
Facing imperfect information about buyer default risk, sellers either demand prepayment
or cash or nd ways to evaluate creditworthiness. Trade credit terms can be designed to
elicit information on creditworthiness because buyersresponses to the terms help identify
those who may be having nancial di¢ culties. Their empirical results give support to the-
ories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning
product quality and buyer creditworthiness.
Another argument explaining the trade credit puzzle is connected to a moral hazard
problem. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) present a contract theoretic model of trade credit
relations in competitive markets with asymmetric information and argue that trade credit
reduces the scope for moral hazard on the part of debtors. For this reason, according to
the authors, the weaker the legal protection of creditors, the larger the use of trade credit.
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They also argue that trade credit and bank credit are complementary for rms subject to
liquidity constraints, while they are substitutes for rms with su¢ cient debt capacity, i.e.
rms that have access to external sources of funding. Furthermore, trade credit is more
prevalent in less developed credit markets, and accounts payable of large unrated rms are
more countercyclical than those of small rms.
Nilsen (2002) presents data in favour of the thesis that rms that face credit rationing
use trade credit as a substitute for other sources of funding, and this occurs more markedly
during periods of restrictive monetary policies. In other terms, during monetary contrac-
tions banks restrict some rmsloans, thus reducing their desired investment independently
of interest rates. The author nds that small rms increase trade credit as a substi-
tute credit: more precisely, trade credit is widely used by the small rms su¤ering the loan
decline, indicating a strong loan demand. This analysis supports the bank lending chan-
nel: constraint rms do not voluntarily cut bank loans since they increase a less-desirable
alternative. But the author also nds that large rms increase trade credit as well as small
rms and this appears as a puzzle since they are typically assumed to have wide access to
other credit sources.
A new stream of literature focuses on the role of trade credit in default and liquidation.
Frank and Maksimovic (2005) and Longhofer and Santos (2003), for example, argue that
suppliers have an advantage in liquidating goods in case of their buyersdefault, whereas
Wilner (2000), as well as Cunat (2007), suggest that suppliers are more willing to o¤er
help when their customers are in trouble (e.g., due to liquidity shocks), given their desire
to continue business with those customers in the future. In other terms, trade credit
provides coverage of liquidity risk: suppliers, in the face of default of a client, are better
o¤ allowing postponement of payments rather than resorting to suing the debtor and
possibly contributing to his bankruptcy. The trade credit contract embeds an insurance
against liquidity shocks, and this can also explain its costs (Cuñat, 2007). Cunat (2007)
analyses the interaction between the nancial and the industrial aspects of the supplier-
customer relationship. The author examines how, in a context of limited enforceability
of contracts, suppliers may have a comparative advantage over banks in lending to their
customers. Suppliers are able to enforce debt repayment better than banks, as they hold
the threat of stopping the supply of intermediate goods to their customers. Under another
perspective, suppliers may act as liquidity providers or lenders of last resort, supporting
their customers whenever they experience temporary liquidity shocks and so providing
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insurance against liquidity shortages that may endanger the survival of their customers.
Under this conditions, a nancial relationship between a supplier and a customer emerges as
a natural consequence of their commercial interaction, despite the existence of a competitive
banking sector. As necessary condition for these relationship to exist, the author assume
the existence of a surplus that will be split between suppliers and customers if they stay
together. In other words, there must be a link between the supplier and the customer that
makes it costly for the customer to nd alternative suppliers and makes it costly for the
supplier to loose its current customers. As a result, the relatively high implicit interest
rates of trade credit is justied by the existence of a default premium and an insurance
premium. The default premium accounts for the fact that suppliers lend when banks are
not willing to lend. and they use their extra enforceability power to lend on the basis
of returns that are stochastic. This makes trade credit more risky than bank debt. The
insurance premium is related to the fact that suppliers foresee the future needs of liquidity
of their customers. As they know that they may have to bail out customers in need of
extra liquidity, they will charge them a premium for providing insurance against potential
liquidity shocks.
In Smith (1987) the high interest rate incorporated in trade credit contracts is due to a
default-risk screening mechanism. Trade Credit terms implicitly dene a high interest rate
that operates as an e¢ cient screening device where information about buyer default risk
is asymmetrically held. By o¤ering trade credit, a seller can identify prospective defaults
more quickly than if nancial institutions were the sole providers of short-term nancing.
The information is valuable in cases since it enables the seller to take actions to protect
potentially non-salvageable investments in buyers. The author models two-part trade credit
as such a screening contract, according to which a buyer who forgoes the discount may pay
a very high e¤ective interest rate, as determined by the terms of the two-part o¤er. Failure
to take the discount in such cases signals that monitoring of the buyers nancial position
is merited. Depending on the sellers response to default, simple net terms can generate a
similar signal, although the penalty for paying after the net date is not explicit.
In Kashyap, Lamont, Stein (1994) rms that are "bank-dependent" are much more
prone to shed inventories than their non-bank-dependent counterparts when interest rates
are relatively high (i.e. tight monetary policy). Such di¤erences are largely absent when
interest rates are low (i.e. during a period of "loose" monetary policy), since much more
rms have access to bank credit. The lending channel is likely to be particularly important
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in explaining inventory uctuations during downturns.
According to Petersen, Rajan (1997), small rms whose access to capital markets may
be limited have incentive to use more trade credit when credit from nancial institutions is
unavailable. Suppliers lend to constrained rms because they have a comparative advantage
in getting information about buyers, they can liquidate assets more e¢ ciently, and they
have an implicit equity stake in the rms. Firms with better access to credit o¤er more
trade credit. From the empirical point of view, they analyze the relevance of trade credit
for companies of di¤erent size and age, using data from Compustat and from the Survey
of Small Business Finances of the Federal Reserve. The authors nd that i) the amount
of trade credit granted by companies is directly correlated with the size and with the age
of companies; ii) large and mature companies are often net suppliers of trade credit; iii)
companies prefer to resort to bank credit, when available; iv) companies endowed with
liquid reserves and with long term relations with banks use less trade credit.
In Carpenter, Fazzari, Petersen (1998) nancing constraints explain the dynamic cy-
cles in inventory investment. Cash ow, which is a¤ected by trade credit dynamics, is
much more successful than cash stocks or coverage in explaining the facts about inventory
investment across rm size, di¤erent inventory cycles, and di¤erent manufacturing sectors.
Emery (1984) provides a pure nancial explanation for the existence of trade credit and
for the values of the credit terms o¤ered to customers, consisting of two motives for extend-
ing trade credit. First, the pure operating exibility motive arises because the opportunity
to change credit policy provides the seller an e¢ cient way to respond to uctuations in
demand. Second, the pure nancial intermediary motive arise because trade credit lending
enables the seller and/or the buyers to recapture at least part of the surplus loss due to a
wedge between the market prices paid and received for the product plus a loan. This wedge
is imposed by the fact that market borrowing rate of interest exceeds the market lending
rate of interest and their di¤erential acts as a hindrance to trade or, equivalently, as a
nancial market tari¤ caused by transactions costs). The trade credit lenders familiarity
with its customers and product provide it with information and collection cost advantages
over nancial intermediaries
In Yang, Birge (2014) a cursory empirical investigation1 clearly suggest that the varia-
tion in payable amounts is closely related to that in inventory and this gives support the
reasonable conjecture that trade credit is extensively used, at least partially, to reduce the
1OLS regression which investigates the dynamics of Payable Days versus Inventory Days
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widespread ine¢ ciency in supply chains. They argue that, with demand uncertainty, trade
credit enhances supply chain e¢ ciency by serving as a risk-sharing mechanism. Two forces
determine the optimal trade credit terms: the sales motive (increasing sales through risk-
sharing) and the nancing motive (minimizing costs of nancial distress through nancial
diversication, that is, employing multiple nancing sources). In other terms, trade credit
inuences supply chain e¢ ciency through two separate e¤ects. First, the sales motive (sim-
ilar to many other channel coordination mechanisms) thanks to which trade credit allows
the retailer to share inventory risks with the supplier, hence inducing a higher order quan-
tity from the. Second, the nancing motive, through which trade credit transfers some of
the distress costs from the retailer to the supplier, allowing the former to further increase
the order quantity. Facing a trade credit contract, the retailer nances inventory using
a portfolio of cash, trade credit, and short-term debt, and the structure of this inventory
nancing portfolio depends on the retailers nancing need and bargaining power and on
the retailers leverage.
In, brief, we can summarize the arguments with which economic theory has responded to
the questions at the hearth of the trade credit puzzle by classifying them in four categories
categories:
1. Information advantage (monitoring costs): sellers are better informed than banks
about their own clients; the receipt of trade credit is a signal of creditworthiness for
banks. [Biais and Gollier (1997)];
2. Liquidation value: the collateral assets have a larger liquidation value for the suppliers
than for the banks;
3. Moral hazard: i) delayed payments eliminate the risk that suppliers sell goods of a
quality inferior to that contracted with the buyer; ii) Diversion theory: trade credit
is in kind, suppliers lend goods while banks lend money. Trade credit makes it
more di¢ cult for the managers of rms to divert resources from purposes which are
consistent with the interests of their creditors [(Burkart and Ellingsen (2004)];
4. Coverage of liquidity risk: suppliers, in the face of default of a client, are better
o¤ allowing postponement of payments rather than resorting to suing the debtor
and possibly contributing to his bankruptcy. The trade credit contract embeds an
insurance against liquidity shocks, and this can also explain its costs (Cuñat, 2007).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we illustrate the
arguments we lay out the basic setting that models the investment decisions of a nancially
constrained rm with trade credit connections on the supply side and access to two sources
of funding, (i.e. bank credit and trade credit). The model, inspired by Caggese (2007), is
developed over three periods and characterizes the impact of an exogenous liquidity shock
which is su¢ ciently large to force the rm to postpone the repayment of the trade debt
with the aim to maintain a su¢ ciently high level of next-period inventory investment. In
the section 3 we describe the empirical framework aimed to test empirically the validity of
the implications of the model.
3 The Model
The aim of this section is to develop a structural model of investment with nancing con-
straints which is able to analyse the impact of a liquidity shortage on the rmsinvestment
behaviour. Our starting point is the model described in Caggese (2007) in which we con-
sider the trade credit as alternative source of funding. An unexpected liquidity shortage
can have binding e¤ects on the funding of the working capital of the rm and, consequently,
on its production levels. Such e¤ects are transmitted from rms facing a liquidity crisis
to their suppliers to an extent that depends on the size of their trade credit obligations.
Furthermore, under bank credit rationing, a su¢ ciently large liquidity shortage is likely to
force the rm to reduce its desired level of investments in intermediate goods. This have
cascade e¤ects on the expected output level of the subsequent period. According with a
number of stylized facts, when the buyer does not have cash and is bank credit constrained,
in absence of trade credit it could not buy the good from the seller. By extending trade
credit, the supplier enables the buyer to raise the funds necessary to purchase the goods.
In what follows, we analyse those sorts of e¤ects of liquidity shortages which are caused
by adverse events that generate unanticipated costs. The model described below lends
itself, with simple adaptations, to characterize also the e¤ects of liquidity shocks generated
by other causes, such as a credit crunch, uctuations of the product price and/or of the
exchange rate (for exporting rms).
We consider a risk-neutral rm whose objective is to maximize the discounted sum of
future expected prots. The discount factor is equal to 1=R, where R = 1 + r and r is
the lending/borrowing risk-free interest rate. The rm nances its production with two
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sources of funding: the bank credit, b and the trade credit TC. Trade credit arises cause
the rms supplier allows its customer to delay the payment of goods already delivered. We
associate the trade credit connection between the rm and its supplier with the purchase
of intermediate goods. Financing imperfections are introduced as follows: both the sources
of funding are limited by an upper limit and the rm cannot obtain new capital from the
shareholders.
The model is developed over three periods: we proceed to characterize the e¤ects of a
liquidity shock on the rm activity by considering a succession of production cycles, i.e.
a succession of time periods t, t + 1, t + 2, and perturbation of the steady state of the
supply chain by an exogenous shock which happens in the second period and causes e¤ects
in term of investment decisions and output levels over the second and the third period.
The rm operates with three inputs, Kt, Lt and It, which denote xed capital, labour
and inventories, respectively. We consider as xed capital land, buildings, plant, and equip-
ment; as inventories the stock of intermediate goods that is used in the production process:
raw materials, work-in-process goods and completely nished goods that are considered to
be the portion of a businesss assets that are ready or will be ready for sale.
Banks behave competitively and are willing to lend and borrow at an interest rate
equal to r. Firmssupplier provides the rm with the intermediate goods necessary for
production and is willing to concede a deferral of payment at an interest rate r1 > r over
one period, and at an interest rate r2 > r1 > r over two period, in case the rm is su¤ering a
liquidity shortage and is unable to repay the trade credit debt within the initial contracted
terms.
Time is divided in periods; the length of a period corresponds to a production cycle.
The timing of the model is as follows:
At the beginning of period t the rm has a stock of permanent and xed-term workers
equal to Lt. The rm observes t 1, realizes revenues Yt , repays the debt bt 1 R and the
trade credit obtained in the previous period, TCt 1  R1. Furthermore, the rm obtains
new bank credit bt from the bank and new trade credit TCt from its supplier in order
to nance production factors which will be used to produce the output Yt. Output Yt is
obtained with factors Kt; It; Lt (decided at t) and observed at time t+1; the entire output,
produced with factors purchased at t, is sold to its client at t + 1. During the second
period (at time t+1), the rm observes a Liquidity Shock which perturbs the steady state
and inicts a loss on it. We assume that the loss is su¢ ciently large to force the rm to
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reduce the investment in inventories if it has no possibility to posticipate the repayment
of the trade credit obtained in the previous period. In other terms, despite the fact that
the loss is partially absorbed by the current prots t+1, its extent is such that, after the
payment of wages due to labour contracts and the repayment of bank credit obtained in
the previous period, the rm is not able to repay the trade credit obtained at time t, TCt,
without reducing the optimal and desired level of investment in inventories It+1.
On the basis of the theoretical and empirical results cited above, we assume that a
supplier never asks for the liquidation of a defaulting buyer and always accepts to defer
the payment to the next period. So, the Firm can posticipate to the subsequent period the
repayment of a fraction (1 D) of the trade credit TCt at an higher interest rate r2 > r1 > r.
The rm, su¤ering a liquidity shortage and subject to bank credit constraints, can choose
to repay the portion D  TCt , with 0 < D < 1, at an interest rate r1;within the initial
contractual terms (i.e. at time t+1), deferring the repayment of the portion (1 D) TCt
to the subsequent period t+ 2, at an interest rate r2 > r1
The production function is strictly concave in all the three factors. We assume a Cobb-
Douglas functional form:
Yt = tK

t I

t L

t with +  +  = 1 (1)
All prices are constant and normalized to one. This simplifying assumption will be
relaxed in the empirical section of the paper. The factor t is a productivity shock that
follows a stationary AR(1) stochastic process. For simplicity we assume that inventories
stock is nondurable and fully depreciates after one period, while xed capital is durable
and depreciates at the rate k,
0 < k < 1 (2)
Gross xed capital investment, Kt, is irreversible, that is
Kt  0 (3)
and is given by
Kt = Kt   (1  k)Kt 1 (4)
Financial imperfections are introduced by assuming that new share issues and risky debt
are not available. At time t the rm can borrow one-period debt from or lend one-period
debt to the banks at the market riskless rate r, where the face value of debt is denoted
by bt, and bt  R is the amount the rm must repay at time t + 1. A positive (negative)
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bt indicates that the rm is a net borrower (lender). Banks only lend secured debt, and
the only collateral they accept is physical capital. Therefore, at time t the bank-borrowing
capacity of the rm is limited by the following constraints:
bt  vKt (5)
t  0 (6)
and
0 < v  1  k (7)
where t are the prots with which the rm remunerate the shareholders, and v is the
share of xed capital that can be used as collateral.
Analogously, at time t the rm can obtain one-period trade debt from its supplier which
is limited by the following constraint:
TCt  TC (8)
TCt denotes the face value of trade debt; TC denotes the upper limit of the amount of
the credit the supplier is willing to grant. If TC = It, the entire amount of inventories can
be nanced with trade credit and the constraint is not binding.
It is useful to dene the nancial wealth of the rmW Ft , after the debts bt 1 and TCt 1
are repaid, as
W Ft = Yt 1   bt 1 R  TCt 1 R1 (9)
where R = (1 + r) and R1 = (1 + r1) and TCt 1 R1 is the amount that rm repays to
its supplier within the terms established in the trade credit contract.
After producing, the rm allocates W Ft plus the new borrowed funds between prots,
xed capital investment, wages and inventory investment according to the following ow
of funds equation (i.e. the budget constraint) for the period t:
t + It + !Lt +Kt = W
F
t + bt + TCt (10)
or, analogously:
t + It + !Lt +Kt = Yt 1   bt 1 R + bt   TCt 1 R1 + TCt
In the second period, t+1, we introduce an expected Liquidity Shock, which is a¤ected
by the magnitude of t, and which generate a loss for the rm, with a positive probability
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p2. As well as in the rst period, the rm uses nancial wealth plus new borrowing bt+1
to pay dividends and wages, and obtains new trade credit TCt+1 to nance investment in
inventories It+1. The budget constraint for the second period is the following:
t+1 + It+1 + !Lt+1 +Kt+1 = W
F
t+1 + bt+1 + TCt+1   Liq:Shock (11)
or, analogously.
t+1 + It+1 + !Lt+1 +Kt+1 = Yt   bt R + bt+1  D  TCt R1 + TCt+1   Liq:Shock
where D is the fraction of TCt which the rm is able to repay at t+ 1; at an interest rate
r1 and (1 D) is the defaultable fraction of TCt, i.e. the portion of trade debt obtained in
the previous period which the rm can choose to repay at t+2, at an interest rate r2 > r1
in order to absorb the liquidity shortage condition. In accordance with empirical and
theoretical results cited above, we assume that the supplier never asks for the liquidation
of a defaulting buyer and always accepts to defer the payment to the next period.
It is useful to dene the "defaultable" trade credit as
(1 D)TCt = TCDt (12)
Condition 1 The liquidity shock is su¢ ciently large to force the rm to reduce the desired
investment in inventories in absence of defaultable trade credit
It+1 + !Lt+1 +K

t+1 < Yt   bt R + bt+1  D  TCt R1 + TCt+1   Liq:Shock
where D = 1. If D = 1, it means that the supplier is not willing to concede a deferral
of payment, so TCDt = 0. Kt+1 = 0 and Kt = (1   k)Kt 1, since the irreversibility
constraint. Prots t+1 cover partially but not totally the liquidity shortage due to the
shock. In this situation the rm would be forced to reduce the desired optimal level of
investment in inventories, and It+1 < It+1. This produce a detrimental and decreasing
e¤ects on the level of expected output Yt+1 (to be obtained at the beginning of third period)
and therefore on the level of expected revenues.
2In this version of the paper, without loss of generality, we consider the case in which the probability of
the occurrence of the Liquidity Shock equals to 1. In the next version, we will specify in the model the case
0 < p < 1, and we will specify the relation between the extent of the Liquidity Shock and the productivity
term t.
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if 0 < D < 1, it means that the supplier is willing to concede a deferral of payment, so
TCDt > 0. In this case the rm decides to repay the fraction (1 D)TCt = TCDt in the third
period: in this way it has the possibility to maintain the level of investment in inventories
as much as possible close to the optimal desired level It+1. For a su¢ ciently low value of
the Liq:Shock, it could exist a value of D for which the above ow of funds equation holds
with equality. The advantage of the defaultable trade credit for the rm consists on the
minimum possible investment reduction in response to the liquidity shock.
As a consequence of the Condition 1, the budget constraint for the third period is the
following:
t+2 + It+2 + !Lt+2 +Kt+2 = W
F
t+2 + bt+2 + TCt+2 (13)
or, analogously.
t+2 + It+2 + !Lt+2 +Kt+2 = Yt+1   bt+1 R + bt+2   TCDt R22   TCt+1 R1 + TCt+2
where TCDt = (1 D)TCt
In our model the amount of defaultable trade credit inuences the spending power of
the rm in the second period and, as a consequence, its investment decisions. Under bank
credit constraint and liquidity shortage condition, the possibility to defer the repayment
of the trade debt increases the available cash ow to nance the inventory investments.
As a consequence, the extent of the defaultable trade credit produces e¤ects on the level
of the expected output to be observed in the third period. Formally, the output Yt+1 is a
function of TCDt :
Yt+1 = V [It+1(D 
)] = V [It+1(TC
D
t
+
)] (14)
Under liquidity shortage, the e¤ects of D (and hence of TCDt ) on It+1 (and hence on
Yt+1) are as follows:
@Yt+1
@It+1
> 0;
@It+1
@D
< 0 =) @Yt+1
@D
< 0 and (15)
@TCDt
@D
< 0;
@It+1
@TCDt
> 0 =) @Yt+1
@TCDt
> 0 (16)
The term
@Yt+1
@TCDt
is the marginal productivity of the defaultable trade credit concerning
the output Yt+1: in other terms, it is the incremental quantity of output Yt+1 which the
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rm is able to obtain by purchasing an incremental unit of It+1 thanks to the possibility
to defer the repayment of a fraction of TCt. In this framework, the trade credit obtained
from the supplier (upstream rm) in the rst period, TCt, produce e¤ects not only on
the output obtained at the beginning of the second period, Yt (by a¤ecting the amount of
It), but also on the expected output to be observed at the beginning of the third period,
Yt+1, through the e¤ects of the defaultable portion TCDt = (1 D)TCt, (which a¤ects the
amount of It+1)
Let us denote the rms value at time t, after t 1 is realized, by Vt. Formally, the
rms maximization problem is as follows:
Vt = MAX
bt;It;TCt;Kt

t +
1
R
Et [t+1] +
1
R2
Et [t+2]

(17)
The rms maximizes (17 ) subject to Eqs. (3), (5), (6), (8), which are respectively the
irreversibility constraint, the bank-borrowing constraint, the non-negativity constraint of
prots and the trade credit constraint, and subject to the three ow-of-funds equations
(10), (11), and (13).
In order to describe the optimality conditions of the model, we use Eqs. (10), (11), and
(13) to substitute t, t+1, t+2 in the value function (17). Let t, t, t and t be the
Lagrangian multipliers associated, respectively, with the irreversibility constraint (3), the
bank-borrowing constraint (5), the non-negativity constraint of prots (6) and the trade
credit constraint (8). The solution of the problem is dened by the following conditions:
1 + t = t + Et

1 + t+1

(18)
1 + t =  +
R1
R
Et

1 + t+1
  1
R2
Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

(1 +Et

t+2

)  1
R2
COV

t+2;
@Yt+1
@TCDt

(19)
Et

@Yt
@It

TC
= R 	Dt +R 	It +
1
R
 InsuranceEffectTerm (20)
where
	Dt =
(
R2
R
2
 1 + Et

t+2

1 + Et

t+1
 +D "R1
R
 

R2
R
2
 1 + Et

t+2

1 + Et

t+1
#) (21)
	It =
8>><>>:
t   1
R
COV

t+1;
@Yt
@It

  1
R2
COV

t+2;
@Yt+1
@TCDt

1 + Et

t+1

9>>=>>; (22)
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InsuranceEffectTerm =  Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

1 + Et

t+2

1 + Et

t+1
 (23)
and
Et

@Yt
@It

b
= R  (1 + It ) (24)
where:
It =
8><>:
t   1
R
COV

t+1;
@Yt
@It

1 + Et

t+1

9>=>; (25)
and
Et

@Yt
@Kt

=

R

1 + Kt
  (1  k)	+ 1  k
1 + Et

t+1
Et t+1 (26)
where
Kt =
264(1  v)t   t   1RCOV

t+1;
@Yt
@It

1 + Et

t+1

375 (27)
Eqs. (18), and (19) are the rst-order conditions of bt and TCt respectively. Eq. (20)
is the rst-order condition of It when nanced with trade credit TCt. Eq. (24) is the
rst-order condition of It when nanced with bank credit bt. Eq. (26) is the rst-order
condition of Kt, nanced with bank loan. In
As well as in Caggese (2007), by iterating forward Eq. (18) over the three periods, we
obtain
t =
2X
j=0
Ett+j (28)
t is the shadow value of money, i.e. the shadow cost of the non-negativity constraint
of prots. t is the shadow cost of a binding bank nancing constraint. Eq. (28) shows
that t is equal to the sum of the current and future costs of a binding nancing constraint.
As long as t > 0, then the return from investing earnings inside the rm is higher than
r, and the rm does not distribute prots, so t = 0. t is the shadow cost of a binding
trade credit constraint.
Now we combine the ow-of-funds equation (10) with the bank borrowing (collateral)
constraint (5) and the trade credit constraint (10) in order to dene the maximum invest-
ment capacity of the rm at time t:
It + !Lt +Kt  W Ft + (1  k)Kt 1 + vKt + TC   t (29)
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or, analogously
It + !Lt + (1  v)Kt  W Ft + (1  k)Kt 1 + TC   t (30)
Eq. (30) implies that the down payment necessary to buy Kt and It must be lower
than the residual net worth, dened as W Ft + (1   )Kt 1, after distributing prots plus
the maximum level of trade credit which the supplier is willing to concede.
In the Eq. (26), the optimality condition of Kt, the left-hand side is the marginal
productivity of xed capital and the right-hand side the marginal cost of xed capital.
The term Kt is equal to zero if the rm is not nancially constrained (in term of bank
credit) today or in the future. The terms t and Et

t+1

measure the shadow cost of a
currently binding irreversibility constraint and of future expected irreversibility constraints,
respectively.
Eq. (20) is the optimality condition of It when nanced with trade credit TCt. As
well as in the optimality condition of Kt, the left-hand side is the marginal productivity
of inventories and the right-hand side the marginal cost of inventories. The term 	It is
directly related to t , the Lagrange multiplier of the trade credit constraint. Eq. (24) is
the optimality condition of It when nanced with bank credit bt. Analogously, the left-hand
side is the marginal productivity of inventories and the right-hand side the marginal cost
of inventories. The term It is directly related to t , the Lagrange multiplier of the bank
borrowing-constraint.
In our model, the rm, in dependence of the intensity of nancing constraints in term
of bank credit and trade credit, can consider the optimal inventory nancing portfolio com-
posed of bank credit and trade credit, considering the two sources of funding as substitutes
or complementary. Formally, the optimality condition of inventories, when nanced with
both nancing sources, is the following:
\
Et

@Yt
@It

=M  Et

@Yt
@It

TC
+ (1 M)  Et

@Yt
@It

b
(31)
Where M is the fraction of inventory investment the rm decides to nance with trade
credit.
If constraint (29) is not binding then t; t = 0. In this case the rm can nance
all the desired amount of inventories with the bank credit (at a lower interest rate) and
Eqs. (24) and (26) determine the optimal unconstrained capital levels Kut and I
u
t . If K
u
t is
greater than (1 k)Kt 1 then the irreversibility constraint (3) is not binding, the Lagrange
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multiplier t is equal to zero, and fKt ; It g, the optimal investment choices are determined
by fKut ; Iut g. If Kut is smaller than (1   k)Kt 1 then the irreversibility constraint is
binding, Kt is constrained to be equal to (1   k)Kt 1, and Eqs. (24) and (26) can be
solved to determine I ict and 
ic
t In this case the optimal investment choices fKt ; It g are
determined by f(1  k)Kt 1; I ict g. Alternatively the collateral constraint and the trade
credit constraint are both binding if nancial wealth is not su¢ cient as a down payment
for fKt ; It g, even if distributed prots are zero:
It + !Lt + (1  v)Kt > W Ft + (1  k)Kt 1 + TC   t (32)
In this case the constrained levels of capital Kct and inventories I
c
t are such that:
Ict + !Lt + (1  v)Kct = W Ft + (1  k)Kt 1 + TC   t (33)
3.1 Model Implications
In the Eq. (20), the term 	Dt captures the e¤ect of trade credit interest rates r1 and r2
on the marginal cost of inventories. Depending of the magnitude of D, i.e. the fraction of
TCt which will be repaid within the trade credit contract terms, r1 and r2 a¤ect the value
of the marginal cost of inventories. More precisely:
 if D = 1 (i.e. TCDt = 0 since the total amount of TCt is repaid within the contracted
terms):
	Dt =
R1
R
(34)
 if D = 0 (i.e. TCDt = TCt since the total amount of TCt is repaid one period later):
	Dt =

R2
R
2
 1 + Et

t+2

1 + Et

t+1
 (35)
If the rm expects to be equally nancially constrained at t + 1 and at t + 2 (i.e.
the expected shadow value of money does not change from period two to period three,
and Et

t+1

= Et

t+2

) the term 	Dt is decreasing in D. In other terms the greater the
portion of trade credit TCt which will be repaid one period later, the higher is the marginal
cost of inventories when nanced with trade debt, due to the combined e¤ect of the trade
credit interest rates. Formally,
@	Dt
@D
< 0, and the term D capture the increasing e¤ect
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of higher trade credit interest rates on the marginal cost of inventories and, consequently,
their decreasing e¤ect on inventory investment level.
For the tractability of the next sections, its useful to dene the spending power of the
rm at time t as the amount of nancial liquid resources with which it can nance its
inventory investment decisions. Formally:
 Spending power at time t, not considering trade credit as source of funding:
SPt = W
F
t + bt (36)
 Spending power at time t, considering trade credit as source of funding:
SP TCt = W
F
t + bt + TCt (37)
The term 	It summarizes the e¤ect of trade credit nancing constraint on inventory
investment and is a monotonously decreasing and convex function ofW Ft and TCt as stated
in the following proposition, inspired by Proposition 1 in Caggese (2007):
Proposition 1 We dene SP TCt as the level of spending power (i.e. internal nancial
wealth plus bank credit and trade credit obtained at t) such that the rm does not expect to
be nancially constrained now or in the future. In other terms SP TCt is the level of spending
power that allows the rm to purchase the desired levels of investments in xed capital and
inventories. It follows that, for a given value of the state variables t 1 and Kt and for
SP TCt < SP
TC
t , 	
I
t is positive and is decreasing and convex in the amount of internal
nance nancial wealth and in the amount of trade credit granted, that is,
@	It
@W Ft
< 0 ,
@	It
@TCt
< 0 and
@2	It
@ (W Ft )
2 > 0 ,
@2	It
@ (TCt)
2 > 0. This implies that, for SP
TC
t < SP
TC
t ,
	It is positive and is decreasing and convex in the amount of the spending power SP
TC
t .
Conversely, if the amount (W Ft + vKt + TC) is such that SP
TC
t  SP TCt , then 	It = 0
Proof. See Appendix 1
Conversely the term It summarizes the e¤ect of bank credit nancing constraint on
inventory investment and, analogously to the term 	It , is a monotonously decreasing and
convex function of W Ft and TCt
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Proposition 2 For a given value of the state variables t 1 and Kt and for SP TCt < SP TCt
, It is positive and is decreasing and convex in the amount of internal nancial wealth and
in the amount of trade credit granted, that is,
@It
@W Ft
< 0 ,
@It
@TCt
< 0 and
@2It
@ (W Ft )
2 > 0 ,
@2It
@ (TCt)
2 > 0. This implies that, for SP
TC
t < SP
TC
t , 
I
t is positive and is decreasing and
convex in the amount of the spending power SP TCt . Conversely, if the amount (W
F
t +TC)
is such that SP TCt  SP TCt , then It = 0
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the proposition 1. See Appendix 1
Proposition 2 applied to Eq. (24) establishes a link between trade credit availability
and the inventory investment decisions of rms. It says that when a rm is nancially
constrained due to credit rationing from the bank-credit market side, the availability of
trade credit increases the investment in inventories and reduces its marginal return, due to
an increasing e¤ect on the rms spending power. The intensity of trade credit nancing
constraint a¤ect directly the value of t and, through it, the marginal return of inventories.
It is important to note that Proposition 3 cannot be applied to xed capital investment
because of the presence of the irreversibility constraint. As well as in Caggese (2007), if the
irreversibility constraint is binding, then Kt = (1  k)Kt 1 =) Kt and t > 0. In this
case a change in the intensity of trade credit nancing constraints, which causes a change
in Kt in Eq. (26) a¤ects the value of t but does not a¤ect xed capital investment.
Proposition 2 applied to Eq. (20), analogously, shows the e¤ect of a relaxed trade credit
constraint on the marginal cost of inventories. An increase of TC (i.e. the max possible
amount of the credit the supplier is willing to grant), increases the spending power and
has a decreasing e¤ect on 	It , by a¤ecting the value of t. The consequence is an increase
in inventory investment and a reduction of its marginal return.
Eq. (20) also shows the e¤ect of the defaultable portion of the trade credit obtained
at time t, i.e. TCDt , which is captured by the InsuranceEffectTerm. According to Eqs.
(36) and (37), we dene the spending power of the rm at time t+ 1:
SP TCt+1 = W
F
t+1 + bt+1 + TCt+1   Liq:Shock (38)
where W Ft+1 = Yt   bt R D  TCt R1.
Proposition 3 For a given value of the state variables t and Kt+1, the term Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

in Eq. (23) is positive and is decreasing and convex in the amount of the spending power
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available at time t + 1. Furthermore, it is decreasing and convex in the amount of the
internal nancial wealth W Ft+1, the bank credit bt+1, and the defaultable portion of trade
credit TCDt . Formally
@Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

@SP TCt+1
< 0 ,
@Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

@W Ft+1
< 0,
@Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

@bt+1
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 1
Proposition 3 applied to Eq. (20) establishes a link between the defaultable portion
of trade credit obtained at t (the repayment of which can be deferred to t + 2) and the
amount of inventory investment decided at t and nanced with trade credit. The higher the
intensity of nancing constraint the rm expects to be subject to (due to credit rationing
or due to the extent of the Liquidity Shock) in the subsequent period, the higher the
expected marginal productivity of the defaultable portion of trade credit obtained at t.
More precisely, if the rm expects to be subject to a liquidity shortage and that the amount
of expected revenues plus the expected amount of available bank credit (which both a¤ect
the spending power available at t + 1) will be not su¢ cient to absorb the liquidity shock,
the expected marginal productivity of inventories nanced with the defaultable portion of
trade credit is relatively high. Consequently, the expected level of inventory investment,
when nanced only with internal nance plus constrained bank credit, without considering
the defaultable portion of trade credit, is relatively low, far from the desired optimal level.
This means that the nancially constrained rm, in presence of a positive probability of
su¤ering future liquidity shortage tomorrow, is has incentive to nance inventories with
trade credit today, because the possibility to defer the repayment of a fraction of the
trade debt beyond the contractual terms makes possible for the rm to maintain a level of
expected inventory investments (and, as a consequence, a level of future expected output)
as close as possible to the optimal desired level. In other terms, the trade credit contract
yields an insurance e¤ect, i.e. an insurance coverage against liquidity risk, which explains
why the liquidity constrained rm has incentive to nance inventories with trade credit,
in spite of its high implicit cost. The higher the intensity of expected future nancing
constraints, the higher the value of the expected marginal productivity of the defaultable
portion of the trade credit and, consequently, the higher the incentive for the rm to nance
inventory investment decisions with trade credit today.
If the rm, considering the bank credit market side, is not currently nancially con-
strained and expects to be not nancially constrained in the future, the terms It and 	
I
t
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are equals to zero. In this case, Eqs. (20) and (24) becomes as follows:
Et

@Yt
@It

b
= R (39)
and
Et

@Yt
@It

TC
= R 	Dt +
1
R
 InsuranceEffectTerm (40)
where, in absence of future expected nancial constraints,
	Dt =
(
R2
R
2
+D
"
R1
R
 

R2
R
2#)
, and
InsuranceEffectTerm =  Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

.
Eq. (39) shows that, if the rm is not nancially constrained today or in the future,
the marginal cost of inventories, when nanced with bank credit, is equal to R. Without
liquidity constraints, the extent of the InsuranceEffectTerm is relatively low (due to
Proposition 4) and, considering that the rm is able to repay the total amount of trade
debt within the initial contractual terms (i.e. D = 1), 	Dt =
R1
R
. In this case, Eq. (40)
shows that the trade credit one-period interest rate has an increasing e¤ect on marginal
cost of inventories which is balanced by the decreasing e¤ect of the insurance motive. But,
in absence of future expected liquidity constraints, the latter is weaker compared to the case
in which the rm expects to be nancially constrained. As a consequence, for su¢ ciently
high values of R1, it would be optimal to nance the total amount of inventories with
bank credit. Conversely, if the rm expects to be nancially constrained today and in
the next period, It > 0 and 	
I
t > 0, and both increase as the amount of the spending
power decrease (Propositions 2,3). Furthermore, the InsuranceEffectTerm is relatively
high and increases as the future expected spending power decreases (Proposition 4). When
the bank-borrowing constraint is binding, if the rm expects to su¤er a future liquidity
shortage, it would be optimal for the rm to nance inventories with a portfolio of bank
credit and trade credit, since the higher decreasing e¤ect of the InsuranceEffectTerm (i.e.
the marginal productivity of the defaultable portion of trade credit on the expected output)
on the marginal cost of inventories balances in a stronger fashion the increasing e¤ect
of trade credit interest rates guided by the fraction D. In other terms, the higher the
intensity of future expected nancial constraints (or, equivalently, the higher the intensity
of the expected bank-borrowing constraint which a¤ect the expected spending power),
the higher the marginal productivity of TCDt on Yt+1 (i.e. the higher the absolute value
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of the InsuranceEffectTerm), the lower the marginal cost of inventories It and, since
the production function is concave in all the factors, the higher is the level of inventory
investment nanced with trade credit at time t, for a given value of Kt. If the rm expects
the occurrence of a su¢ ciently high liquidity shock for which it expects to be subject to a
binding nancial constraint from the bank-lending market side, for su¢ ciently low values
of trade credit one-period and two-periods interest rates, r1 and r2 respectively, it would
be optimal to nance the largest possible portion of inventories with trade credit today,
because the possibility to defer the repayment of the trade debt to the next period (at an
interest rate equal to r2), makes the rm able to maintain a su¢ ciently high level of future
expected inventory investment and so a su¢ ciently high level of future expected output,
as close as possible to the optimal desired level.
3.2 Model Extension
In this extension of the model, we consider the term D, i.e. the fraction of TCt which the
rm repays at t + 1, as a choice variable of the maximization problem. More precisely,
the rm is allowed by the supplier to decide the extent of D, and, consequently, the
amount of TCt which will be repaid at t + 2 at an interest rate equal to r2 > r1. The
rm now maximizes the current prot plus the discounted sum of expected prots of the
two subsequent periods, considering D as choice maximization variable. The rst order
condition of D is as follows:
TCt =
Et

@Yt+1
@D

+
COV

@Yt+1
@D
;t+2

(1 + Et

t+2

) 
R1R
 
1 + Et

t+1

(1 + Et

t+2

)
 R22
! (41)
Where the term
@Yt+1
@D
is the marginal productivity ofD concerning the expected output
Yt+1 which will be observed at t + 2. Intuitively,
@Yt+1
@D
is negative, because repaying an
additional unit of trade credit TCt at t + 1 is equivalent to subtract an additional unit
of cash ow available to purchase inventories It+1, and this produces a decreasing e¤ect
on the expected output Yt+1. If we assume that the rm expects to be equally nancially
constrained at t+1 and at t+2 (i.e. the expected shadow value of money does not change
from period two to period three, and Et

t+1

= Et

t+2

) and change the sign of both
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the denominator and numerator, we obtain
TCt =
 Et

@Yt+1
@D

 
COV

@Yt+1
@D
;t+2

(1 + Et

t+2

)
(R22  R1R)
(42)
The marginal productivity of D (with reference to output Yt+1) is negative and has
opposite sign respect on the marginal productivity of (1 D). More precisely, an additional
unit of the fraction (1 D) of the trade credit TCt, which will be repaid one period later
(i.e. at t + 2 instead of at t + 1), is equivalent to add an additional unit of cash ow
available at t+1 to purchase inventories It+1, and this produces an increasing e¤ect on the
expected output Yt+1. We can rewrite Eq. (42) as follows:
TCt =
Et

@Yt+1
@(1 D)

 
COV

@Yt+1
@D
;t+2

(1 + Et

t+2

)
(R22  R1R)
(43)
Eq. (43) is the rst order condition of the trade credit obtained at t. It shows that the
optimal level of TCt is decreasing in trade credit interest rates r1 and r23, and increasing
in the term Et

@Yt+1
@(1 D)

, i.e. the expected marginal productivity of the defaultable
fraction of TCt with reference to the expected output Yt+1 which will be observed at t+2.
In other terms, the higher the expected marginal productivity of the defaultable fraction
of TCt, the higher the incentive for the nancially constrained rm to ask its supplier for
more credit, in a context in which the rm expects a liquidity shock to happen in the next
period with a positive probability.
4 Empirical Framework (draft)
In this section, in order to verify the validity of the model implications, we propose an em-
pirical framework which is able to determine that, under liquidity and nancial constraints,
the dynamics of trade credit is more signicant than bank credit dynamics in explaining
the dynamics of inventory investments. To this end, we derive a reduced-form inventory
3Since r2 > r1, if r1 increases, r2 must increase too, for at least the same extent.
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investment equation and test it on a sample of small and medium Italian manufacturing
rms. The sample is obtained by the dataset AIDA (Italian Company Information and
Business Intelligence), provided by Bureau Van Dijk, which contains comprehensive in-
formation on companies in Italy, with up to ve years of history. Aida covers 1 million
companies in Italy over a period of ten years.
For the empirical specication of the test framework we consider the following speci-
cation of the production function in the Eq. (1),
Yi;t = i;tK

i;t 1I

i;tL

i;t (44)
dening the variables (in real terms) as follows: Yi;t is total revenues (during period t, rm
i); Ki;t 1 is the value of plant, equipment, and intangible xed capital (end of period t  1,
rm i); Ii;t is the stock of inventories, more precisely, the stock of intermediate goods that
is used in the production process: raw materials, work-in-process goods and completely
nished goods that are considered to be the portion of a businesss assets that are ready or
will be ready for sale (during period t, rm i); Li;t is the labor cost (during period t, rm
i). We assume that xed capital installed in period t will become productive from period
t+ 1 on. More detailed information about all the variables is reported in Appendix 2.
By using Eq. (44) in the optimality condition specied by Eq. (20), we obtain:
i;tK

i;t 1I
 1
i;t L

i;t = R 	Dt +R 	It +
1
R
 InsuranceEffectTerm (45)
If we take logs of both sides of Eq. (45) and solve for ln Ii;t, we obtain:
ln Ii;t =
1
1   ln

R
+
1
1   lnEti;t +

1   lnKi;t 1 +

1   lnLi;t +
  1
1   ln

	Dt +	
I
t +
1
R2
 InsuranceEffectTerm

(46)
As discussed in the previous section, the term 	Dt is increasing in the amount of trade
credit interest rates. This allows us to approximates it with a positive function of
RTCt
R
,
where RTCt = (1+ rTCt ) and rTCt is the trade credit implicit interest rate on annual basis.
We approximate 	Dt as follows:
	Dt =
 
RTCt
R
!1
(47)
where 1 is an indicator of the sensitivity of the inventory investment to a change in the
trade credit interest rates.
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Proposition 2 allows us to approximate the term	It with a negative and convex function
of the terms
(
SP TCt
W Ft
;
SP TCt
bt
;
SP TCt
TCt
)
, where SPt is the level of total spending power at
time t, considering internal nancial wealth plus bank credit and trade credit, that allows
the nancing of all protable investment projects, i.e. the level of nancial wealth such
that the rm does not expect to be nancially constrained now or in the future (and for
which the bank borrowing constraint and the trade credit constraint, dened by the upper
limits vKt and TC respectively, are not binding). We approximate 	It as follows:
	It =
 
SP TCt
W Ft
!2

 
SP TCt
bt
!3

 
SP TCt
TCt
!4
(48)
where 2, 3, 4 are measures of the responsiveness of the inventory investment to a
change in the available internal nance, bank credit and trade credit, respectively. In
other terms 2, 3, 4 are indicators of the intensity of the internal nance constraint, the
bank borrowing constraint and the trade credit constraints respectively. The more the
rm is nancially constrained (in the model, this corresponds to lower values of v and TC)
which tightens the nancing constraints, the more the investment of the rm is sensitive to
internal nance (meaning that 	It increases more rapidly as W
F
t decreases), and the larger
2 is. Furthermore, 3 and 4 isolate the intensities of the bank borrowing constraint and
the trade credit constraint: the more the investment of the rm is sensitive to bank credit,
(meaning that 	It increases more rapidly as bt decreases), the larger 3 is; the more the
investment of the rm is sensitive to trade credit, (meaning that 	It increases more rapidly
as TCt decreases), the larger 4 is.
Eq. (23) shows that the InsuranceEffectTerm is a negative function of the term
Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

and Proposition 4 explains that the latter is decreasing and convex in the
amount of the spending power available at time t + 1, SP TCt+1, and so it is decreasing
and convex in the amount of the internal nancial wealth W Ft+1 and the bank credit bt+1.
This means that the InsuranceEffectTerm is negative and is increasing in W Ft+1 and
bt+1. It follows that if the rm expects to be nancially constrained in the next period,
cause a combined e¤ect of the binding bank borrowing constraint and the extent of the
liquidity shock, the expected marginal productivity of the defaultable portion of trade
credit obtained in the previous period is relatively high. According to Eqs. (23) and (46),
this means that the rm has a relatively high incentive to increase the amount of inventory
investment nanced with trade credit TCt. The lower the internal nancial wealthW Ft+1and
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the higher the intensity of the bank borrowing constraint (corresponding to a lower upper
limit for bt+1) and/or the higher the extent of the expected Liquidity Shock (and so, the
lower the value of the spending power SP TCt+1)
4, the higher is the increasing e¤ect of the
InsuranceEffectTerm on the amount of inventory investment purchased at time t and
nanced with TCt. The marginal productivity of the defaultable trade credit TCDt on the
output Yt+1 is not observable in reality. But it can be approximate with a positive function
of the total trade credit to internal nancial wealth ratio at time t + 1. The intuition
is as follows: if the rm expects to be nancially constrained from the bank borrowing
side and to su¤er a liquidity shortage due to a liquidity shock at time t+ 1 (i.e. expected
future values of W Ft+1 and SP
TC
t+1 are relatively low), it increases the portion of inventories
purchased with trade credit TCt, since the therm Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

is relatively high and so the
InsuranceEffectTerm a¤ects negatively the marginal cost of inventories and positively
the level of inventory investment (since the concavity of the production function). If the
rm will actually be under liquidity constraints in the next period (t + 1), it intuitively
will decide to defer the repayment of the fraction (1  D) of the trade debt TCt in order
to have su¢ cient cash ow to purchase a level of inventories It+1 as close as possible to
the optimal desired level It+1. The consequence is that the rm, at time t+ 1, is shifting
its inventory nancing portfolio towards an higher fraction of trade credit compared to the
fractions of internal nancial wealth and bank debt, i.e. the rm is increasing the following
ratios:
TCDt
SP TCt+1
,
TCDt
W Ft+1
,
TCDt
bt+1
.
This allows us to approximate the absolute value of the InsuranceEffectTerm with
a positive function of one of the ratios above. We dene:
TCratiot+1 =
TCDt
SP TCt+1
(49)
where SP TCt+1 is the total spending power of the rm at time t + 1, as dened in Eq.
(38). We approximate the InsuranceEffectTerm in modulus as follows:
jInsuranceEffectTermj =

TCDt
SP TCt+1
5
=
 
TCratiot+1
5 (50)
where 5 is a measures of the responsiveness of the inventory investment to a change in
TCratiot+1 . Considering Eqs. (47), (48), (49), (50), and considering that the InsuranceEffectTerm
4All the three phenomena correspond to a lower value of the spending power SPTCt+1
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enters in Eq. (46) with negative sign, we set:

	Dt +	
I
t +
1
R2
 IET

=
 
RTCt
R
!1

 
SP TCt
W Ft
!2

 
SP TCt
bt
!3

 
SP TCt
TCt
!4
 
TCratiot+1
5  1R2 (51)
Inserting Eq. (51) in Eq. (46) we obtain the following reduced-form inventories equa-
tion:
ln Ii;t = 0 +1 ln i;t 1 +2 lnKi;t 1 +3 lnLi;t +4 lnRTCt +
+5 lnW
F
i;t +6 ln bi;t +7 lnTCi;t +8 lnTC
ratio
i;t+1 + "i;t (52)
where the subscript i indicates the ith rm, "i;t is the error term and i;t 1 is the
productivity shock5. The coe¢ cients are as follows:
 0 =

1
1   ln

R
+
1
1   lnR
2 +
1
1   lnR  (
2 + 3 + 4 + 5
1   ) lnSP
TC
t

 1 = 1
1  
 2 = 
1  
 3 = 
1  
 4 =   1
1  
 5 = 2
1  
 6 = 3
1  
 7 = 4
1  
 8 = 5
1  
5In this version of the paper we omit the specication of the stochastic idiosyncratic productivity shock
t and its estimation. In the next version of the paper we will model it as a stochastic process and specify
how it is related with the liquidity shock.
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In this version of our paper we skip the estimation of the productivity shock , and we
consider only the liquidity shock during the second period, occurring with probability 1:
this means that we consider i;t 1 = 1 and, as a consequence, ln i;t 1 = 0. We lagged the
ratio of one period and we use the trade credit amount TCi;t as numerator of the ratio,
instead of TCDt , considering that TC
D
t is empirically not observable and that, conceptu-
ally, all the trade credit amount is defaultable. Futhermore, in order to avoid possible
multicollinearity problems, we decide to maintain the variable TCi;t only inside the ratio
TCratioi;t
6The Eq. (52) becomes as follows:
ln Ii;t = 0 +1 lnKi;t 1 +2 lnLi;t +3 lnRTCt +
+4 lnW
F
i;t +5 ln bi;t +6 lnTC
ratio
i;t + "i;t (53)
The variables Ii;t, bi;t and TCi;t (as numerator of the ratio) are in term of stocks. In
the following subsection we consider an alternative empirical framework in which we put
inside the regression framework the changes in the variables, i.e. the ows, instead of the
absolute values (i.e. the stocks). The rationale under considering the stocks is to consider
the investment decisions of the rm from a mid-term perspective. The current stocks of
I, b and TC are consequences of investment decisions taken during a certain number of
previous periods.
The coe¢ cients 4, 5 measure the functional relationship between the investment in
inventories (the dependent variable of our regression framework) and the internal nancial
wealth and the bank credit, respectively. The coe¢ cient 6 explains how the dynamics of
inventory investment is related to the value of the TCratioi;t . This term, which is specied
by lagging Eq. (49) by one period, is the ratio between the portion of trade credit the rm
has decided to repay one period later respect on the initial contractual terms (i.e. TCDt )
and the total spending power amount (i.e. SP TCt ). The term TC
D
t is not observable in
reality. As a proxy we use the value of Accounts Payable plus any other debts towards
suppliers, no distinguishing on the basis of the repayment terms.
We compute W Fi;t, net nancial wealth of rm i at the beginning of period t, by using
the budget constraint (10) at time t  1 to substitute bi;t in (8), considering the amount of
trade credit obtained in the previous period as totally defaulted7:
W Ft = Yt 1  R(It 1 + !Lt 1 +Kt 1) +R(W Ft 1   t 1) (54)
6In the empirical framework, the ratio becomes as follows: TCratioi;t =
TCi;t
SPTCi;t
7I.e. the term TCt 1 in the budget constraint is zero.
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In the model, the term Yt 1   R(It 1 + !Lt 1 + Kt 1) represents the beginning-of-
period t prots generated from the investment in period t   1. We therefore estimate
Yt 1   R(It 1 + !Lt 1 + Kt 1) as the operating prots during period t   1 (value of
production minus the cost of production inputs). Moreover, we estimate (W Ft 1   t 1) as
the net short-term nancial assets at the beginning of period t 1. Moreover, we estimate
SP TCt as the operative prots during period t   1 (value of production minus the cost of
production inputs)8, plus net short-term nancial assets of period t  1 multiplied by one
plus the nominal interest rate, plus the amount of short-term debt obtained at time t from
the lending-market side (bank credit), plus the amount of Accounts Payable at time t.
On the basis of the model implications, our theoretical results suggest the following
hypotheses:
 1, 2 > 0
 3 < 0
 4, 5 > 0
 6 > 0 with 6 > 5 and 6 > 4
The regression framework is under implementation at the moment of the PhD thesis de-
fense day. After a set of preliminary regressions, the results seem to conrm the predictions
of the analytical model.
4.1 Estimation of the trade credit interest rate
The estimation of RTCt give rise to a brief analysis of the trade credit conditions and forms.
Generally, a trade transaction between rms can be settled in three ways:
1. Cash on delivery
2. Cash before delivery
3. Cash after delivery
8I.e. the beginning-of-period t prots generated from the investment in period
t  1.
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Only the third case is identied as trade credit.
Basicly trade credit transactions can be regulated in two ways:
1. Net Terms. This is the simplest form: the payment has to be made within certain
time. In other terms, no interest will be charged if payment is made within the
specied period, usually 30, 60, 90, or 120 days
2. Two-part Terms: This is the most complex form: it provides the possibility for the
buyer to receive a discount on the price agreed if he/she pays within a shorter period.
In other terms, a two-part o¤er of trade credit adds a discount period during which
the purchaser may take a discount if payment is made within an even shorter period.
For example, a "2=10 Net 30" o¤er means that the buyer has the option of taking a
2 percent discount if payment is made within ten days. Otherwise, full payment is
expected within 30 days.
In the last case, there are three elements dening the trade credit conditions: the
discount percentage o¤ered by the supplier, the time period within which the buyer must
repay the discounted price and the time period within which the buyer must repay the full
price. These three elements dene ex-ante what is the implicit cost of the trade credit for
the buyer9.
9In their paper Cannari, Chili, Omiccioli (2014) provide a formula to estimate the trade credit in-
teret rate as a measure of the ex-ante trade credit implicit cost on annual basis, adopting the following
specication:
RTCt = 1 +
264 100
100  s
 360
N + rit  n   1
375  100 (55)
where s is the discount (in percentage) o¤ered for an early repayment within contractual dened terms,
N is the number of days within which the rm must pay the full price, n is the number of days within
which the rm can pay the discounted price.
In another alternative specication, a repayment delay in payment, beyond the deadline agreed upon,
and the possible application of penalties are further elements that dene the ex-post implicit cost of trade
credit.
In this case:
RTCt = 1 +
264100 + pen
100  s
 360
N + rit  n   1
375  100,
where rit is the number of delay days and pen is the penalty apllied due to the delay.
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Two-part trade credit form has an implicit interest charge built in. That is, if the
purchaser chooses the "Net 30" option over the "2/10" option and fails to take the trade
discount o¤ered, then the purchaser is in e¤ect paying an interest charge on the 30 days
of credit that has been extended. When annualized, the interest rate on most trade credit
far exceeds that o¤ered by banks and other nancial institutions. Consequently, two-part
trade credit o¤ers provide suppliers/sellers with information about the creditworthiness of
their customers. Creditworthy customers would always take the trade discount, because
they could nd third-party nancing at better rates than are o¤ered by the two-part trade
credit o¤er. The actual credit terms of trade credit o¤ers appear to be standardized
within industries, although they may vary from industry to industry. They tend to remain
constant and not be a¤ected by supply and demand. The extending of trade credit can
serve a business rms informational and nancial needs. In addition to providing sellers
with information on the creditworthiness of their customers, trade credit o¤ers can serve
to bond relationships between buyers and sellers. Sellers who o¤er trade credit have a
nancial interest in maintaining a continuing relationship with their buyers. The extending
of trade credit also gives the purchaser time to verify the quality of the goods purchased
and evaluate the sellers performance.
According to the Mediocredito Centrale Survey (2001), the di¤usion in Italy of the
two-part term contract form is very limited. According to the Survey of Small Business
Finances, conducted by Federal Reserve in 1998, the percentage of suppliers that o¤er
a discount for a cash repayment is, on average, 22%; for the rst quartile of rms, this
percentage is zero, the median is 5%. Danielson, Scott (2000) found that, considering a
sample of small american rms, the percentage of trade debts with o¤ers of a discount for
an earlier repayment is, on average, 24%, with a median of 10%. Summers, Wilson (2003)
found that the most part of small-medium rms in UK generally o¤er net-terms contracts;
the percentage that o¤er two-part terms contracts is 17%., only the 2% of the rms requires
a cash payment. Therefore, the most part of trade credit is o¤ered in form of net-terms
contracts. Futhermore, the most part of supply rms declares that trade credit is granted
without an interest rate, i.e. without additional costs associated to a deferred payment.
On the basis of this empirical evidence, we consider two options in order to include the
trade credit interest rate among the determinants of the investment decisions in inventories.
The rst option is to include the term RTCt inside the intercept 0 of the Eqs. (52),
(53), considering it as a constant.
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The second option is to consider the interest rate for bank loans to non-nancial italian
rms as a proxy of the term RTCt : more precisely we estimate RTCt as the interest rate for
bank loans to non-nancial italian rms, provided by Bank of Italy, times two.
4.2 Alternative Testing Strategies
4.2.1 Considering changes (ows) in the variables
In this alternative specication, instead of looking at absolute values, we focus on the
changes in inventories, trade credit (accounts payable) and bank credit (short-term debt
towards nancial institutions) instead of stocks, and how they are related to the change in
inventory investment. We modify Eq.(53) as follows:
lnIi;t = 0 +1 lnKi;t 1 +2 lnLi;t +3 lnRTCt +
+4 lnW
F
i;t +5 lnbi;t +6 lnTC
ratio
i;t + "i;t (56)
where Ii;t = Ii;t Ii;t 1, bi;t = bi;t bi;t 1 and TCratioi;t =
TCi;t
SP TCi;t
(where, TCi;t =
TCi;t   TCi;t 1 and SP TCi;t = SP TCi;t   SP TCi;t 1).
The rationale under considering the ows is to analyse and to investigate the investment
decisions of the rm under a short-term perspective. The ows of I, b and TC represents
the investment decisions taken in the last period.
4.2.2 Considering absolute values (stocks) over two periods
In this specication, we consider the following modied empirical framework:
ln Ii;t = 0 +1 lnKi;t 1 +2 lnLi;t +3 lnRTCt
+4 lnW
F
i;t 1 +5 ln bi;t 1 +6 lnTCi;t 1
+7 lnW
F
i;t +8 ln bi;t +9 lnTCi;t + "i;t (57)
The regression framework specied in Eq. (57) is aimed to establish the functional re-
lationships between the inventory investment and the three sources of funding considered
in this paper: internal nancial wealth (after debts repayment), bank credit and trade
credit, which together constitutes the spending power available for the rm in order to
nance the investment decisions. The test is aimed to establish how the two-period dy-
namics of the three sources of funding are able to explain the inventory investment decision
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of the rm. To this end, we consider the absolute value of internal nancial wealth and
the stock of trade credit and bank credit over two periods (the current period t and the
previous period t  1) as explanatory variables of the stock of inventory investment in the
current period. This means that the amounts of the three sources of funding at time t
are related to the amount of inventories at time t but also at time t   1. In other terms,
internal nancial wealth, trade credit and bank credit (and their distribution in the in-
ventory nancing portfolio) are able to explain ex-post the rm investment behavior over
two periods. Futhermore, in this framework, we consider the stock of trade credit TC, in
substitution of the TCratio, i.e. the proportion of the total spending power of the rm in
form of trade debt.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have illustrated a structural model of a prot maximizing rm subject to
bank borrowing constraints and with three sources of funding: self-nancing, bank credit
and trade credit. The solution of the optimal investment problem shows that, under current
and future expected nancing constraints, the amount of current and future available trade
credit a¤ects investment decisions. The model shows that trade credit yields e¤ects on the
investment decisions of a nancially constrained rms in manufacturing supply chains, with
particular reference to a context of bank borrowing constraints. Trade Credit enhances the
resilience of rms to liquidity shocks and, due to the exibility of repayment terms, embeds
an insurance coverage against liquidity risk. The implicit cost of this insurance e¤ect is
incorporated in the trade credit interest rate. Due to this insurance e¤ect, trade credit
is an optimal source of funding for a nancially-constrained rm under future expected
liquidity shortage, because the rm can maintain a level of expected inventory investment
and, as a consequence, future expected levels of output and revenues, as close as possible
to the optimal desired level.
We also proposed an empirical framework in order to test conjectures and implications
of the analytical model. A set of econometric regressions over a sample of italian man-
ufacturing rms is under implementation. The sample is obtained by the dataset AIDA
(Italian Company Information and Business Intelligence), provided by Bureau Van Dijk:
it is consisting of 1 million small and medium companies in Italy over a period of ten years.
The results of the empirical analysis will be drawn in the next version of this article.
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Appendix 1: proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Let SP TCt be the level of spending power that allows the
nancing of all protable investment projects. If SP TCt  SP TCt , then It = It andKt = Kt .
It follows that SP TCt satises the condition:
It + !Lt +K

t = SP
TC
t + (1  k)Kt 1 (58)
where: SP TCt = W
F
t + vKt + TC. Suppose now that SP
TC
t decreases below SP
TC
t . Eq.()
cannot be satised with equality. If the irreversibility constraint is binding with equality,
then Kt = (1 k)Kt 1. In this case a reduction of SP TCt causes a reduction in It below It .
The proof of Proposition 2 follows by the fact that the Cobb-Douglas production function
implies that Et

@Yt
@It

is decreasing and convex in It conditional on Kt = (1  k)Kt 1. If
the irreversibility constraint is not binding, then both It and Kt must decrease as SP TCt
decreases below SP TCt because the two factors of production are complementary. This still
implies that Et

@Yt
@It

is decreasing and convex in SP TCt because the production function
is concave in all the factors. Since, according to Eq. (37),
@SP TCt
@W Ft
> 0 and
@SP TCt
@TCt
> 0,
it follows that Et

@Yt
@It

is decreasing and convex in W Ft and TCt.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of Proposition 2 is the same as the proof of
Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows from the fact that the Cobb-Douglas
production function is concave in all the factors and from the denition of spending power
at time t + 1, SP TCt+1. Eq. (38) shows that SP
TC
t+1 is positive function of W
F
t+1, which, by
denition, is negative function of D TCt. But, if D TCt increases, by denition, TCDt =
(1   D)TCt decreases. It follows that SP TCt+1 is positive function of TCDt . Analogously
to the proof of Proposition 2, Let SP TCt+1 the level of spending power at t + 1 that allows
the nancing of all protable investment projects at time t + 1. If SP TCt+1  SP TCt , then
It+1 = I

t+1 and Kt+1 = K

t+1. It follows that SP
TC
t+1 satises the condition:
It+1 + !Lt+1 +K

t+1 = SP
TC
t+1 + (1  k)Kt (59)
where: SP TCt+1 = W
F
t+1+bt+1+TCt+1 Liq:Shock andW Ft+1 = Yt btR DTCtR1. Suppose
now that SP TCt+1 decreases below SP
TC
t+1. It can happen through an increase in D  TCt (i.e.
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a decrease in TCDt ) which causes a decrease in W
F
t+1. Eq.(62) cannot be satised with
equality. If the irreversibility constraint is binding with equality, then Kt+1 = (1  k)Kt.
In this case a reduction of SP TCt+1 causes a reduction in It+1 below I

t+1. The proof of
Proposition 4 follows by the fact that the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that
Et

@Yt+1
@It+1

is decreasing and convex in It+1 conditional on Kt+1 = (1   k)Kt. If the
irreversibility constraint is not binding, then both It+1 and Kt+1 must decrease as SP TCt+1
decreases below SP TCt+1 because the two factors of production are complementary. This
still implies that Et

@Yt+1
@It+1

is decreasing and convex in SP TCt+1 because the production
function is concave in all the factors. But, the cash ow available for the rm at time t+1
in order to nance the investment It+1 is increasing in the amount of TCDt : in other terms,
deferring the repayment of the portion (1 D) of the trade debt TCt, the rm reacts to the
liquidity constraint by increasing the amount of the inventory investment It+1 to a level as
close as possible to the optimal level It+1. An additional unit of TC
D
t means an additional
unit of available cash ow at t+1, and this means an additional unit of It+1 if It+1 < It+1.
Since, according to Eq. (38),
@SP TCt+1
@W Ft+1
> 0 and
@SP TCt
@TCDt
> 0, it follows that Et

@Yt+1
@It+1

and
Et

@Yt+1
@TCDt

are both decreasing and convex in W Ft+1 and TC
D
t .
Appendix 2: denition of the variables used in the empirical framework
We describe here the variables we are using in the empirical analysis section of the
paper:
 Yi;t : total revenues realized during year t
 Ki;t 1: sum of the values of i) plants and equipment, and ii) intangible xed capital
(Software, Advertising, Research and Development). We include in Ki;t 1 all capital
purchased before the end of time t
 Ii;t : stock of intermediate goods that is used in the production process: rawmaterials,
work-in-process goods and completely nished goods that are considered to be the
portion of a businesss assets that are ready or will be ready for sale. It is computed
as follows: beginning-of-period t input inventories (materials and work in progress),
plus new purchases of materials in period t, minus end-of-period t input inventories.
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 Li;t : the total cost of the labor in year t
 TCi;t : Accounts payables (Total Invenories, Raw and Consumable Materials, Work
in Progress and Semi-Finished Goods)
 W Fi;t : operating prots during period t   1 (value of production minus the cost of
production inputs) plus net short-term nancial assets.
 SP TCt+1 : operating prots during period t (value of production minus the cost of
production inputs) plus net short-term nancial assets at the beginning of period t
multiplied by one plus the nominal interest rate (i.e. W Fi;t+1), plus short-term debts
towards nancial institutions, plus Accounts Payable.
 SPt+1 : SP TCt+1 minus Accounts Payable
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Chapter 4
The eects of connectivity and centralization
of nancial networks on their exposure to
systemic risk: a numerical investigation
Mario Eboli, Bulent R. Ozel, Andrea Teglio, Andrea Toto
february 2016
Abstract
This paper studies the eects that two characteristics of the topology of a nancial
network, namely its degrees of connectivity and of centralization, have on the response
of the network to external shocks that can generate phenomena of default contagion.
We put forward some conjectures about such eects, conjectures based on some
analytic results that shed some light on the exposure to systemic risk of three highly
stylised classes of networks: i) complete networks, which are the most connected
ones; ii) circular networks (also known as 'wheels'), which are the least connected
and least centralised networks; and iii) the star-shaped networks, which are the least
connected and most centralised networks. We conjecture that the more a network
is connected, the more it displays a robust-yet-fragile nature, in the sense that it
is completely resilient to relatively small shocks but it is exposed to the risk of
a total melt down (the default of all agents in the network) if it is hit by large
enough shocks. We also conjecture that the centralization of a nancial network
has the same eects: the more centralised a network is, the more it is robust-yet-
fragile. Conversely, we conjecture that a sparse and decentralised network, likewise
the circular networks, has the opposite feature: the more sparse and decentralised a
network is, the more it displays a vulnerable-yet-resilient nature, in the sense that
it is exposed to episodes of local contagion due top relatively small shocks, while it
faces a rather small risk of complete contagion. The numerical simulations that we
run conrm these conjectures.
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1 Introduction, motivation and related literature
The exposure of interbank and nancial networks to the risk of contagion has become a
major concern for authorities as well as for academic economists. A large and growing
stream of literature investigates the response of banking and nancial networks to shocks,
with the aim of understanding the structural features that determine the contagiousness
of a nancial networks, i.e. its exposure to systemic risk.
Eisenberg and Noe, as well as the present paper, do not investigate agents' behaviour
in a nancial network and focus on the mechanics of contagion as governed by the rules of
limited liability, debt priority and pro-rata reimbursements.
This marks a major dierence with respect to theoretical analyses of direct nancial
contagion that take explicitly into account the behaviour of banks and depositors. In Allen
and Gale (1998), the initial failure of one or more banks, capable of generating a widespread
nancial crises, can be due to exogenous causes. Financial crises arise as a consequence of
downturns in the economic cycle. Recessions can cause losses in the value of the assets held
by banks, these losses are capable of rendering them insolvent. If depositors foresee the
recession, they will protect themselves from possible bank defaults by withdrawing their
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) is the seminal contribution which has provided the analytical
basis and the computational tool to many authors (see the below cited papers) who perform
numerical simulations to study direct contagion. As well as their paper, the present one
studies the properties of the same object: a directed and weighted graph that represents
a nancial system. Dierently from the present one, their paper resorts to a dierent
analytical approach: Eisenberg and Noe resort to matrix algebra and lattice theory. These
authors investigate the domino eect generated by the default of agents that participate
in a single payment system. In so doing, they study the existence and the uniqueness of
a vector of payments that clears a network of interdependent nancial claims, where the
capability of an agent to repay in full his debts depends on the solvency of his own debtors
which, in turn, depends on the solvency of their debtors, and so forth. They express such
a vector as a function of the operating cash ows of the members of the nancial network.
This function is dened on a lattice, representing such a nancial system, and complies
with the requirements of limited liability, debt priority and pro-rata reimbursements.
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deposits and, in so doing, they create the conditions for the occurrence of a widespread
crisis. In Allen and Gale (2000) the failure of a bank is due to an idiosyncratic shortage of
liquidity that forces the bank to liquidate long-term assets, incurring the costs of such re
sales. They show that a complete network - a network where all banks are equal to one
another, all having mutual bilateral obligations and of the same amount - is more robust
than an incomplete network, i.e., a network with fewer links among the banks.
Concernings the literature related on simulation techniques to study nancial conta-
gion, Upper (2007, page 2 and 3) says: "Unfortunately, analytical results on the rela-
tionship between market structure and contagion have been obtained only for a limited
number of highly stylized structures of interbank markets, which are of limited use when
it comes to assessing the scope for contagion in real world banking systems.[...] Given the
scarcity of theoretical results, researchers have increasingly turned to computer simulations
to study contagion." Upper refers to several authors who, in order to assess the robust-
ness of dierent network structures, have studied the mechanics of default contagion using
numerical simulations, foregoing the microeconomic behaviour of banks and depositors.
Such papers - which includes the works by Sheldon and Maurer (1998), Furne (2003),
Wells (2002), Elsinger, Lehar and Summer (2006), Upper and Worms (2004), Degryse and
Nguyen (2004), Blavarg and Nimander (2002), Cifuentes (2003), Mistrulli (2005,2006),
Canedo and Martnez Jaramillo (2009) - have analyzed national banking systems, in most
cases estimating the structure of national interbank networks, using simulations to evaluate
their exposure to default contagion.
Numerical simulations are also used by Shin et al. (2005) and Nier et al. (2007), who
analyze generic network structures, rather than specic national ones. Shin et al. present a
model where default contagion is exacerbated by the eects of re sales. Nier et al., using
a computing device, generate random banking networks, in the fashion of the random
graphs a la Erdos-Renyi, and use them to run numerical simulations aiming at evaluating
the exposure to systemic risk of dierent network structures.
Recent analytic results (Acemoglu et al. 2013, 2015; Eboli 2013, 2016) have shown
that complete networks, i.e. networks where everybody is connected to everybody else,
conrm the conjecture by Haldane (2009) that highly dense interbank networks have a
`robust-yet-fragile' nature:
\In a nutshell, interconnected networks exhibit a knife-edge, or tipping point, property.
Within a certain range, connections serve as a shock-absorber. The system acts as a mu-
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tual insurance device with disturbances dispersed and dissipated. Connectivity engenders
robustness. Risk-sharing { diversication { prevails. But beyond a certain range, the sys-
tem can ip the wrong side of the knife-edge. Interconnections serve as shock-ampliers,
not dampeners, as losses cascade. The system acts not as a mutual insurance device but
as a mutual incendiary device. Risk-spreading { fragility - prevails." Eboli (2013) shows
that star-shaped networks display the same feature: the bank at the center of such a kind
of network acts as a hub, distributing losses evenly among the other members of the net-
work, in case of a crisis. Acemoglu et al. (2013) challenge the conclusion of Allen and
Gale (2000), that the complete network structure is the most robust. As the authors put
it: "One of our main results is that as the magnitude or the number of negative shocks
cross certain thresholds, the types of nancial networks that are most prone to contagious
failures change dramatically. In particular, more nancial interconnections are no longer
a guarantee for stability. Rather, in the presence of large shocks, interbank liabilities fa-
cilitate nancial contagion and create a more fragile system. Our results show that, in the
presence of large shocks, weakly connected nancial networks - for example, one consisting
of a collection of pairwise connected banks with only a minimal amount of shared assets
and liabilities with the rest of the system - are signicantly less fragile than the more
complete networks. [Acemoglu et al. (2013), pages 2 and 3].
Conversely, Acemoglu et al.(2013) and Eboli (2016) prove that circular networks, where
each agent is connected to just one or two neighbours, forming a cycle, behave in the
opposite way: they are vulnerable with respect to episodes of local contagion, caused by
relatively small shocks, while they are less exposed than complete and star networks to
the risk of a complete system melt down. These analytic results describe the behaviour of
highly stylized examples of nancial networks:1 the complete network is the most densely
connected network, the star is the most centralised and sparse network while the circle is the
most sparse and decentralised network. We believe that the eects that connectivity and
centralization have on such stylized nancial networks are also present in generic networks,
according to their degrees of connectivity and centralization. We conjecture that the more
a nancial network is a) densely connected or b) sparse and highly centralised, the more
the network has a robust-yet-fragile nature, likewise the complete and the star-shaped
networks; while the more a network is sparse and decentralised { likewise the circular
1Eboli (2013, 2015) analyse the behaviour of complete, star-shaped and unilateral circular networks,
while Acemoglu et al.(2013, 2015) focus on complete and bilateral circular networks.
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networks { the more it displays a vulnerable-yet-resilient behaviour. The purpose of the
present work is to test such conjectures by means of numerical simulations. To this end,
we look at the response of nancial networks to external shocks in terms of rst and last
thresholds of default contagion. The rst threshold of contagion is the value of the smallest
external shock capable of causing a secondary default. i.e. the default of an agent due
to the losses received by its neighbours. The last contagion threshold is the value of the
smallest shock capable of causing the default of all agents in the network. The more the
rst and the nal thresholds of contagion in a network are close to one another, the more
the network is 'robust-yet-fragile'. Conversely, the more apart are these thresholds in a
network, the more the network displays a 'fragile-yet-resilient' nature. More specically,
we conjecture that, ceteris paribus: i) the more dense a nancial network, the closer its
rst and its nal contagion threshold; ii) the more centralised a nancial network, the
closer its rst and its nal contagion thresholds; and iii) the more sparse and decentralised
a nancial network, the larger the gap between its rst and its nal contagion thresholds.
We test these conjectures generating random networks with various degrees of density
and centralization and perturbating them with the shocks of increasing value, shocks that
diminish the value of the external assets of the banks in the networks in a random fashion.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we introduce the network model
used in this paper and describe the above mentioned analytic results by Eboli (2013,
2016), results concerning the response to shocks of complete, star-shaped and circular
nancial networks. On the basis of these analytic results, in section three we put forward
some conjectures about the relation between the degree of connectivity and the degree of
centralization of nancial networks, on one hand, and their exposure to episodes of default
contagion, on the other hand. In the same section we present the results of the numerical
simulations that we run to test such conjectures. Conclusions are drawn in section four.
2 Complete, star and circular networks
In this section, as well as in the numerical simulations that we run, we model an interbank
network as a connected, directed and weighted graph N := (
;); where the node !i(i =
1; 2; :::; n) in 
 represents a bank and the links in   
2 represent the interbank deposits
that connect the members of 
 among themselves. The liabilities of a bank !i in 
 comprise
customers (households) deposits, hi; and interbank deposits, di; and its own equity ei. On
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the asset side, a bank !i holds long-term assets, ai, which are liabilities of agents that do
not belong to 
, and short-term assets ci, which are deposits made by bank !i in other
banks of the network. The budget identity of a bank is: ai + ci = hi + di + ei. A link
lij 2  represents the interbank obligations, and its direction goes from the debtor node !i
to the creditor node !j. The weight of the link lij is equal to the amount of money cji that
bank !j has deposited in bank !i: For simplicity, we assume that all interbank deposits
are reciprocal, i.e. lij = lji for all lij 2 :
In a complete interbank network, each bank places a deposit in every other bank:
c = flijji 6= j; i; j = 1; :::; ng : Let N c = f
;cg be a complete interbank network where
all the links in s have the same capacity cij, and
P
j cij = (n  1)cij = ci. In other words,
each bank in N c evenly allocates its own interbank deposits ci among all other banks in
the network. Eboli (2013) shows that in a complete network N c the rst threshold and the
nal threshold of contagion coincide and are equal to
 c = nei + (n  1)eihi
di
= E

1 +
1


  E
n
1

(1)
where E =
Pn
i=1 ei is the total equity of the banks in 
; and  = di=hi is the ratio between
the interbank debt and the external debt of a bank.
This result shows that the complete network, on one hand, is entirely resilient to rela-
tively small shocks, i.e. faces no defaults for shocks smaller than  c. On the other hand,
for large enough shocks { larger than or equal to  c { this network induces a complete
system melt down. The same applies to the star-shaped network, as shown below.
A star-shaped interbank network consists of a central node, !c; that places a deposit in
each of the remaining n  1 peripheral banks which, in turn, place their deposits in !c and
exchange no deposits among themselves. Let N s = f
;sg be a star-shaped interbank
network that complies with the above assumptions, i.e. s = flic; lciji 2 
n!cg, and where
each link in s has a capacity equal to cs. That is, cs is the amount deposited by each
peripheral bank in !c and is the amount that the central node deposits in each of the
peripheral ones. In the star-shaped network the two thresholds of contagion may coincide
or not, depending on whether the central node is in the set of primary defaults or not. If
the central node !c is in the set of primary defaults, i.e. if  = f!c; !pjfor some p 2 
g,
then in a star-shaped network N s the rst threshold of contagion  s1 and the nal threshold
of contagion  sf coincide, 
s
1 = 
s
f = 
s, and we have
 s = E + nep
1

  ep = E

1 +
1


  E
n
 (2)
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where  =  "(1+2)
2"(1+)
:
If the central node !c is not in the set of primary defaults, the rst and the nal
thresholds of contagion of the star-shaped network do not coincide. In this case they are,
respectively, equal to
 s1 = mep + ec

1 +
1


(3)
and
 s2 = E

1 +
1


+
E
n
+ 1
2
, (4)
wherem is the minimum number of peripheral primary defaults which is sucient to induce
the default of the central node.2
Note that, for arbitrarily large values of n; which is the cardinality of the set of nodes

 in the network, the above contagion thresholds  c;  s and  s2 become arbitrarily close to
 = E

1 +
1


: (5)
The response to external shocks of a circular network is rather dierent from the one de-
scribed above. Formally, a cycle-shaped nancial networkN o =


; A; T;H; L
; LA; LT ; LH ; 
	
is such that L
 = flijji = 1; 2; :::; n; j = i+ 1 for i = 1; :::; n  1, and j = 1 for i = ng :
Acemoglu et al.(2015) and Eboli (2016) nd that a circular network is `vulnerable yet
resilient' in as much as it is exposed to episodes of local contagion when hit by relatively
small shocks (while the star and the complete are not), and is less exposed to the risk of a
complete melt down because, for suciently large number n of banks in the network, there
is always a positive probability that at a least a bank survives even in case of large shocks.
Eboli (2016) shows that in the unilateral circular network, also known as the wheel, the
bankruptcy of a bank {in the worse possible scenario, where the bank looses all of its assets
{ induces the defaults of at the most k successive banks along the wheel, where k is the
smallest integer such that 

1+
k
(1 + )

1 


1+
k > "1  "
It follows that the nal threshold of contagion in the wheel, i.e. the default of all banks,
can be achieved by relatively small external shocks (smaller than ), as long as these
2Eboli (2013) shows that m  "+"(n 1))1 " 1+ = n
h
"(1+)
1 "
i
+ "(1 
2)
(1 ") :
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shocks are evenly distributed among k=n banks that are located at a regular distance k
from one another. However, the probability that such a specic allocation of an external
shock occurs is sharply decreasing in the number of banks in the wheel. For example, for
the ranges of parameters " 2 (0:06; 0:12) and  2 (0:1; 0:6); k is at the most equal to 2.
Within this plausible range of values of " and , for n > 4; and for a number of primary
defaults m < n  2 (that is, for external shocks that spare just two banks out of n) there
is always a positive probability that at least one bank survives (while for large enough m;
i.e. for shocks larger than  ; there are no survivors at all in the star and in the complete
networks).
As mentioned above, on the basis of these analytic results we make the following con-
jectures:
1. in the class on networks with the same degree of connectivity, the more a network
is centralised, the closer its rst and nal thresholds of contagion. In our numerical
simulations, we expect that moving from high centralised networks to progressively
less centralised networks, keeping connectivity constant, the gap between the rst
and the nal thresholds increases.
2. in the class on networks with the same degree of centralization, the more dense is a
network, the closer are its rst and nal thresholds of contagion. In our numerical
simulations, we expect that the gap between the rst and the nal thresholds increases
as we move from the highly dense networks to progressively more sparse networks,
keeping centralization constant.
In order to bring these properties in the foreground in a neat fashion, we rst present
simulations on the eects of centralization keeping connectivity at its minimum. That is, we
track the behaviour of the rst and nal contagion thresholds as we progressively transform
circular interbank networks into star-shaped networks. We then present simulations on
the eects of connectivity keeping centralization at its minimum. That is, we explore the
response to shocks of the class of regular networks, starting from the least dense one, the
circle, and progressively moving towards the most dense one, the complete network. Finally,
we investigate numerically the behaviour of networks with varying degrees of centralization
and connectivity.
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3 The simulations
In this section we present the results of several numerical simulations that describe the
behavior of dierent network congurations when subjected to exogenous shocks, i.e. the
resilience of dierent types of nancial networks in a stress scenario. We devise a simulation
engine that (a) is able to generate interbank networks according to the network shapes
that are under investigation in this paper and that (b) allows us to study the resilience
of the realised banking system to shocks and how resilience to shocks depends on the
key parameters of the system. The aim is to investigate the eects of connectivity and
centralization on the resilience of the network in term of their exposure to systemic risk.
In doing this, we simulate a contagion process triggered by exogenous shocks over dierent
types of network and analyze the behavior of the dierent networks in terms of local and
global resilience, robustness and fragility. The starting point conguration is a circular
graph, unilateral or bilateral, with zero centralization and minimum level of connectivity;
the nal congurations are the complete network and the star shaped network.
We think of a banking system as a network of nodes, where each node represents a bank
and each link represents a directional lending relationship between two nodes. Importantly,
the banking system needs to obey bank-level as well as aggregate balance sheet restrictions.
For every simulation framework, the network is composed of 64 banks (nodes); each
bank is characterized by its own balance sheet. On the asset side, let ai be the value of the
sum of external assets owned by the bank i. Besides the external assets, the bank i can
hold internal assets which are liabilities of other banks in 
; and let ci be the sum of the
such assets held by agent i: On the liability side of the balance sheet, let di be the sum of
the debts that the bank i owes to other agents in 
, while hi is the external debt of i, i.e.,
the amount of debt claims against i held by households, and
P
j dij is the internal debt of
agent i; i.e., the claims against i held by other banks of 
. For simplicity, we assume that
all debts have the same seniority. Finally, the value of the equity of the i-th agent, ei, is
set by the budget identity ei  ai+ ci  di  hi. We assume that the value of the external
assets is set by the market and take the other balance sheet headings ci; di; hi, as well as
the debts dij; at their book values. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that all the
shares issued by the members of 
 are held by households, i.e., there is no cross-holding of
shares among the nancial intermediaries.
The key parameters to set the initial balance sheet entries are: i) the ratio between
144
intra-network debt and external debt,  = d
h
, and the capitalization ratio, " = e
(a+c)
. For all
the experiments, the capitalization ratio, ", is invariant and xed equal to 0:1. Dierently,
we consider three dierent values for the parameter : 0:3, 0:4, 0:5.
In the connectivity experiment, the simulation engine generates the initial network
conguration, the unilateral circle (also know as the wheel) with connectivity equal to one
and zero centralization, where all the banks have the same balance sheet conguration.
Then, in 63 steps, the engine increases the connectivity of the initial network, creating 63
dierent network congurations, each one with a dierent higher degree of connectivity.
The nal network conguration is a complete network where the bank i is connected with
all the other n   1 banks. In other terms, the engine starts from a sparse decentralized
network and move through more dense network congurations, keeping invariant the zero-
centralization level, until reaching the complete network.
In the centralization experiment, the starting point conguration is the bilateral circle,
where each node is connected with two neighbours and the centralization level is zero. In
order to move towards more centralized congurations, the engine randomly designates a
candidate center node and, step by step, rewires each of the other nodes to the designated
center. During the entire experiment, the simulation engine creates 64 dierent more
centralized network shapes; the nal conguration is a perfect star with a single node in
the center and 63 pendant nodes.
In both the simulation frameworks, for each network conguration, the simulation en-
gine perturbs the system with sequential idiosyncratic shocks that hit each of nodes in a
random fashion. In order to obtain a suciently large sample of dierent shock scenarios,
the engine produces, for each network conguration, 100 dierent round of idiosyncratic
shocks. The target of the exogenous shock is the external asset a: the amount of the loss
is the total share of a and it is partially or totally absorbed by the amount of the equity
e. If the total loss is smaller than e, the shock is totally absorbed and the node is solvent;
conversely, we are in presence of a primary default. The defaulted bank transmits losses to
its creditors and customers: upon the occurrence of a shock, the propagation of the losses
across the system is governed by the rules of limited liability, debt priority and pro-rata
reimbursement of creditors.
The graphic representations of the dierent experiments show, for each network cong-
uration, two boxplots that depict graphically the distribution of two contagion thresholds
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over 100 shock simulations, by displaying the median value and their quartiles3.
In Figure 1 and Figure 2 we analyze the eects of an increase in connectivity on the
exposure of the network to systemic risk. The starting point is a wheel network, i.e.
the unilateral circle network, where every node is connected with only one neighbour,
the connectivity is 1 and the centralization is zero and constant for all the subsequent
congurations. The nal conguration, i.e. where the connectivity is maximum, is a
complete network. The dierence between the two gures lies purely in the graphic style.
On the horizontal axis we have the dierent degrees of connectivity, from 1 to n   1; on
the vertical axis we have the amount of exogenous shocks that hit the network. T1 is the
rst threshold, i.e. the minimum amount of the exogenous shock that is sucient to yield
one secondary default4. Tn is the nal threshold, i.e. the minimum amount of exogenous
shock that is sucient to yield the complete meltdown of the system.
The path of the two thresholds show the eects of connectivity of the interbank network
on its exposure to systemic risk. The two paths are clearly convergent in a quasi-monotonic
fashion. For low levels of connectivity, there is a distance between the two thresholds. The
small values of T1 show that a relatively small exogenous shock is sucient to trigger a
secondary default: this means that sparse networks are vulnerable with respect to episodes
of local contagion when hit by relatively small shocks. Conversely, the high values of
Tn demonstrate that sparse networks are resilient with respect to the risk of a complete
meltdown of the system because, for a suciently large number of agents, there is always a
positive probability that at least a bank survives even in case of large shocks. For high level
of connectivity, the two thresholds converge towards the same values and, in the case of a
the complete network, they are coincident. This shows that dense networks behave in the
opposite way: they are resilient to relatively small shocks, i.e. they exhibit no secondary
defaults for shocks smaller than a quite large threshold, but they are vulnerable for large
enough exogenous shock, i.e. they are exposed to the complete failure of the system when
hit by shocks larger than a quite small threshold. Furthermore, the complete network
exhibits a perfect coincidence of the rst and the nal thresholds, and this constitutes a
conrmation of one of the analytical results of the model. The convergence value of the
two thresholds in the nal conguration network (the complete network) conrms perfectly
the analytical result in Eq.(5): substituting the total equity present in the network and
3The bottom and top of the box are always the rst and third quartiles
4A secondary default is a default due to losses transmitted from other defaulted nodes, i.e. not directly
caused by an exogenous idiosyncratic shock.
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the initial set value of , the nal threshold is exactly calculated by the analytical formula.
In summary, as conjectured in the previous section, in the class of networks with the
same degree of centralization, the more dense is a network, the closer are its rst and
nal thresholds of contagion. The numerical simulations conrm this conjecture: the
rst threshold decreases and the nal threshold increases as we move from the highly
dense networks to progressively more sparse networks, keeping the degree of centralization
constant and xed at the minimum value.
Figures 3, 4, 5 are related to simulations on the eects of centralization keeping con-
stant connectivity at its minimum. The simulation framework is the same for the three
experiments. The initial conguration is a circular network with bilateral links, i.e. a
decentralised network. Then, step by step, the engine creates 64 more centralized con-
gurations, until reaching a star-shaped network, with one center node, i.e. the most
centralized network conguration. In this framework, the higher the grade of centraliza-
tion, the higher the aggregate amount of the interbank lending, while the balance sheet
entries of the sole peripheral (pendant) nodes are kept constant during the entire experi-
ment. Conversely, the center node increases the amount of its intra-network debt, keeping
constant the other balance sheet entries, so becoming progressively more exposed to pe-
ripheral shocks. In other terms, while the d=h ratio of the peripheral nodes is constant,
the d=h ratio of the central node increases until reaching its maximum value in the nal
conguration. Toghether with the the stock of equity e, the d=h ratio between internal and
external debt is the only heading of the balance sheets of the agents that determines the
contagion thresholds of the above analysed networks. Moreover, all the above character-
ized thresholds are increasing in the equity endowments, e, and decreasing in the d=h ratio.
The protective role played by the equity stock is not surprising: the larger the equity of
the members of a network, the larger the amount of losses that can be absorbed by those
agents, the higher the contagion thresholds of the network (and, of course, the smaller the
set of defaults induced by any given shock). The relevance of the d=h ratio lies in the fact
that this ratio governs the allocation of the ow of losses, released by defaulting nodes,
between external creditors (households) and internal ones (other nodes in 
). The larger
this ratio between internal and external debt, the smaller the portion of losses that, at
each default, is sent into the sink H; and the larger the ow of losses that continues to
circulate among the nodes in 
, and vice versa. Therefore, the larger the d=h ratio: i) the
larger the portion of an external shock that overows from the primary defaults towards
147
the rest of the network; ii) the smaller the smallest shocks capable of causing secondary
defaults (the contagion thresholds), and iii) the larger the number of defaults induced by
a shock. This is evident examining the Figures 3, 4, 5. The variant parameter of the
three experiments is the d=h ratio between internal and external debt, relatively to all the
peripheral nodes, that varies from 0:3 to 0:5. For higher values of the ratio d=h, ceteris
paribus, the paths of both the thresholds are characterized by lower values. It's important
to note that, together with the nal threshold, the other threshold under examination here
is not T1, but T2, i.e. the minimum amount of the exogenous shock that is sucient to
yield two secondary defaults. This is due to the fact that here the initial network con-
guration is a circular one with bilateral links: under this condition, for  2 [0:3; 0:5],
a primary default on a peripheral node yields at least two secondary defaults. This rst
experiment on the eect of centralization demonstrate that, basically, an increase in the
degree of centralization, keeping constant the degree of connectivity, has the same eect
of an increase in connectivity, keeping constant the degree of centralization, i.e. the con-
vergence of the two fundamental thresholds (the second and the nal threshold, in this
case). For low levels of centralization, there is a big distance between the two thresholds.
The small values of T2 show that a relatively small exogenous shock is sucient to trig-
ger two secondary defaults: this means that decentralised networks are vulnerable with
respect to episodes of local contagion when hit by relatively small shocks. Conversely, the
high values of Tn demonstrate that decentralised networks are resilient with respect to
the risk of a complete meltdown of the system. For high level of centralization, the two
thresholds converge towards the same values and, in the case of a the star-shaped network,
they are coincident. This shows that highly centralised networks behave as well as highly
dense networks: they are entirely resilient to relatively small shocks, i.e. they exhibit no
secondary defaults for shocks smaller than a quite large threshold, but they are vulnerable
for large enough exogenous shock, i.e. they are exposed to the complete failure of the
system when hit by shocks larger than a quite small threshold. In other terms, they have a
have a robust-yet-fragile nature. Furthermore, the star-shaped network exhibits a perfect
coincidence of the rst and the nal thresholds, and this, as well as in the case of the
complete network, constitutes a conrmation of one of the analytical results of the model.
As conjectured in the previous section, in the class of networks with the same degree of
connectivity, the more a network is centralised, the closer its second and nal thresholds
of contagion. The numerical simulations conrm this conjecture: the second threshold
148
decreases and the nal thresholds increases as we move from high centralised networks to
progressively less centralised networks, keeping connectivity constant.
Figures 6, 7, 8 show the result of the second simulation framework on the eect of
centralization. Dierently from the previous experiment on centralization, here the balance
sheet entries of both the pendant nodes and the designated central node are not constant
during the entire centralization process. The invariant parameters in this framework are
the total interbank lending and the initial set value of , which is constant and xed to,
respectively, 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 for every single node. This means that the central node,
keeping constant the value of , as well as the other peripheral nodes, preserves the same
robustness and the same exposure to external shocks of the peripheral nodes. As well
as in the rst experiment on the eects of centralization, the second experiment conrm
that, keeping constant the connectivity, the more a network is centralised, the closer its
second and nal thresholds of contagion. Furthermore, decentralised networks exhibit
a vulnerable-yet-resilient behavior, while highly centralised networks show a robust-yet-
fragile nature.
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Figure 1: Threshold T1 and Final Threshold as function of connectivity;  = 0:4, " = 0:1
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Figure 2: Threshold T1 and Final Threshold as function of connectivity;  = 0:4, " = 0:1
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Figure 3: Threshold T2 and Final Threshold as function of centralization;  = 0:3, " = 0:1,
constant for all nodes but the center
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Figure 4: Threshold T2 and Final Threshold as function of centralization;  = 0:4, " = 0:1,
constant for all nodes but the center
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Figure 5: Threshold T2 and Final Threshold as function of centralization;  = 0:5, " = 0:1,
constant for all nodes but the center
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Figure 6: Threshold T2 and Final Threshold as function of centralization;  = 0:3, " = 0:1,
constant for all nodes
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Figure 7: Threshold T2 and Final Threshold as function of centralization;  = 0:4, " = 0:1,
constant for all nodes
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Figure 8: Threshold T2 and Final Threshold as function of centralization;  = 0:4, " = 0:1,
constant for all nodes
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4 Conclusions
In this paper we make some conjectures about the impact of centralization and connectivity
on the response of nancial network to exogenous shocks to the assets held by the members
of the networks. These conjectures are based on analytic results that pointed out that, in
stylized examples of networks, i) complete connectivity as well as maximum centralization
render a network robust-yet-fragile, in the sense that these types of networks have a sin-
gle contagion threshold: for shocks smaller than such a threshold, no secondary defaults
occur, while for shocks larger than such a threshold all members of the network default;
and, conversely, ii) the network with minimum connectivity and minimum centralization
is characterised by a large gap between the rst and the nal thresholds of contagion, thus
it displays a vulnerable-yet-resilient behaviour: it is exposed to episodes of local contagion
due to relatively small shocks while it is resilient with respect to large shocks.
We conjecture that these eects of centralization and connectivity apply to generic net-
work in a fashion that is proportional to their degrees of density and centralization. To
test these conjectures, we run numerical simulations on randomly generated networks with
varying degrees of connectivity and centralization. The results we obtained conrm our
conjectures. We tested the conjectures of the eects of connectivity by running simulations
on the class of regular networks, where all node have the same degree of centrality, hence
centralization is kept at zero. We obtain that, as density increases, the networks become
progressively more robust-yet-fragile: the rst and the nal contagion thresholds converge
to the unique threshold of the pure star-shaped conguration in a quasi-monotonic fashion.
Similarly, we tested the eects of centralization on a class of networks with constant and al-
most minimum connectivity, moving from circular networks towards star-shaped networks.
We nd that the gap between the rst and the nal thresholds of contagion decreases as
we move from sparse and decentralised networks towards sparse and highly centralised
networks, showing that the vulnerable-yet-resilient features of the circular networks is pro-
gressively replaced by the robust-yet-fragile nature of the highly centralised star-shaped
network. Also in these test, the convergence of the rst and the nal thresholds towards
the unique threshold of the star network in quasi-monotonic.
Interestingly, our results show that the pattern of the rst threshold in the rst set
of experiments is clearly convex, while the pattern of the same threshold in the second
set of experiments is clearly concave. The exact opposite applies to the pattern of the
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nal threshold of contagion: in the simulations aimed to test the eects of connectivity,
the nal threshold shows a concave pattern while, in the simulations that test the eects
of centralization, the nal threshold has a neatly convex pattern. This result indicates
that the eects of increasing connectivity, in rendering a network robust-yet-fragile, be-
came noticeable starting from relatively low levels of connectivity. Conversely, increasing
centralization, that also makes a network increasingly robust-yet-fragile, yields evident ef-
fects only for high values of centralization. In other words, the losses due to exogenous
shocks are distributed among the members of a network in an even fashion - generating the
robust-yet-fragile phenomenon - starting from relatively low levels of density. Conversely,
increasing centralization delivers the same eect but only for high levels of centralization.
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